scholarly journals Judging The Judges: “May They Boldly Go Where Ivan Rand Went Before”

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-21
Author(s):  
Ian Binnie

Justice Ivan Rand was perhaps the greatest exponent of the rule of law in the history of the Supreme Court of Canada. He was a great judge. He scorned as impractical the admonition that judges should “apply the law, not make it”. His judgements frequently broke new ground, but it should be understood that in “making the law” great judges like Ivan Rand respond to fundamental considerations of order and fairness and not to personal whim. It is sometimes necessary for judges to return to first principles to provide legislators with a framework within which to operate in unforeseen situations. The word “activism” is usually used by critics to imply that a judge is pushing the envelope beyond the proper boundaries of the law, but properly understood the term may equally indicate a judicial tightening of the boundaries to deny the bench a power seemingly conferred by the Constitution or legislation. Restraint, as much as expansion, is governed by the judges’ recognition of the limits of their institutional competence and their appreciation of their role in the constitutional scheme.In the absence of statutory authority the courts have not yet addressed issues related to globalization and human rights with the sort of boldness and creativity we associate with great judges like Ivan Rand. Order and fairness have acquired a global dimension. Globalization offers a different kind of challenge, but is no less demanding of the rule of law. In the case of creating some form or forum of relief for Third World victims of globalization, we seem to have used restraint as an excuse for inertia. Judges need to be practical, but their greatness will rest on their capacity to see not only what the law is but what it should become. There is a time for boldness and a time for restraint and judges should be judged on their ability to tell the difference.

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.21) ◽  
pp. 317
Author(s):  
M Zamroni ◽  
. .

Hope to have legislation that specifically set while an umbrella in running materialize advocate profession, lawyers are more confident in addition to other law enforcement officials, such as judges, prosecutors and police, as well as respected as an equal partner in the law enforcement process. But the big question is how the existence of the profession of advocate Indonesia before and after the enlawment of Act Number 18 of 2003 concerning the Advocate, as well as any constraints that occur in their implementation. The rule of law relating to the profession of advocate before the enLawment of Act Number 18 of 2003 concerning The Advocate, scattered in various laws, such as Act Number 1 of 1946 on the Law of Criminal Code, Act Number 1 of 1950 on the Supreme Court, Emergency Act Number 1 of 1951 governing temporary measures to organize the unity of the pecking order and civil court events, and Herziene Indlandsch Regalement (HIR). Before the release of Act Number 18 of 2003 concerning Advocates, advocate the use of the term in prLawice there has been no standard for the profession. In various provisions of the legislation of any inconsistency pr. For example Act Number 14 of 1970, as has been replaced by Act Number 35 of 1999, and was replaced again by Act Number 4 of 2004 as well as the latter is replaced by Act Number 48 of 2009, regarding the power of Justice, to use the term legal aid and lawyers. Birth of the Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 18 of 2003 concerning The Advocate is the expectation of a long delayed during the 58 years since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, the laws governing the profession of advocate a free, independent and responsible for the implementation of a judicial honest, fair, and legal certainty for all seekers of justice in upholding the law, truth, justice, and human rights.  


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-217
Author(s):  
Dewi Ratnasari Rustam

Dissenting opinion is the difference of opinion between the Tribunal judges who handle certain a matter with other judges of the Tribunal dealing with certain cases. Dissenting opinion does not have the force of law because it cannot be the Foundation for the inception of the award. Dissenting opinion itself is an aspect of the law that need to be examined in order to prevent the formation of false opinion among the public. So, nowadays have started to formed the perception that dissenting opinion was an engineering law, instead of enforcing the rule of law but rather media that gave the opportunity for the defendant in corruption regardless of criminal trapping; but on the other hand is a form of difference of opinion and the independence of the judges as the metre is guaranteed by the provisions of the law; that the importance of dissenting opinion in the Court ruling was the judge's opinion be weighted, in an attempt of law appeal or cassation; as an indicator to determine the career judge, as an attempt to avoid the practice of corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN) and the judicial mafia; as a real step towards the transparency of judicial democratization; the judiciary; and kemandiarian the judge require the freedom of speech.


2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Wexler ◽  
Andrew Irvine

In Politics III.10 and IV.4, Aristotle discusses the difference between governments that are regulated by the rule of law and those that are not. Although he concludes that the rule of law helps guard against arbitrary and injudicious government action, Aristotle is also sensitive to the fact that in a democracy it is essential for the people to remain sovereign over the law. His discussion is helpful for understanding, not only the tension between the ‘rule of law’ and the ‘rule of men’, but also the complex role the rule of law plays in any modern democracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 169-216
Author(s):  
Brian A. Langille

Judicial review of the decisions of labour relations boards has been a nagging problem for the Supreme Court of Canada for decades. The decision of the Court in Le Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec et de L’Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board et al. provides an opportunity for and indeed provokes review of the work of the Court in dealing with this recurring problem. This essay begins by placing in perspective the concrete issue posed in the L’Acadie decision. But the particular facts of that case are used only as a vehicle to explore the nature of the problem of judicial review of labour decisionmakers and the history of the Court's handling of it. A fundamental thesis of this essay is that the Court's work can be best understood as comprising two distinct periods, the early years (pre-1979) and the new era (1979-1984?). This essay articulates the view that during the early years the Court developed a law of judicial review which was wholly inadequate both in functional and doctrinal terms. In the new era the Court simplified and reformed the law of judicial review of labour boards and labour arbitrators. It is only from the perspective of the Court's previous handling of the issue that the decision in L’Acadie can be truly understood. When so viewed the decision is perfectly inadequate. The case creates a new distinction based upon the old confusion of “jurisdiction”. This essay then develops the view that no theory of judicial review which revolves around the notion of “jurisdiction” can ever satisfactorily deal with the issues presented. In this respect the Court's own cases from the “new era” represent a much more sensible, if still a second best approach. Finally, suggestions for a legislative solution to the problem posed by L’Acadie are briefly explored.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-175
Author(s):  
Devrin Froese

In 2000, the BC government sued 14 "tobacco manufacturers" pursuant to the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. The Tobacco Companies challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, alleging amongst other things that the Tobacco Act violated the rule of law. In this paper, I begin by showing that the Supreme Court of Canada adopts a formal approach to the rule of law devoid of much substantive content. This, I argue, is in line with the views of Joseph Raz. I then argue that the Tobacco Companies' reliance on Raz's views for support in its claim that the Tobacco Act violates the rule of law is misguided. Far from invalidating the Tobacco Act, Raz's view can be understood to license it. In the last section of the paper, I show that a formal approach to the rule of law such as Raz's does not confine Charter interpretation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Thomas Halper

Abstract Felix Frankfurter, renowned as a public intellectual fighting for justice, became as a member of the Supreme Court a figure proclaiming his devotion to the rule of law and its corollary, judicial self restraint, even when its results conflicted with his deepest beliefs. Yet an analysis of several of his leading opinions suggests that his famous balancing tests had little to do with law. In sacrificing his policy and ethical goals in the service of law, he often failed to serve the law, and in that sense, his well publicized sacrifices were for nothing.


1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell McInnes ◽  
Janet Bolton ◽  
Natalie Derzko

This article takes an in-depth look at the law clerks and the role they play at the Supreme Court of Canada. Such an examination both informs prospective clerks on the nature of the position and promotes a better general understanding of how the judicial process operates at this level. The authors begin their analysis by looking at the history of the law clerks at the Supreme Court. Although the functions of the clerks have changed little since their introduction in 1968, the clerkship program has evolved with a changing Supreme Court, contributing to the institutions "coming of age." The authors then shift their attention to examining the present clerkship program. The article first reveals the manner in which the clerks are selected by the Court. Using data collected by a questionnaire sent to clerks of the 1991-93 terms, the authors also attempt to convey, in a general way, some sense of the people who have served at the Court in recent years. Next, the major functions performed by the clerks are described. While the clerks do have a great deal of responsibility, the authors dispel much of the criticism directed at United States Supreme Court clerks by stating that the law clerks at the Supreme Court of Canada do not have an improper degree of authority. The authors conclude that the clerking experience benefits both the clerks themselves and the procedures of the Court. As such, the law clerks are an entrenched and indispensable part of the judicial process at the Supreme Court of Canada.


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