Restitution and Democracy in Germany after Two World Wars

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Hughes

As Central and East Europeans (including Germans) strive to build new democracies on the ruins of old dictatorships, they seek to establish democratic values as well as democratic institutions. They know that democratic institutions alone were not able to save democracy in Germany's Weimar Republic, which had also risen out of the collapse of an authoritarian regime. West Germans, though, later built a viable democracy, the Federal Republic, from even more devastated and authoritarian remnants. To help explain such differing outcomes, historians have posited changes in political values, arguing that West Germans developed a democratic political culture to replace the authoritarian values many Germans had held earlier. As illuminating as such arguments could be, historians have had great difficulty finding evidence on just what political values Germans, especially common citizens, have in fact held at various times.

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 467-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONGRYN MO

This article argues that political gridlock in Korea was responsible for the defeat of many economic reform efforts before the economic crisis. Successful and timely economic reforms would have made the Korean economy less vulnerable to the economic crisis. The persistence of political gridlock can be attributed to the immature or unconsolidated nature of Korean democracy, including weak democratic institutions and traditional political values and practices. With a model of policy gridlock in the context of the Korean decision-making process, the article attempts to link Korean political culture and institutions to the occurrence of policy gridlock.


1994 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Arnold

Mexicans during the early national era actively grappled with identifying, clarifying, and defining core republican political values, principles, and doctrines. Throughout the first federal republic (1824-1835), the central republic (1835-1846), the second federal republic (1846-1853), and into the years of the Revolution of Ayutla (1853-1855) and the Wars for Reform (1858-1861), defining and protecting individual rights, delimiting the rights and prerogatives of corporations and their members, and limiting the power of the state became the fundamental challenges Mexicans confronted as they endeavored to create a republican political society and their own republican political culture. As in many, if perhaps not all, countries in transition from a corporate model to a republican model, the issues polarized public opinion; and militant elements procured arms and pursued civil war, not just once but several times. Simultaneously, el pueblo mexicano actively clamored for justice. Because of that clamoring, jurists, litigants, legislators, and executives all came to recognize that colonial jurisprudence was no substitute for new and innovative republican jurisprudence. The men on the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice persistently counselled politicians that extant jurisprudence contained their competence and impeded them from administering justice when individuals, corporations, and local and national government officials sought protection from perceived wrongs. Significantly, in seeking protection from perceived wrongs, in seeking justice, el pueblo mexicano initiated defining those values, principles, and doctrines that ultimately could unify the society and mystify and mythicize the meaning of the nation.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth J. Zechmeister ◽  
Daniela Osorio Michel

Political culture in Latin America leans democratic and participatory. Even amid institutional backsliding in the early 21st century, most leaders assume office and claim their mandate via elections. However, in the face of significant governance challenges, reservations regarding democracy and democratic processes are on the rise. In 2014, 68% of individuals in the average Latin American country expressed support for democracy. Five years later, in 2019, that figure was 58%. Support for state-led redistribution declined during this period as well. In brief, there are signs that the public is moving away from a social democratic orientation. Generalizations about political culture risk overlooking significant heterogeneity in Latin American beliefs and inclinations. Survey data, especially from comparative projects, permit assessments of the region’s political culture across time, countries, and population subgroups. Analyses of these data paint an appropriately nuanced portrait of Latin American political culture. Support for core democratic values is highest in the Southern Cone countries of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Support for democratic institutions and processes is far lower in countries that have experienced recent instability and governance challenges, including Honduras and Peru. In Latin America, the young tend to be less committed to democratic institutions and processes. Those in rural areas tend to be more inclined to engage in local politics. Those who are poor tend to perceive themselves as less capable of understanding key national issues. Finally, women tend to be politically more conservative. How people in the region believe politics ought to be organized and function—that is, political culture in Latin America—matters. This is because the public’s inclinations to express core democratic values and to engage in the system shape political outcomes. Where individuals lack confidence in the democratic state, they are less prone to support it. Further, they are more likely to issue demands, and to look for leadership, outside of formal political channels. The comparatively low and decreasing levels of support for democracy place Latin America at a crossroads. Failure to meet key governance challenges—corruption, inequality, crime—could accelerate declines in confidence and interest in participatory democracy, to the detriment of political culture and democratic consolidation in Latin America.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Reisinger ◽  
Arthur H. Miller ◽  
Vicki L. Hesli ◽  
Kristen Hill Maher

Employing data from three surveys of mass opinion conducted in Lithuania, Ukraine and European Russia during 1990, 1991 and 1992, we examine three prominent but competing hypotheses about the source of political values in the post-Soviet societies: historically derived political culture, regime indoctrination and the effects of societal modernization. The literature on Soviet political culture argues that Russian mass values are distinguished by authoritarianism and love of order, values which will be largely shared by Ukrainians, especially East Ukrainians, whereas Lithuanian society would not evince this pattern. Our data do not support this hypothesis. We then examine acceptance of Soviet era norms, both political and economic. We do not find support for the argument that regime indoctrination during the Soviet period produced a set of ideologically derived values throughout the former Soviet Union and across a series of generations. The third hypothesis – that industrialization, urbanization, war and changing educational opportunities shaped the formative experiences of succeeding generations in the Soviet societies and, therefore, their citizens' values – receives the most support: in each of the three societies, differences in political values across age groups, places of residence and levels of education are noteworthy. The variations in political values we find across demographic groupings help us to understand the level of pro-democratic values in each society. We find that in Russia and Ukraine more support for democracy can be found among urban, better educated respondents than among other groups. In Lithuania, the urban and better educated respondents evince pro-democratic values at about the same level as their counterparts in Russia and Ukraine, but Lithuanian farmers and blue-collar workers support democracy at a level closer to urban, white-collar Lithuanians than to their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. In all three societies, those citizens most likely to hold values supportive of democracy are those who are less favourable to Soviet-era values and less convinced of the primacy of the need for social and political ‘order’. Those who desire strong leadership, however, tend to have more democratic values, not more authoritarian ones.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-317
Author(s):  
Osahon O. Guobadia

A new constitutional democracy was established in Nigeria on 29 May 1999. This Fourth Republic was founded upon the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which unshackled the judiciary from the bondage of military decrees. This also brought excitement to the citizenry which finds expression in the belief that the judiciary, their last bastion of succour, is now poised to intervene in the inevitable tussle between might and the exercise of new democratic tenets. These tenets encompass the ideals of economic justice, political justice and social justice. 1 1 C. C. Nweze, ‘Judicial Sustainability of Constitutional Democracy in Nigeria: A Response to the Phonographic Theory of the Judicial Function’, in E. S. Nwauche and F. I. Asogwah (eds), Essays in Honour of Professor C. O. Okunkwo, (SAN) Jite Books (2000), p. 225. Against the backdrop of this reality, the article will examine the extent to which the judiciary in Nigeria has performed its constitutional role as an independent arm of government towards ensuring the observance of democratic values in a free, open, humane and civilised society.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCUS M. PAYK

While it is well known that German conservative intellectuals were skeptical or indifferent to the Federal Republic of Germany established in 1949 and to its democratic founding principles, this essay shifts attention to a specific mode of right-wing acceptance of the new order. Focusing on Hans Zehrer, a renowned journalist and notorious opponent of democracy in the Weimar Republic, I will demonstrate how right-wing intellectuals interpreted West Germany's political system as a post-liberal order after the “end of politics”. But this vision of transcending societal and intellectual conflicts in a meta-politics was neither entirely new nor simply raked up from the late 1920s but reshaped to fit the postwar sociopolitical context. The essay illuminates several intellectual connections between Weimar-era neoconservatism and the specific conservative consensus formed after 1949, but it also explores personnel continuities within a network of right-wing journalists as well as continuities in the field of journalistic style.


2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byong-Kuen Jhee

This study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies. It investigates 70 founding election outcomes, finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. It also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions. Interim governments that initiate democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods. This study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee-jerk reaction to short-term economic performance in new democracies.


Author(s):  
Carlos A. Ball

Progressives who opposed the Trump administration’s policies found themselves repeatedly relying on constitutional principles grounded in federalism, separation of powers, and free speech to resist the federal government. Although many progressives had either criticized or underemphasized those principles before Trump, the principles became vital to progressive causes after Trump was elected. Using dozens of examples from the ways in which Trump abused presidential powers, this book explains how the three sets of principles can help mitigate the harms that autocratic leaders in the Trump mold can inflict on both democratic institutions and vulnerable minorities. In doing so, the book urges progressives to follow this rule of thumb in the post-Trump era: if a constitutional principle was worth deploying to resist Trump’s harmful policies and autocratic governance, then it is likely worth defending in the post-Trump era even if it makes the short-term attainment of progressive objectives more difficult. This type of principled constitutionalism is essential not only because being principled is good in and of itself, but also because being principled in matters related to federalism, separation of powers, and free speech will help both advance progressive causes over the long run and reduce the threats posed by future autocratic leaders in the Trump mold to our system of self-governance, to our democratic values, and to traditionally subordinated minorities. Going forward, progressives should promote and defend constitutional principles grounded in federalism, separation of powers, and free speech regardless of whether they have an ally or an opponent in the White House.


2020 ◽  
pp. 52-57
Author(s):  
Эдиль Канатбеков

В статье рассматривается политическая культура Кыргызстана как одна из важных основ политической жизни общества. Уделяется внимание на необходимость развития политической культуры общества, как фундаментальной основы цивилизации, основ существования общества и общественных отношений. В работе анализируется сущность политической культуры. Описывается проблема формирования политической культуры Кыргызстана как одной из актуальных тем, на протяжении многих лет. Рассматривается формирование и становление политической культуры Кыргызстана, как очень трудоёмкий и долговременный процесс, обусловленный определенными аспектами политико-культурологического характера. Политическая культура конкретной общности состоит из представлений индивидов, их взглядов, политических ценностей, политической идеологии и символики, политических норм, стандартов, стереотипов. Каждый субъект страны являясь гражданином так или иначе становиться свидетелем и даже участником политической реальности, тем самым на основе этих элементов и опыта человек формирует собственный взгляд и определяет для себя систему ценностей и линию поведения. Макалада Кыргызстандын саясий маданияты коомдун саясий турмушунун маанилүү негиздеринин бири катары каралат. Цивилизациянын фундаменталдык негизи, коомдун жана коомдук мамилелердин негиздеринин маңызы катары коомдун саясий маданиятын өнүктүрүү зарылдыгына көңүл бурулган. Изилдөө ишинде саясий маданияттын маани-маңызына анализ жүргүзүлгөн. Кыргызстанда саясий маданияттын калыптануу көйгөйү көп жылдардан бери актуалдуу темалардын бири катары эсептелинет. Кыргызстандын саясий маданиятынын калыптанышы жана калыптануусу саясий жана маданий мүнөздүн айрым аспектилерине байланыштуу өтө эмгекчил жана узак мөөнөттүү процесс катары каралат. Белгилүү бир коомдун саясий маданияты жеке адамдардын идеяларынан, алардын көз караштарынан, саясий баалуулуктарынан, саясий идеологиясынан жана символдорунан, саясий нормаларынан, стандарттарынан, стереотиптеринен турат. Өлкөнүн ар бир субъектиси, ошол өлкөнүн жараны болуп туруп, кандайдыр бир жол менен саясий чындыктын интригасынын күбөсү, ал тургай, катышуучусу болуп калат, ошентип, адам ушул элементтердин жана тажрыйбанын негизинде өзүнүн көз карашын калыптандырат жана өзү үчүн баалуулуктар системасын жана жүрүм-турум линиясын аныктайт. Тhe article considers the political culture of Kyrgyzstan as one of the important foundations of the political life of society. Attention paid to the need to develop the political culture of society as the fundamental basis of civilization, the foundations of the existence of society and social relations. The paper analyzes the essence of political culture. The article describes the problem of forming the political culture of Kyrgyzstan as one of the topical issues for many years. The article considers the formation and formation of the political culture of Kyrgyzstan as a very labor-intensive and long-term process, due to certain aspects of political and cultural character. Тhe Political culture of a particular community consists of individual representations, their views, political values, political ideology and symbols, political norms, standards, and stereotypes. Each subject of the country, being a citizen, in one way or another becomes a witness and even a participant in the intrigue of political reality, thereby the basis of these elements and experience, a person forms his own view and defines for himself a system of values and a line of behavior.


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