Hume's ‘Manifest Contradictions’

2016 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
P. J. E. Kail

AbstractThis paper examines Hume’s ‘Title Principle’ (TP) and its role in a response to one of the ‘manifest contradictions’ he identifies in the conclusion to Book I of A Treatise on Human Nature. This ‘contradiction’ is a tension between two ‘equally natural and necessary’ principles of the imagination, our causal inferences and our propensity to believe in the continued and distinct existence of objects. The problem is that the consistent application of causal reason undercuts any grounds with have for the belief in continued and distinct existence, and yet that belief is as ‘natural and necessary’ as our propensity to infer effects from causes. The TP appears to offer a way to resolve this ‘contradiction’. It statesWhere reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.’ (T 1.4.7.11; SBN 270)In brief, if it can be shown that the causal inferences that undermine the belief in external world are not ‘lively’ nor mixed with some propensity’ then we have grounds for think that they have no normative authority (they have no ‘title to operate on us). This is in part a response to another ‘manifest contradiction’, namely the apparently self-undermining nature of reason. In this paper I examine the nature and grounds of the TP and its relation to these ‘manifest contradictions’.

2019 ◽  
pp. 239-242
Author(s):  
Karen Stohr

This concluding chapter summarizes the main arguments of the book. In order for moral improvement to be a practical project, it must work from a psychologically plausible picture of human nature and it must rely on ideals that have normative authority and regulative efficacy for the person who is aiming to improve. The book argues that we should understand moral improvement as the cultivation of an aspirational moral identity. The cultivation of this identity takes place in social contexts that affect its trajectory. Moral improvement requires good moral neighborhoods, or normative structures that facilitate moral improvement by enabling us to enact fictive moral selves. In this way, moral neighborhoods help us close the gap between our moral ideals and the flawed reality in which we live.


2012 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 189-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Patterson

Descartes is well known for his employment of the method of doubt. His most famous work, the Meditations, begins by exhorting us to doubt all our opinions, including our belief in the existence of the external world. But critics have charged that this universal doubt is impossible for us to achieve because it runs counter to human nature. If this is so, Descartes must be either misguided or hypocritical in proposing it. Hume writes:There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties… The Cartesian doubt, …were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject (Enquiry 12.3; emphasis added).


2019 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 02004
Author(s):  
Maksim Maidansky ◽  
Irina Maidanskaya ◽  
Olga Dekhnich

The paper deals with the consequences of technological transformation of the biological nature of human beings. How will our religious and scientific worldview change? What arguments for and against human cyborgization do naturalists and engineers, philosophers and futurologists propose? Answers to these questions can be decisive in determining the future of humanity. The Russian philosophers-cosmists were the first to put their minds to this problem; nowadays, this dialogue is conducted on the border between science and religion. The image of cyborg is a kind of testing ground for discussing philosophical concepts about human nature and interaction of man with the external world, about the limits of historical development and the meaning of human existence.


This chapter, taken from Josiah Royce's Gifford Lectures of 1899, begins by setting out the three conceptions of natural religion. The first regards natural religion as a search for what a well-known phrase has called “the way through nature to God.” The second views religion less as a doctrine to be proved or disproved through a study of the external world than as a kind of consciousness whose justification lies in its rank amongst the various inner manifestations of our human nature. The third conception identifies the doctrine in question with the fundamental philosophy of religion. The chapter then states that the focus of these lectures is the most neglected and arduous of the methods of studying the relations between religion and the ultimate problems of the Theory of Being. The central problem of the discussion will be the question: What is Reality?


2019 ◽  
pp. 133-146
Author(s):  
Refat E Rubaia

John Locke, Bishop Berkeley and David Hume are the pioneers of modern British Philosophy during 17th  and 18th  centuries. Among them, John Locke‟s epistemological work is one of the greatest defenses of modern empiricism. He attempts to determine the limits of human understanding and seeks to clear the ground for future developments by providing a theory of knowledge compatible with the study of human nature. In his discussion the term „ideas‟ plays an important role. To understand Locke‟s empiricism, one must realize what he means by „ideas‟. For Locke, ideas are all signs which represent the external world of physical objects and the inner world of consciousness. However, in his book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he discusses „ideas‟ in details but he does not provide a sufficiently clear account of the nature of ideas. This paper is an attempt to give a critical exposition of John Locke‟s theory of ideas in which I will try to show that his explanation about the nature of idea is not sufficient enough to establish the theory of ideas he presented. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 133-146


Author(s):  
Chemeda Bokora

Long ago the external world (most prominent among which is the west) had excommunicated African mind from the realm/ treasure of reasoned knowledge. According to Hegel, Hume, Kant, and others, for any thought (about human life, about knowledge and truth, good and bad, right and wrong, mind and matter; about human nature and the universe we inhabit) to count as reasoned knowledge it must be subject to writing. African philosophers like Hountondji, Appiah, Bondurin, etc. have also expounded that individualist element, the main or only yardstick of reasoned knowledge, as they have put it, is missing in the traditional genre of thought. Apiece of these characterizations are unfair as they have indisputably tried to discredit the thoughtful knowledge built on oral tradition. The central point in this article, therefore, is unraveling the practical reasoned knowledge exhibited in the traditional genre of thought. The aspiration is partly alluded to the task of being informative about the place of Oromo society and, by extension, traditional African thought in the realm of global knowledge. This is done by closely examining the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical elements embedded in some proverbs of the Oromo.


2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Reber
Keyword(s):  

1997 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 525-526
Author(s):  
Jack Martin
Keyword(s):  

1956 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 90-90
Author(s):  
Albert S. Thompson
Keyword(s):  

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (9) ◽  
pp. 686-687
Author(s):  
Marc Bekoff
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document