Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement

2018 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 117-138
Author(s):  
Casey Rebecca Johnson

AbstractIt is uncontroversial that we sometimes have moral obligations to voice our disagreements, when, for example, the stakes are high and a wrong course of action will be pursued. But might we sometimes also have epistemic obligations to voice disagreements? In this paper, I will argue that we sometimes do. In other words, sometimes, to be behaving as we ought, qua epistemic agents, we must not only disagree with an interlocutor who has voiced some disagreed-with content but must also testify to this disagreement. This is surprising given that norms on testimony are generally taken to be permissive, and epistemic obligations are usually taken to be negative. In this paper I will discuss some occasions in which epistemic obligations to testify may arise, and I will attempt to investigate the nature of these obligations. I'll briefly discuss the relationship between epistemic and moral norms. I'll offer an account of what it takes to discharge epistemic obligations to testify. Finally, I'll look at some accounts of epistemic obligation that might explain these obligations.

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Boyd Millar

AbstractIt is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared (or joint) moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue that we have epistemic obligations to perform actions of the sort that can be performed in conjunction with other people, and that consequently, we are often jointly blameworthy when we violate shared epistemic obligations. Second, I argue that shared responsibility is especially important to doxastic responsibility thanks to the fact that we don't have the same kind of direct control over our beliefs that we have over our actions. In particular, I argue that there are many cases in which a particular individual who holds some problematic belief only deserves epistemic blame in virtue of belonging to a group all the members of which are jointly blameworthy for violating some shared epistemic obligation.


Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Boyd Millar

Abstract Very often when the vast majority of experts agree on some scientific issue, laypeople nonetheless regularly consume articles, videos, lectures, etc., the principal claims of which are inconsistent with the expert consensus. Moreover, it is standardly assumed that it is entirely appropriate, and perhaps even obligatory, for laypeople to consume such anti-consensus material. I maintain that this standard assumption gets things backwards. Each of us is particularly vulnerable to false claims when we are not experts on some topic – such falsehoods have systematic negative impacts on our doxastic attitudes that we can neither prevent nor correct. So, when there is clear expert consensus on a given scientific issue, while it is permissible for experts to consume anti-consensus material, laypeople have an epistemic obligation to avoid such material. This argument has important consequences for philosophical discussions of our epistemic obligations to perform or omit belief-influencing actions. Such discussions typically abstract away from the important differences between experts and laypeople. Accordingly, we should reject this typical practice as problematic, and insist instead that laypeople and experts have fundamentally different epistemic obligations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 1823-1841 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Tingchi Liu ◽  
Yongdan Liu ◽  
Ziying Mo

PurposeThis research extends the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) and aims to study the underlying factors that influence Chinese consumers' purchase intentions towards green products. The conceptual model encompasses four elements (subjective norms, perceived behaviour control, moral norms and attitude) and one consumer response (purchase intention).Design/methodology/approachThe current research employs a questionnaire survey and two experiments. In Study 1, the hypotheses were tested using structural equation modelling with 485 consumers in China. Study 2 employed a single-factor, two-condition (morally engaged vs control), between-subject design.FindingsThe findings reveal that the morally extended TPB framework is more applicable in predicting Chinese consumers' green purchase intentions than the original TPB model. Attitude plays the most significant role in predicting purchase intentions, and moral norms prove to be a mediator of the relationship between the original construct of subjective norms and purchase intentions. The findings further revealed that moral norms comprise the underlying mechanism of the relationship between subjective norms and attitude.Originality/valueThis study therefore expands the TPB theory by including moral norms. Moreover, it contributes to the literature by clarifying the direct, indirect and total effects of each TPB element on the purchase intentions towards green products. Finally, managerial implications are given.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Tarcisio Amorim Carvalho

Contemporary political theorists often disagree on whether or not religious establishment is justified in liberal states, even when its existence does not constitute a hindrance to the basic rights of citizens. In this article, I contend that religious established does not raise issues of democratic legitimacy, by showing that political frameworks of justice are entangled with substantive conceptions of the good and ethical forms of life. Then, drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s latest works on the relationship between religion and the public sphere, and Maeve Cooke’s readings thereof, I argue that religious symbols can contribute to the creation of meaningful imaginaries that inform moral norms and principles of justice. After this, I recall Axel Honneth’s conception of “struggles for recognition”, demonstrating that the recognition of specific collective traits, including religious, is necessary to provide citizens with a sense of worth and esteem.


Author(s):  
Alex Langlinais ◽  
Brian Leiter

This article examines methodological debates in legal philosophy by focusing on two (related) methodological claims in H. L. A. Hart’s 1961 book, The Concept of Law: that Hart’s theory is both general and descriptive, and an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology. It considers what these claims reveal about Hart’s theoretical ambitions and methodological commitments, and what light they shed on debates in legal philosophy since then. In particular, it discusses the most important elements of Hart’s theory, such as the union of primary and secondary rules in law, the “rule of recognition” as a social rule, and the relationship between legal and moral norms. It also explores several objections to Hart’s approach to the problems of legal philosophy, including one that questions the fruitfulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis. Finally, it analyzes the argument of Hart and all legal positivists that legal systems are social constructs.


Author(s):  
Kathrin Bachleitner

This chapter places collective memory at the source of a country’s values. In that regard, it enquires into the nature of normative obligations arising from memory. Based on moral-philosophical considerations, it finds normativity in the ‘processes surrounding memory’ described in the temporal security concept. Over time, the relationship between collective memory, identity, and behaviour generates a ‘duty to act’ for countries in the sense of ‘ought’. This last and most diffuse impact of collective memory unfolds and persists into the long run. Through it, collective memory, entirely outside the realm of conscious choice, channels behaviour towards one good course of action. To illustrate this, the empirical study picks up the case countries, Germany and Austria, at a late point in time. In 2015, large numbers of refugees arrived at their borders during what became known as the ‘European refugee crisis’. In this ‘critical situation’, both countries were required to react and thus position themselves vis-à-vis the highly normative issue of asylum. With the help of a content analysis of official speeches, the case study demonstrates how German and Austrian politicians came to identify different versions of what a good response entails based on their country’s diverse collective memories.


Author(s):  
Jessica W. Berg ◽  
Paul S. Appelbaum ◽  
Charles W. Lidz ◽  
Lisa S. Parker

How can informed consent be integrated into the physician-patient relationship in a manner that is respectful of both the idea of informed consent and the imperatives of clinical care? A realistic answer to that question could, we believe, remove much of the resistance of many healthcare professionals to the idea of informed consent. This chapter’s goal is to offer a practical procedural framework within which clinicians can operate to facilitate patients’ decision making in a manner that meets both these desiderata. The interactions of physicians and patients in making decisions about medical treatment can be conceptualized in two ways. Decision making can be approached as an event that occurs at a single point in time (an “event model”), or it can be viewed as a continuous element of the relationship between patients and their caregivers (a “process model”). The implications of these different ways of conceptualizing decisions about treatment are quite profound, rooted as they are in distinct visions of the relationship between physicians and patients. The event model of informed consent is predicated on a relatively simple paradigm. A patient seeking medical care approaches a physician for assistance. After assessing the patient’s condition, the physician reaches a diagnosis and formulates a recommended plan of treatment. The physician’s conclusions and recommendations are presented to the patient, along with information concerning the risks and potential benefits of the proposed treatment, and possible alternatives and their risks and potential benefits. Weighing the available data, the patient reflects on the relative risks and benefits of each course of action and then selects the medically acceptable alternative that most closely fits the patient’s particular values. On the surface at least, the event model conforms well to the legal requirements for informed consent. The event model emphasizes the provision of full and accurate information to patients at the time of decision making. Consent forms are often used for this purpose; indeed, the consent form can be said to be the central symbol of the event model (see Chapter 9). Patients’ understanding, although desirable in the abstract, is less crucial to this model than is the provision of information.


Author(s):  
Shirly Bar-Lev ◽  
Dizza Beimel

Encouraging patients to play a more active role in their health care is crucial for healthcare planning and for the design of services. This chapter shifts the scholarly focus from practitioners' decision making to that of laypersons' trying to make sense of the lab results available on their EPRs. The authors developed a methodology to capture the relationship between information formats (graph, numeric, or verbal), laypersons' assessment of the conditions' gravity, and their preferred course of action. Focusing on the effect of “not knowing” on laypersons' preferred courses of action, our findings show that formats that left respondents less able to understand the results—namely, the numeric and verbal formats—produced a lower sense of urgency, and correspondingly, less inclination to actively seek professional help. The chapter takes a step toward deriving practical recommendations as to how personal clinical information should be communicated, to improve laypersons' interpretation of the information's significance.


2022 ◽  
pp. 264-292
Author(s):  
Mansour Alraja ◽  
Mohamed Hamdoun

This study aims to explore the ways in which targeted consumers engage with corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on social media platforms, specifically when discussing their opinions and experiences regarding the CSR activities of their favorite brands. Therefore, the variable moral norms were integrated in the theory of reasoned action. The study data about consumers' engagement (CE) in corporate social responsibility communication (CSRC) over social media (SM) platforms—electronic word of mouth, or e-WoM—was collected from 290 actual engaged consumers in online ordering and involved in social media groups. The findings confirmed that the antecedent factors (consumers' attitudes, subjective norms, and moral norms) have a positive influence on consumers' intention to use e-WoM, while no effect was found on CE in CSRC in SM. Furthermore, e-WoM was found to have direct significant impact on CE in CSRC in SM as it mediates the relationship between the antecedent factors and CE in CSRC in SM.


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