scholarly journals Epistemic Obligations of the Laity

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Boyd Millar
Keyword(s):  
Expert Consensus ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Scientific Issue ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Epistemic Obligation ◽  
Doxastic Attitudes ◽  
Epistemic Obligations

Abstract Very often when the vast majority of experts agree on some scientific issue, laypeople nonetheless regularly consume articles, videos, lectures, etc., the principal claims of which are inconsistent with the expert consensus. Moreover, it is standardly assumed that it is entirely appropriate, and perhaps even obligatory, for laypeople to consume such anti-consensus material. I maintain that this standard assumption gets things backwards. Each of us is particularly vulnerable to false claims when we are not experts on some topic – such falsehoods have systematic negative impacts on our doxastic attitudes that we can neither prevent nor correct. So, when there is clear expert consensus on a given scientific issue, while it is permissible for experts to consume anti-consensus material, laypeople have an epistemic obligation to avoid such material. This argument has important consequences for philosophical discussions of our epistemic obligations to perform or omit belief-influencing actions. Such discussions typically abstract away from the important differences between experts and laypeople. Accordingly, we should reject this typical practice as problematic, and insist instead that laypeople and experts have fundamentally different epistemic obligations.

Dealing with Normatively Inappropriate Dissent

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín ◽  
Kristen Intemann
Keyword(s):  
Social Impacts ◽  
Reliable Identification ◽  
Public Beliefs ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Epistemic Obligations

This chapter considers whether the reliable identification of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) would be helpful in addressing many of the adverse epistemic and social impacts that can result from it. It considers a variety of ways in which such identification could be used to minimize the epistemic and social damages that NID can inflict, including prohibiting the dissent in question, targeting it for special scrutiny, placing limits on scientists’ epistemic obligations, guiding public beliefs, emphasizing the existence of a consensus, and discrediting dissenters. It shows that although some of these strategies could be useful, others are unhelpful in limiting the negative impacts of NID, and may even exacerbate them or generate other equally serious problems.

Responsible Belief, Influence, and Control: Response to Stephen White

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 53-62
Author(s):  
Rik Peels ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Reasons Responsiveness ◽  
Control Response ◽  
The Will ◽  
Doxastic Responsibility ◽  
Epistemic Obligation ◽  
And Control ◽  
Epistemic Obligations

I reply to Stephen White’s criticisms of my Influence View. First, I reply to his worry that my Appraisal Account of responsibility cannot make sense of doxastic responsibility. Then, I discuss in detail his stolen painting case and argue that the Influence View can make sense of it. Next, I discuss various other cases that are meant to show that acting in accordance with one’s beliefs does not render one blameless. I argue that in these cases, even though the subjects act in accordance with their own beliefs, there is plenty of reason to think that at some previous point in time they violated certain intellectual obligations that led to them to hold those beliefs. Even on a radically subjective account of responsibility, then, we can perfectly well hold these people responsible for their beliefs. I go on to defend the idea that reasons-responsiveness will not do for doxastic responsibility: we need influence on our beliefs as well. Thus, doxastic compatibilism or rationalism is untenable. Subsequently, I defend my earlier claim that there is a crucial difference between beliefs and actions in that actions are often subject to the will, whereas beliefs are not. Finally, I respond to White’s worry that if one has a subjective epistemic obligation just because one believes that certain actions are epistemically bad, some people will have a wide range of absurd epistemic obligations, such as the obligation to listen to Infowars.

Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement

2018 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 117-138
Author(s):  
Casey Rebecca Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Epistemic Obligation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Epistemic Obligations

AbstractIt is uncontroversial that we sometimes have moral obligations to voice our disagreements, when, for example, the stakes are high and a wrong course of action will be pursued. But might we sometimes also have epistemic obligations to voice disagreements? In this paper, I will argue that we sometimes do. In other words, sometimes, to be behaving as we ought, qua epistemic agents, we must not only disagree with an interlocutor who has voiced some disagreed-with content but must also testify to this disagreement. This is surprising given that norms on testimony are generally taken to be permissive, and epistemic obligations are usually taken to be negative. In this paper I will discuss some occasions in which epistemic obligations to testify may arise, and I will attempt to investigate the nature of these obligations. I'll briefly discuss the relationship between epistemic and moral norms. I'll offer an account of what it takes to discharge epistemic obligations to testify. Finally, I'll look at some accounts of epistemic obligation that might explain these obligations.

Shared Epistemic Responsibility

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Boyd Millar
Keyword(s):  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Doxastic Responsibility ◽  
Epistemic Obligation ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Epistemic Obligations ◽  
Epistemic Blame ◽  
Incomplete Picture

AbstractIt is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared (or joint) moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue that we have epistemic obligations to perform actions of the sort that can be performed in conjunction with other people, and that consequently, we are often jointly blameworthy when we violate shared epistemic obligations. Second, I argue that shared responsibility is especially important to doxastic responsibility thanks to the fact that we don't have the same kind of direct control over our beliefs that we have over our actions. In particular, I argue that there are many cases in which a particular individual who holds some problematic belief only deserves epistemic blame in virtue of belonging to a group all the members of which are jointly blameworthy for violating some shared epistemic obligation.

scholarly journals Healthcare Transition from Pediatric- to Adult-Focused Care in X-Linked Hypophosphatemia: Review and Expert Consensus

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Dahir ◽  
Ruban Dhaliwal ◽  
Jill Simmons ◽  
Erik A Imel ◽  
Gary S Gottesman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evidence Synthesis ◽  
Clinical Care ◽  
Healthcare Access ◽  
Expert Consensus ◽  
Modified Delphi ◽  
Healthcare Transition ◽  
Functional Consequences ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Effective Transfer ◽  
Transition Preparation

Abstract Context X-linked hypophosphatemia (XLH) is an inherited skeletal disorder that can lead to lifelong deleterious musculoskeletal and functional consequences. Although often perceived as a childhood condition, both children and adults experience the negative impacts of XLH. Adolescents and young adults (AYA) benefit from effective healthcare transition preparation to support the transfer from pediatric- to adult-focused care. Whereas transition timelines, milestones, and educational tools exist for some chronic conditions, they do not meet the unique needs of patients with XLH. Evidence Acquisition To produce the first expert recommendations on healthcare transition preparation for AYA with XLH developed by clinical care investigators and transition experts, a formal literature search was conducted and discussed in an advisory board meeting in July 2020. A modified Delphi method was used to refine expert opinion and facilitate a consensus position. Evidence Synthesis We identified the need for psychosocial and access-related resources for disease education, genetic counselling, family planning, and AYA emancipation from caregiver-directed care. Additionally, we recognized that it is necessary to facilitate communication with patients through channels familiar and accessible to AYA and teach patients to advocate for their healthcare/access to specialists. Conclusions Clear healthcare transition preparation guidelines and treatment-related goals are defined. Individualized timelines and practical strategies for healthcare transition preparation are proposed to optimize health outcomes resulting from continuous clinical care throughout the patient lifecycle. We provide an expert consensus statement describing a tailored healthcare transition preparation program specifically for AYA with XLH to aid in effective transfer from pediatric- to adult-focused healthcare.

SHOULD THE PRIVATE SECTOR PROVIDE PUBLIC CAPITAL?

2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-346
Author(s):  
SANTANU CHATTERJEE
Keyword(s):  
Open Economy ◽  
Public Capital ◽  
Borrowing Constraints ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Production Externalities ◽  
International Capital Markets ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Large Production ◽  
Government Provision

The choice between private and government provision of a productive public good like infrastructure (public capital) is examined in the context of an endogenously growing open economy. The accumulation of public capital need not require government provision, in contrast to the standard assumption in the literature. Even with an efficient government, the relative costs and benefits of government and private provision depend crucially on the economy's underlying structural conditions and borrowing constraints in international capital markets. Countries with limited substitution possibilities and large production externalities may benefit from governments encouraging private provision of public capital through targeted investment subsidies. By contrast, countries with flexible substitution possibilities and relatively smaller externalities may benefit either from governments directly providing public capital or from regulation of private providers. The transitional dynamics also are shown to depend on the underlying elasticity of substitution and the size of the production externality.

Inclusion of Transgender Voice and Communication Training in a University Clinic

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (10) ◽  
pp. 109-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Oates ◽  
Georgia Dacakis
Keyword(s):  
Training Program ◽  
Clinical Education ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Communication Training ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Transgender People ◽  
Language Pathology ◽  
Effectiveness Of Training ◽  
Negative Impacts

Because of the increasing number of transgender people requesting speech-language pathology services, because having gender-incongruent voice and communication has major negative impacts on an individual's social participation and well-being, and because voice and communication training is supported by an improving evidence-base, it is becoming more common for universities to include transgender-specific theoretical and clinical components in their speech-language pathology programs. This paper describes the theoretical and clinical education provided to speech-language pathology students at La Trobe University in Australia, with a particular focus on the voice and communication training program offered by the La Trobe Communication Clinic. Further research is required to determine the outcomes of the clinic's training program in terms of student confidence and competence as well as the effectiveness of training for transgender clients.

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