A correction

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES McCALL SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Supportive Evidence ◽  
Erroneous Conclusion ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Political Controversy

In my article ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: the Politics of Procedure in Appellate body Rulings’ (March 2003), I linked the resignation of Debra Steger, former Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat, to the political controversy regarding amicus curiae submissions. This erroneous conclusion was based on two interviews in Geneva and implicitly supportive evidence from a WTO Reporter article.

scholarly journals The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body as a Voice Mechanism

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 820-861
Author(s):  
Joshua Paine
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Political ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This article focuses on the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) – the diplomatic body, consisting of representatives of WTO members, that administers the dispute settlement system. Focusing on the WTO, the article provides one perspective on the relationship between international tribunals and the political bodies that oversee the governance of such tribunals. Specifically, I argue that the DSB operates as an important ‘voice’ mechanism, which enables members to provide regular feedback to WTO adjudicators, and helps sustain the internal legitimacy of WTO adjudication. However, the DSB can also be used in ways that undermine judicial independence. In short, the DSB is a key site where the tension plays out between WTO adjudicators’ independence from members, and control by, and accountability to, members. The episodes examined in detail to develop this argument are the crisis of a generation ago over amicus curiae briefs, and the ongoing crisis over Appellate Body appointments.

scholarly journals THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
The Public ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.

The WTO Bananas Decision: Cutting Through the Thicket

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce R. Hirsh
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade In Services ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Quota Allocation ◽  
The Eu

The Bananas decision demonstrated that WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body are capable of effectively and clearly analyzing whether extremely complex measures are consistent with WTO rules. The trade-liberalizing decision established the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a meaningful constraint on discriminatory measures with an impact on both goods and services and clarified the nature of the GATS Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The decision also severely constrained the ability of the EU to justify non-tariff discriminatory measures such as the quota allocation system at issue in Bananas based on the Lomé waiver.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

Conclusions to Part II

2019 ◽  
pp. 161-166
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Rule Compliance ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
The One

When asked what, if anything, distinguishes US-Clove Cigarettes from other disputes filed with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), an Appellate Body (AB) Secretariat staff member replied: ‘A number of things and nothing at the same time’.1 This answer aptly captures the story of trade-and disputes and the DSS’s goal-attainment patterns in such cases, as revealed in this second part of the book. On the one hand, as in all WTO disputes, the DSS appears to be engaged in this class of cases in the routine legal exercise of law application and interpretation while pursuing its multiple goals, including rule-compliance and dispute resolution. On the other hand, as a WTO practitioner remarked when discussing the ‘interpretative exercise’ carried out by the DSS in trade-and disputes:...

On the Legality of the United States Action of Terminating India’s GSP Status

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
R. Rajesh Babu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Generalized System Of Preferences ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Developmental Opportunities ◽  
Enabling Clause

Since the US Presidential Proclamation terminating India status as a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) beneficiary with effect from 5 June 2019, questions are raised on the WTO legitimacy of such an action. The US measure, which appears to have a punitive element—a move precipitated by lack of reciprocity from India by not providing ‘equitable and reasonable access’ for US products in Indian markets—challenges the fundamentally premise of the GSP schemes. Since the GSP schemes are established to provide economic and developmental opportunities for developing countries, and once established must be administered as per the 1979 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Enabling Clause, meaning it must be on a ‘generalised’, ‘non-reciprocal’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ basis, can India raise a legitimate challenge against the US action at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body? Or can the GSP schemes, being voluntary and unilaterally administered, be structured by developed countries as trade policy tools with stringent trade and non-trade conditionalities? The decision of the Appellate Body in European Communities—Tariff Preferences, the contested nature of the Enabling Clause and the heterogeneous nature of developing countries at the WTO makes the interpretation knotty. In this context, this article provides a brief comment on the legal basis of the Enabling Clause in the WTO framework and the legitimacy of the US action of termination of India from the beneficiary status. Keeping aside the legal question, the author is also of the view that time is ripe for India to consider ‘graduating’ itself from such preferential arrangements and engage in binding obligations that are reciprocal and sustainable. JEL Codes: K33, O24

scholarly journals Introduction

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-172
Author(s):  
CHAD P. BOWN ◽  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The WTO dispute settlement system has come under severe criticism in recent times, which does not seem, for now at least, to affect its relevance. In terms of output, 2017 was yet another bumper year. We review eight cases that constitute the ‘last word’ of the dispute settlement system: we review exhaustively all Appellate Body reports, as well as all un-appealed panel reports.

European Legal Culture and WTO Dispute Settlement: Thirty Years of Socio-Legal Transplants from Brussels to Geneva

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-133
Author(s):  
Tommaso Soave
Keyword(s):  
Significant Contribution ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
The Self ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Social ◽  
Trade Measures

Abstract This article argues that the legal culture of EC/EU institutions has made a significant contribution to the ethos, the style, and the tone of WTO dispute settlement bodies. Areas of alignment between the two regimes include the self-perceived role of adjudicators vis-à-vis their political environment and the jurisprudence on the ‘necessity’ of non-trade measures. Based on these premises, the article traces some of the social and professional pathways through which European sensibilities and perspectives have found their way from Brussels (and Luxembourg) to Geneva. In particular, it describes the convergent trajectories of the EC/EU and the GATT/WTO professional communities. The goal of the analysis is to provide a fresh outlook on the ongoing diplomatic stalemate surrounding the future of the Appellate Body and WTO dispute settlement at large.

scholarly journals Why Developing Countries are at Disadvantage Position in WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 60-63
Author(s):  
Muhammad Waqas
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Dispute ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Specialized Institutions ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

The Dispute Settlement Board of WTO aims to solve the disputes of WTO members regarding international trade. Dispute settlement process involves the parties and third parties to a case, and it operates through the DSB panels, the Appellate Body, the WTO Secretariat, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialized institutions. Although the dispute settlement mechanism provides opportunities to the developing countries to seek remedies if they are aggrieved by any other country, yet there are certain challenges for the developing countries to participate effectively in DSM. The study finds out the challenges that caused the role of developing countries less significant in the WTO dispute settlement process. Moreover, several recommendations have also been made for making the role of developing countries more effective.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/ijssm.v1i2.10103 Int. J. Soc. Sci. Manage. Vol-1, issue-2: 60-63

Mutually agreed solutions under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Analytical Framework after the Softwood Lumber Arbitration

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALBERTO ALVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Intimate Relation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractThe unprecedented enforcement of the mutually agreed solution (MAS) in the WTO Softwood Lumber disputes – but outside the WTO dispute settlement system – and the recent use of MAS to resolve important trade disputes should trigger a hard look at these dispute settlement instruments provided for by the DSU. This article seeks to provide a detailed framework of analysis of MAS under the DSU that allows the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate MAS-related disputes. WTO Members should not go outside the system to enforce MAS. The article illustrates that MAS can create binding obligations and that MAS are WTO law, given the explicit reference to them in the DSU, their intimate relation with the WTO-covered agreements and the requirement for compliance with these agreements. In addition, the article offers an interpretation of the DSU that allows panels and the Appellate Body to regard MAS as applicable law. This interpretation is offered in the view that there is no policy reason to sustain that these controversies – always fully related to WTO rights and obligations and framed under the corners of the covered agreements – have to be resolved by an adjudication system other than that of the WTO.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document