The trade-off between pension costs and salary expenditures in the public sector

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-168
Author(s):  
Dongwoo Kim ◽  
Cory Koedel ◽  
P. Brett Xiang

AbstractWe examine pension-cost crowd out of salary expenditures in the public sector using a 15-year data panel of state teacher pension plans spanning the Great Recession. While there is no evidence of salary crowd out prior to the Great Recession, there is a shift in the post-recession years such that a 1% (of salaries) increase in the annual required pension contribution corresponds to a decrease in total teacher salary expenditures of 0.24%. The effect operates through changes to the size of the teaching workforce, not changes to teacher wages. An explanation for the effect heterogeneity pre- and post-recession is that public employers are less able to shield the workforce from pension costs during times of fiscal stress. This problem is exacerbated because unlike other benefit costs, such as for health care, pension costs are countercyclical.

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 851-869
Author(s):  
Amanda Pullum

Following the Great Recession, austerity programs and restrictions on the public sector were introduced worldwide. In this article, I ask how and why labor coalitions in two states used differing organizational structures to respond to “shock politics” that severely restricted public-sector unions in 2011. I find the availability or lack of a citizen-initiated veto referendum shaped but did not completely explain differences in strategic choices between unions in Wisconsin and Ohio. Rather, tensions among allies and lack of time for strategic planning also contributed to a nonhierarchical coalition in Wisconsin, while Ohio unions had ample time to create a bureaucratic coalition and plan a successful veto referendum campaign. I argue that given sufficient time to respond to political threats, hierarchical organizations can promote efficient, effective deployment of some political tactics.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


Author(s):  
Mirari ERDAIDE GABIOLA ◽  
Arantza GONZÁLEZ LÓPEZ

LABURPENA: Estatuko Aurrekontu Orokorren Legeak sektore publikoko herriadministrazio eta erakunde guztiei debekatu egiten die ekarpenik egitea enpleguko pentsio-planetan edo aseguru kolektiboko kontratuetan, erretiroagatiko estaldura jasotzen badute. Hain zuzen ere, debeku hori aztertzen da lan honetan. Azterketa Enplegatu Publikoaren Oinarrizko Estatutua eta EK-ko 149.1.13. nahiz 156. artikuluen inguruko doktrina konstituzionala oinarri hartuta egituratzen da, eta debeku haren konstituziokontrakotasuna ondorioztatzen du. Adibidez, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoaren kasuan, debekuak Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutuko 10.4 artikulutik ondorioztatzen den berezko eskumen-esparru esklusiboan dauka eragina. RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza la prohibición que impone la Ley de Presupuestos Generales del Estado a todas las Administraciones Públicas y entidades integrantes del sector público de realizar aportaciones a planes de pensiones de empleo o contratos de seguro colectivos que incluyan la cobertura de la contingencia de jubilación. El análisis se vertebra a partir del Estatuto Básico del Empleado Público y de la doctrina constitucional en torno a los artículos 149.1.13.ª CE y 156 CE, concluyendo en la inconstitucionalidad de aquella prohibición, que en la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi incide en el ámbito competencial propio y exclusivo que deriva del artículo 10.4 del Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco. ABSTRACT: This work analyzes the prohibition imposed by the State Budget’s Act to every public administration and entity part of the public sector to contribute to pension plans or collective insurance policies that cover the retirement contingency. This analysis has as essential structure the Basic Statute of the Public Employee and the constitutional doctrine regarding articles 149.1.13 and 156 of the Constitution and it concludes with the unconstitutionality of that prohibition which in the Autonomous Community of Euskadi has an impact on the very own and exclusive powers that derive from article 10.4 of the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country.


2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
TERESA GHILARDUCCI ◽  
WEI SUN

We investigate the pension choices made by over 700 firms between 1981 and 1998 when DC plans expanded and overtook DB plans. Their average pension contribution per employee dropped in real terms from $2,140 in 1981 to $1,404 in 1998. At the same time, the share of their pension contributions attributed to defined contribution plans was 23% in 1981 and increased to 68% in 1998. By analyzing pension plan data from the IRS Form 5500 and finances of the plan's sponsoring employer from COMPUSTAT with a fixed-effects ordinary least squares model and a simultaneous model, we find that a 10% increase in the use of defined contribution plans (including 401(k) plans) reduces employer pension costs per worker by 1.7–3.5%. This suggests firms use DCs and 401(k)s to lower pension costs. Lower administrative expenses may also explain the popularity of DC plans. Although measuring a firm's pension cost per worker may be a crude way to judge a firm's commitment to pensions, this study suggests that firms that provide both a traditional defined benefit and a defined contribution plan are the most committed because they spend the most on pensions. Further research, especially case studies, is vital to understand employers' commitment to employment-based pension plans.


2020 ◽  
pp. 107755872090923 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Benitez ◽  
Victoria Perez ◽  
Eric Seiber

Medicaid enrollment increases during economic downturns which imply households using the public health insurance program during coverage gaps due to job loss. However, we provide new evidence demonstrating that the Medicaid program’s countercyclical protections against economic downturns are largely concentrated in states with more generous Medicaid eligibility criteria for adults. We exploit the timing of the 2007-2009 Great Recession to compare trends in recession-linked Medicaid enrollment between states with more generous Medicaid eligibility guidelines and states with more restrictive guidelines. For similar effects of the recession, Medicaid enrollment grew larger states in with more generous Medicaid programs. Our work suggests for every 100 people becoming unemployed in states with a restrictive Medicaid program, about 96 would be uninsured, and about 11 would enroll in Medicaid. Conversely, about 49 would be uninsured in a state with more generous Medicaid guidelines and 57 would enroll in Medicaid.


2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Ferreiro ◽  
Catalina Gálvez ◽  
Carmen Gómez ◽  
Ana González

The outbreak of the economic and financial crisis in 2008, the socalled Great Recession, has made that many European Union countries have made massive interventions in their banking and financial systems. These interventions have had a considerable impact in the public finances of these countries. The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact on the national public budgets of the measures of public support to problem financial institutions carried out between the years 2008 and 2013, and to study how this budgetary impact has affected to the fiscal imbalances and to the strategies of fiscal impulse and consolidation implemented along these years.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
William K Roche ◽  
Tom Gormley

The international literature on the economic and fiscal crisis that heralded the Great Recession emphasizes the negative effects of ‘disorganized decentralization’ on unions’ capacities for pay coordination and ultimately on their effectiveness in representing their members. These effects are seen as particularly pronounced in countries on the ‘European periphery’ such as Ireland. The article challenges this view by showing how the collapse of social partnership and centralized bargaining in Ireland was soon followed in the private sector by a new form of coordinated decentralized pattern bargaining. Coordinated sectoral bargaining emerged and was sustained in the public service. The durability of pay coordination is attributed to the strategic postures of unions, combined with embedded features of industrial relations institutions. The comparative import of the Irish case arises less from ‘disorganized decentralization’ than from the resilience of coordination following one of the most severe economic and fiscal shocks experienced by any advanced economy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Cantin

SummarySince the onset of the Great Recession, anti-union conservatives have been hammering out an arguably bogus yet politically potent argument: collective bargaining with government workers is unaffordable as their wages, health benefits, and pensions are driving states into deficits. Whilst evidence does not support the politically motivated attacks on public sector workers and their unions, a confluence of political-economic factors has been abetting efforts to scapegoat public employees and their unions.The first section of this essay places the 2011 wave of anti-public-sector-collective-bargaining statutes in its broad political and economic context. Whilst resulting from a longstanding hostility of the USA’s conservative movement to unionism and collective bargaining, recent anti-public-sector-collective-bargaining statutes are also the outcome of three political-economic developments galvanising anti-union GOPers—first, the fact that most US union members are now government workers, which makes it easier for anti-unionists to characterize them as a “privileged” elite; second, the Great Recession and ensuing deficit crisis; and third, the rousing of the conservative movement that led to the 2010 electoral “shellacking” of the Democrats. The second section focuses specifically on Wisconsin and argues that what is going on there ought to be seen for what it is: an attempt to exploit the economic crisis to win an eminently political victory over organised labour and allied Democrats.


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