THE ETHICS OF OMISSION
In society, power and responsibility are often linked, supporting the idea that with great power comes great responsibility. I assert that this link between power and responsibility is a form of the Act–Omission Distinction, a principle in ethics that there is a morally relevant distinction between doing something and omitting to do something, e.g. a difference between killing someone and letting someone be killed. As such, using trolleys, elected spider-men, and real-life cases such as R v Stone & Dobinson, I contest this casual relationship between power and responsibility and argue the relationship to be correlative as both power and responsibility are often simultaneously caused by consent.
2020 ◽
pp. 61-65
Keyword(s):
2002 ◽
Vol 24
(2)
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pp. 77-81
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
2021 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
◽
Keyword(s):
2021 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
◽