scholarly journals Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gilens ◽  
Benjamin I. Page
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Organized Interest

Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

The strange case of pluralist lobbying in a corporatist setting: Defending Western business interests in China

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Weil
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political System ◽  
Large Data ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Indigenous Innovation ◽  
Venue Shopping ◽  
Party State ◽  
Innovation Policies

E.U. and U.S. businesses in China are actively shaping the business environment according to their interests. As a state-corporatist framework is applied, the question arises as to how Western businesses go about lobbying China's policies. This article provides insights on what kind of lobbying tools Western interest groups apply to actively influence China's party state. Drawing on a large data set of lobbying actions toward indigenous innovation policies, this article aims to demonstrate that China's political system is receptive to influence from the outside. The argument builds on evidence showing that China's state corporatist system provides some leeway for pluralist lobbying strategies. It is hypothesized that Western interest groups are not completely co-opted by China's state-corporatist system, which increases the number of membership driven lobbying strategies. As Western groups stand outside the system, they are expected to devote their lobbying efforts to the international level. Specifically, this article analyzes how constrained access in domestic China affects transnational venue shopping versus domestic strategies.

After the “Master Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 643-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob S. Hacker ◽  
Paul Pierson
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Political Struggle ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
The World ◽  
Election Results ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Government Authority

Drawing on the pioneering work of Anthony Downs, political scientists have tended to characterize American politics as a game among undifferentiated competitors, played out largely through elections, with outcomes reflecting how formal rules translate election results into legislative votes. In this perspective, voters, campaigns, elections, and the ideological distribution of legislators merit extensive scrutiny. Other features of the political environment—most notably, the policies these legislators help create and the interest groups that struggle over these policies—are deemed largely peripheral. However, contemporary politics often looks very different than the world described by Downs. Instead, it more closely resembles the world depicted by E. E. Schattschneider—a world in which policy and groups loom large, the influence of voters is highly conditional, and the key struggle is not over gaining office but over reshaping governance. Over the last twenty years, a growing body of scholarship has emerged that advances this corrective vision—an approach we call “policy-focused political science.” In this framework, politics is centrally about the exercise of government authority for particular substantive purposes. Such exercises of authority create the “terrain” for political struggle, profoundly shaping both individual and group political behavior. More important, because policies can be so consequential, they also serve as the “prize” for many of the most enduring political players, especially organized interest groups. The payoffs of a policy-focused perspective include a more accurate portrayal of the institutional environment of modern politics, an appreciation for the fundamental importance of organized groups, a better understanding of the dynamics of policy change, and a more accurate mapping of interests, strategies, and influence. These benefits are illustrated through brief examinations of two of the biggest changes in American politics over the last generation: asymmetric partisan polarization and the growing concentration of income at the top.

scholarly journals Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Paniagua ◽  
Jan P. Vogler
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Scholarly Work ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Resource Diversity

AbstractWhat explains the emergence and persistence of institutions aimed at preventing any ruling group from using the state apparatus to advance particularistic interests? To answer this recurring question, a burgeoning literature examines the establishment of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by ethnic or religious cleavages. Going beyond existing scholarly work focused on these specific settings, we argue that political power-sharing institutions can also be the result of common disputes within the economic elite. We propose that these institutions are likely to emerge and persist when competition between elite factions with dissimilar economic interests is balanced. To address the possibility of endogeneity between elite configurations and public institutions, we leverage natural resource diversity as an instrument for elite configurations. We show that, where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful economic groups is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging economic interests.

Media in crisis: Blowing hot and cold

1982 ◽  
Vol 72 (6B) ◽  
pp. S19-S28
Author(s):  
Ralph H. Turner
Keyword(s):  
Los Angeles ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
The Other ◽  
World Views ◽  
Public Controversy ◽  
Earthquake Preparedness ◽  
Scientific World ◽  
Individual Household ◽  
The One ◽  
Organized Interest

abstract A 3-yr content analysis of all items dealing with earthquakes in six major Los Angeles newspapers and a review of television and radio treatment of earthquake topics in the same period, coupled with periodic surveys of popular understanding and attitudes toward the earthquake threat following announcement of the southern California uplift (Palmdale Bulge), lead to the identification of four media problems that contributed to the often erratic treatment of earthquake threat. First is the problem of newsworthiness, determining when and how to feature discussions of the continuing earthquake threat in the absence of either dramatic events or mobilized public controversy. Second is the problem of finding sources to provide a steady flow of material for use in preparing news items, in the absence of well-organized interest groups, especially those concerned with individual, household, and neighborhood earthquake preparedness. Third is the dilemma of how to balance the needs for alarm and reassurance, shocking people out of lethargy into action on the one hand versus trying to minimize unproductive anxiety and community disruption on the other hand. The fourth problem is communicating science when nonscientific world views are prevalent and merged to the point of confusion with scientific world views in popular thinking.

scholarly journals Farm Gate Prices for Non-Varietal Wine in Argentina: A Multilevel Comparison of the Prices Paid by Cooperatives and Investor-Oriented Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustina Malvido Perez Carletti ◽  
Markus Hanisch ◽  
Jens Rommel ◽  
Murray Fulton
Keyword(s):  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Price Effects ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Price Differences ◽  
Multilevel Regression Model

AbstractIn this paper, we use a unique data set of the prices paid to farmers in Argentina for grapes to examine the prices paid by non-varietal wine processing cooperatives and investor-oriented firms (IOFs). Motivated by contrasting theoretical predictions of cooperative price effects generated by the yardstick of competition and property rights theories, we apply a multilevel regression model to identify price differences at the transaction level and the departmental level. On average, farmers selling to cooperatives receive a 3.4 % lower price than farmers selling to IOFs. However, we find cooperatives pay approximately 2.4 % more in departments where cooperatives have larger market shares. We suggest that the inability of cooperatives to pay a price equal to or greater than the one paid by IOFs can be explained by the market structure for non-varietal wine in Argentina. Specifically, there is evidence that cooperative members differ from other farmers in terms of size, assets and the cost of accessing the market. We conclude that the analysis of cooperative pricing cannot solely focus on the price differential between cooperatives and IOFs, but instead must consider other factors that are important to the members.

scholarly journals The Complicated Business of State Supreme Court Elections: An Empirical Perspective

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Heise
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Elections ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
State Supreme Court ◽  
Proper Role ◽  
New Findings ◽  
Judicial Outcomes

Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publicly-elected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345 business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd, emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims. Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests. Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial domain differently than other political domains.

Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 108-149
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Labor Market Reform ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Group Position ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
External Actors ◽  
Crisis Responses

How did the preferences of interest groups shape the design and contentiousness of crisis policies in deficit countries? And how did external actors influence their crisis responses? This chapter investigates these questions by drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources including newspaper coverage, voter public opinion data, interest group position papers, sovereign bailout documentation, and original qualitative evidence from seventeen in-depth interviews with national interest group representatives in Ireland, Spain, and Greece. There was a large consensus among both interest groups and voters across all three countries that external adjustment—that is, unilateral euro exit—should be avoided at all cost. This left financing and internal adjustment as the only options, and significant conflicts flared up in all three countries about how the costs associated with internal adjustment (and to a lesser extent financing) should be distributed. Within the confines set by the Troika, which effectively narrowed down the range of options available to deficit countries, interest groups pushed for reforms to which they were least vulnerable. Business interests, for example, generally supported adopting comprehensive spending-based consolidation measures and labor market reform. Conversely, labor unions and social policy groups actively supported policies that would entail stronger burden-sharing between firms and workers. Overall, internal adjustment policies adopted across all three cases generally reflected the preferences of employer associations more than those of workers, but especially in Spain and Greece, this was associated with considerable political upheaval.

scholarly journals Interest Groups on the Inside: The Governance of Public Pension Funds

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Anzia ◽  
Terry M. Moe
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Public Pensions ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Public Workers ◽  
Financial Consequence

New scholarship in American politics argues that interest groups should be brought back to the center of the field. We attempt to further that agenda by exploring an aspect of group influence that has been little studied: the role interest groups play on the inside of government as official participants in bureaucratic decision-making. The challenges for research are formidable, but a fuller understanding of group influence in American politics requires that they be taken on. Here we carry out an exploratory analysis that focuses on the bureaucratic boards that govern public pensions. These are governance structures of enormous financial consequence for state governments, public workers, and taxpayers. They also make decisions that are quantitative (and comparable) in nature, and they usually grant official policymaking authority to a key interest group: public employees and their unions. Our analysis suggests that these “interest groups on the inside” do have influence—in ways that weaken effective government. Going forward, scholars should devote greater attention to how insider roles vary across agencies and groups, how groups exercise influence in these ways, how different governance structures shape their policy effects, and what it all means for our understanding of interest groups in American politics.

Economic Elites’ Attitudes Toward Meritocracy in Chile: A Moral Economy Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 1219-1241
Author(s):  
Jorge Atria ◽  
Juan Castillo ◽  
Luis Maldonado ◽  
Simón Ramirez
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
National Development ◽  
Moral Economy ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
High Turnover ◽  
Redistributive Policies ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
High Level

We analyze economic elites’ perceptions and beliefs about meritocracy from a moral economy perspective. A moral economy perspective considers how norms and beliefs structure socioeconomic practices through the constitution and expression of what is considered acceptable, proper, and legitimate. Our study explores how economic elites make sense of the roles of talent and effort in the distribution of resources and how they reconcile the idea of meritocracy within a rigid social order. The site of our study is Chile, a country with fluid mobility between low and middle classes, but with high and persistent disparities and strong barriers to elite positions. We conducted 44 semistructured interviews with shareholders, board members, and high-level executives of large or high-turnover companies in three major Chilean cities. We find that the economic elite strongly support meritocracy but explain access to top positions based on talent rather than effort. The economic elite define talent in terms of business and leadership skills. They attribute upward mobility in the private sector to meritocratic practice. At the same time, they view the public sector as the epitome of nonmeritocratic practices, incompetence, and inefficiency. They profess empathy with the poor, but they reject redistributive policies. The economic elite believe in the primacy of competition in economic life and the necessity of continual economic growth, and thus, they understand meritocracy as both the means to survive in a market economy and a responsible approach to lead national development.

America’s Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Strickland
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
State Spending ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Institutional Variables ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Causal Variables

Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America’s statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This study both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multiclient lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.

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