scholarly journals Interest Groups on the Inside: The Governance of Public Pension Funds

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1059-1078 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Anzia ◽  
Terry M. Moe
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Public Pensions ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Public Workers ◽  
Financial Consequence

New scholarship in American politics argues that interest groups should be brought back to the center of the field. We attempt to further that agenda by exploring an aspect of group influence that has been little studied: the role interest groups play on the inside of government as official participants in bureaucratic decision-making. The challenges for research are formidable, but a fuller understanding of group influence in American politics requires that they be taken on. Here we carry out an exploratory analysis that focuses on the bureaucratic boards that govern public pensions. These are governance structures of enormous financial consequence for state governments, public workers, and taxpayers. They also make decisions that are quantitative (and comparable) in nature, and they usually grant official policymaking authority to a key interest group: public employees and their unions. Our analysis suggests that these “interest groups on the inside” do have influence—in ways that weaken effective government. Going forward, scholars should devote greater attention to how insider roles vary across agencies and groups, how groups exercise influence in these ways, how different governance structures shape their policy effects, and what it all means for our understanding of interest groups in American politics.

Trends in Public–Private Pay Parity in State and Local Governments

2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory B. Lewis ◽  
Rahul Pathak ◽  
Chester S. Galloway
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Labor Economics ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
College Graduates ◽  
Census Data ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Economics Model ◽  
State And Local

Have state and local governments (SLGs) achieved pay parity with the private sector? The answer depends on how one defines parity. Using a standard labor economics model on U.S. Census data from 1990 to 2014, we find different patterns if we focus on pay, on pay plus benefits, or on total compensation within an occupation. All approaches indicate that pay is higher in local than in state governments and that Blacks, Hispanics, and employees without college diplomas earn higher pay in SLGs than in the private sector. In contrast, Whites, Asians, and college graduates are less likely to enjoy higher pay working in SLGs than in the private sector. Unsurprisingly, states with more liberal and Democratic legislatures pay public employees better, relative to workers in the private sector.

scholarly journals Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gilens ◽  
Benjamin I. Page
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
Electoral Democracy ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Organized Interest

Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics—which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism—offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

Direct Democracy and Public Employees

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2227-2246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John G. Matsusaka
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Public Employee ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Sector Employment ◽  
Initiative Process

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)

Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. By Kenneth M. Goldstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 170p. $49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-210
Author(s):  
Beth L. Leech
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Research Projects ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Convincing Argument ◽  
Mass Participation ◽  
Interest Group Influence

Studies of interest-group influence on politics and studies of mass participation in politics typically have been quite separate undertakings. With a few notable exceptions, research projects have been designed to examine one or the other, not both, and the influence of interest-group activity on mass political activity is too seldom considered. In this broadly integrative book, Kenneth Goldstein makes a convincing argument for why this should not be the case.

Understanding Decisions in State Pension Systems: A System Framework

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gang Chen
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
System Framework ◽  
Retirement Benefits ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Pension Systems ◽  
Financial Conditions ◽  
Public Sector Unions ◽  
State Pension

State governments establish pension systems to provide retirement benefits to public employees. State governments as sponsors, state legislatures as policy makers, and public-sector unions as representatives of public employees may exert considerable influence over the decisions made in pension systems. This study applies a system framework to examine these influences. It focuses on four decisions in pension systems: benefits, employer contributions, employee contributions, and the asset smoothing period. The findings show that changes in the short- and long-term financial conditions of a state government have different influences on pension decisions, and that legislatures and public employee unions play important roles that affect these decisions.

scholarly journals “Outside Lobbying” over the Airwaves: A Randomized Field Experiment on Televised Issue Ads

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
JOSHUA L. KALLA ◽  
DAVID E. BROOCKMAN
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Group Influence ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Persuasive Power ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Organized Interest ◽  
Interest Group Influence

We present the first field experiment on how organized interest groups’ television ads affect issue opinions. We randomized 31,404 voters to three weeks of interest group ads about either immigration or transgender nondiscrimination. We then randomly assigned voters to receive ostensibly unrelated surveys either while the ads aired, one day after they stopped, or three days afterwards. Voters recalled the ads, but three ads had a minimal influence on public opinion, whereas a fourth’s effects decayed within one day. However, voters remembered a fact from one ad. Our results suggest issue ads can affect public opinion but that not every ad persuades and that persuasive effects decay. Despite the vast sums spent on television ads, our results are the first field experiment on their persuasive power on issues, shedding light on the mechanisms underpinning—and limits on—both televised persuasion and interest group influence.

David B. Truman,

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wyn Grant
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Potential Interest ◽  
Group Politics ◽  
The Impact

This chapter examines David B. Truman’s bookThe Governmental Process(1951, 1971), which offers a classic pluralist analysis of interest groups and their relationships with political decision-makers, as well as their significance in American politics. It considers the arguments put forward by some scholars challenging Truman’s views, including Rothman, Olson, and Lindblom. It then discusses two elements of Truman’s account that he deems significant and to require special emphasis: the notion of multiple or overlapping membership and the function of unorganized interests, or potential interest groups. The chapter also evaluates Truman’s views about business groups and concludes with an assessment of the impact of social media on group politics within his framework.

A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying: Government Growth and Interest Populations

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292097549
Author(s):  
James M. Strickland
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
The Political ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Quiet Revolution ◽  
Government Growth ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
The 1960S

What explains contemporary numbers of interest groups in America? To answer this question and help address conflicting narratives in research, I examine the rise of interest groups in the states. Assembling an original dataset based on archival and secondary sources, I find that relatively few groups lobbied legislators prior to the 1960s or 1970s. During those decades, numbers of interest groups began to grow rapidly. I find that increases in lawmaking activities present inconsistent effects on the political mobilization of groups but increases in spending are strongly correlated with mobilization. In additional tests, I find that the effects of spending on group numbers vary by state and are not discernible in most states. In general, a historic transformation of state governments helps to account for the growth of state lobbying. Interest groups have remained active in state capitols ever since.

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