A Matter of Trust

Civilian Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.

On Resignation

Armed Forces & Society ◽

10.1177/0095327x16657323 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 43 (1) ◽

pp. 41-52 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Richard H. Kohn

Keyword(s):

National Security ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Political Leaders ◽

Military Leaders ◽

The Public ◽

Senior Officers ◽

Military Relations ◽

Civilian Authority ◽

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations ◽

10.1093/oso/9780197535493.003.0015 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 263-282

Author(s):

Sarah Sewall

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Gray Zone ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Face ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

Horror Vacui

10.1093/oso/9780190626013.003.0023 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Ozan O. Varol

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

Domestic Politics ◽

Physical World ◽

Dense Material ◽

The Political ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

Coup Attempt

Nature, Aristotle said, abhors a vacuum. He argued that a vacuum, once formed, would be immediately filled by the dense material surrounding it. Aristotle’s insights into vacuums in the physical world also apply to civil-military relations. Where a vacuum exists in domestic politics because the political parties are weak, unstable, or underdeveloped, the dense material that is the military may fill the void by staging an intervention into domestic politics. But when, as in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the civilian leaders themselves hold densely concentrated authority—in other words, are powerful, popular, and credible—their attempts to keep the military at bay are far more likely to succeed. Without a vacuum there is no void for the military to fill.

The New Civil-Military Relations

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055400124177 ◽

1961 ◽

Vol 55 (1) ◽

pp. 53-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Gene M. Lyons

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Minimum Cost ◽

The United States ◽

Fundamental Principle ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

Myanmar government-military ties could be at risk

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db214238 ◽

2016 ◽

Keyword(s):

Minority Groups ◽

Ethnic Minority Groups ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Internal Security ◽

Content Type ◽

Peace Negotiations ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

The Government ◽

Military Relations ◽

Significance The response underlines the military's continued internal security role but, given that the restive areas are home to large Rohingya populations, also highlights residual political sensitivity about the military's position and the importance of effective government-military relations. Impacts An immediate trigger for civil-military frictions could be a breakdown in peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups. The government will struggle to convince military leaders that wide concessions to armed ethnic groups are needed. Centralisation of power within the NLD will hamper junior civilian leaders gaining experience of working with the military. In time, the military's economic influence will be politically problematic for the NLD.

Tumultuous Times

The Absent Dialogue ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190905903.003.0009 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 250-272

Author(s):

Anit Mukherjee

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Military Relations ◽

This chapter discusses contemporary civil–military relations in India, engaging with, and occasionally refuting, a number of narratives. It begins with an overview of four main controversies—the dispute about withdrawal of troops from the Siachen glacier, the contrasting views over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the tenure of General V. K. Singh (chief of army staff from 2010 to 2012), and issues arising from pay commission reports and the equivalence between civilians and the military. These issues highlight the overall theme of this book—that there is considerable distrust and tension between civilians and the military. Next, it briefly discusses civil–military relations under the Modi government. Thereafter, it examines the issue of defense reforms, considered by many as a panacea to overcoming these difficulties. This is followed by an analysis of the divergence in the positions typically taken across all three levels—political, bureaucratic, and the military leaders.

Soldiers, Pollsters, and International Crises: Public Opinion and the Military's Advice on the Use of Force

Foreign Policy Analysis ◽

10.1093/fpa/orab009 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 17 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Erik Lin-Greenberg

Keyword(s):

Public Opinion ◽

Use Of Force ◽

International Crises ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Public Preferences ◽

Electoral Incentives ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

Original Survey ◽

Military Relations

Abstract When advising civilian leaders on the use of force, are nonelected officials swayed by public opinion? Scholars have long debated whether public preferences affect foreign policy, but most studies focus on elected politicians, overlooking the nonelected officials who formulate policies and advise leaders. Bureaucrats and nonelected officials are expected to provide advice based on technical expertise, yet they may have institutional incentives and civic-minded reasons to recommend actions that align with popular preferences. This potentially creates additional channels through which public opinion influences policy decisions. An original survey experiment fielded on US military officers reveals that public opposition makes military leaders less likely to recommend the use of force. This article contributes to debates on the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking, integrates research on public opinion and civil–military relations, and yields broader insights for scholars studying the behavior of officials who are not subject to electoral incentives. Al asesorar a los dirigentes civiles sobre el uso de la fuerza, los funcionarios no electos ¿se dejan influir por la opinión pública? Los estudiosos llevan mucho tiempo debatiendo si las preferencias del público afectan a la política exterior, pero la mayoría de los trabajos se centran en los políticos electos, pasando por alto a los funcionarios no electos que formulan las políticas y asesoran a los líderes. Se espera que los burócratas y los funcionarios no electos ofrezcan un asesoramiento basado en la experiencia técnica, pero que puedan tener incentivos institucionales y razones de carácter cívico para recomendar acciones que se alineen con las preferencias populares. Potencialmente, esto crea canales adicionales a través de los cuales la opinión pública influye en las decisiones políticas. Una original encuesta realizada a oficiales militares estadounidenses revela que la oposición pública hace que los líderes militares sean menos propensos a recomendar el uso de la fuerza. Este trabajo contribuye a los debates sobre el papel de la opinión pública en la construcción de la política exterior, integra la investigación sobre la opinión pública y las relaciones cívico–militares, y aporta una visión más amplia para los estudiosos que evalúan el comportamiento de los funcionarios que no son objeto de incentivos electorales. Les officiels non élus sont-ils influencés par l'opinion publique lorsqu'ils conseillent des dirigeants civils sur le recours à la force? Des chercheurs ont longuement débattu pour déterminer si les préférences publiques affectaient la politique étrangère, mais la plupart des études se concentrent sur les politiciens élus en négligeant les officiels non élus qui formulent les politiques et conseillent les dirigeants. Les bureaucrates et officiels non élus sont supposés prodiguer des conseils reposant sur une expertise technique, mais ils peuvent toutefois avoir des motivations institutionnelles et des raisons d'ordre civique de recommander des mesures alignées sur les préférences populaires. Cela crée potentiellement des canaux supplémentaires par lesquels l'opinion publique influence les décisions politiques. Une expérience d'enquête originale menée sur des officiers de l'Armée américaine révèle que l'opposition publique rend les dirigeants militaires moins susceptibles de recommander le recours à la force. Cet article contribue aux débats sur le rôle de l'opinion publique dans l’élaboration de la politique étrangère en y intégrant des recherches sur l'opinion publique et sur les relations entre civils et militaires et en apportant des renseignements plus larges aux chercheurs qui étudient le comportement des officiels qui ne sont pas sujets à des motivations électorales.

Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation

Latin American Politics and Society ◽

10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00292.x ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 46 (4) ◽

pp. 29-60 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez

Keyword(s):

Political Institutions ◽

Southern Cone ◽

Democratic Peace ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Military Establishment ◽

Civilian Leaders ◽

International Participation ◽

Military Relations ◽

AbstractThis paper analyzes the conditions in which the governments of Argentina and Brazil founded security institutions in the early 1990s, while they were democratizing. It advances the hypothesis that international cooperation in the security field is often linked to the evolution of civil-military relations. Civilian leaders in both countries established institutions and sought international participation deliberately to achieve civilian control and gain leverage over the military establishment, which they sorely distrusted. The need to stabilize civil-military relations at home was therefore the prime motivating force behind the emergence of security institutions in the Southern Cone. Three mechanisms were at work: omnibalancing, policy handling, and managing uncertainty. These mechanisms are derived from three different schools of thought: realism, organizational-bureaucratic models, and theories of domestic political institutions. Besides explaining the sources of nuclear bilateral cooperation, this argument also serves as a critique of two prominent theories in international relations that attempt to explain cooperation and peaceful relations among democracies: neoliberal insti-tutionalism and democratic peace theory.

No Right to Be Wrong: What Americans Think about Civil-Military Relations

Perspectives on Politics ◽

10.1017/s1537592721000013 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-19

Author(s):

Ronald R. Krebs ◽

Robert Ralston ◽

Aaron Rapport

Keyword(s):

Use Of Force ◽

Military Force ◽

Military Officers ◽

The Public ◽

Public Debates ◽

First Americans ◽

The Right ◽

Military Relations ◽

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”

Military Leaders and Foreign Policy-Making

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1952830 ◽

1963 ◽

Vol 57 (2) ◽

pp. 392-405 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Lewis J. Edinger

Keyword(s):

Comparative Politics ◽

Theoretical Models ◽

The United States ◽

Social Scientists ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Interdisciplinary Field ◽

The One ◽

Military Relations ◽

A survey of the literature of the last decade in the burgeoning interdisciplinary field which has come to be known—rather imprecisely—as civil-military relations, reveals a large number of descriptive and prescriptive, operational and theoretical studies, but little unity of focus or method. The interested shopper finds himself in a veritable department store filled with a wide assortment—including those in the bargain basement. Spurred on by wartime experiences and Cold War exigencies, historians and social scientists, physical scientists and journalists—above all in the United States—have covered reams of paper with discussions of the relationship between arms and men, war and peace, strategy and policy, defense and diplomacy. Displaying a great variety of analytical depth, breadth and sophistication, some of these studies have advanced our knowledge of civil-military relations—particularly in contemporary America—while others have failed to survive changes in international politics and weapons technology. Some writers, both of conservative and liberal orientation, have focused on the “appropriate” role for the military in state and society; others have sought to remain detached from such normative questions in order to concentrate on micro-descriptive phenomenal studies or more or less abstract macro-analytical theoretical models. Between the earth-bound descriptive and prescriptive studies on the one hand, and the soaring theoretical efforts on the other has loomed a wide gap, all too familiar to students of international relations, comparative politics, and public administration, waiting to be bridged—if bridged it can be—by empirical theories of civil-military relationships.