On Resignation

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Kohn
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Senior Officers ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: Civil-Military Relations

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Ganguly
Keyword(s):  
Civilian Control ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
National Leader ◽  
Exogenous Shocks ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
British Colonial ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Civil–military relations in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh constitute an interesting puzzle because all three nations are inheritors of the British colonial tradition of military subordination to civilian authority. The patterns that have emerged and evolved in these countries stand out in marked contrast to one another. In India, barring important and marked exceptions, the military has mostly remained away from politics and has, for the most part, been subordinate to civilian authority. In the early part of the 21st century, however, there have been some disturbing developments which call into question the political neutrality of the military. Yet it is unclear if these will lead to an erosion of the mostly apolitical ethos of the military. In Pakistan, in marked contrast, the military took part in four coups (1958, 1969, 1978, 1999), ruled the country for extensive periods of time and has secured a position in the country’s governing structure. Barring extraordinary endogenous or exogenous shocks, it is hard to envisage a dramatic change in the structure of civil–military relations in the country. In Bangladesh, the military led coups in 1975, 1982, and 2007. Even though it does not have a formal role in government, it nevertheless remains an important force in the politics of the country. No national leader can act on critical questions of public policy without taking into account the views of the uniformed military. More to the point, elements within the military have remained restive and have chafed at civilian control. What explains the three divergent pathways in these countries despite their common colonial heritage? What are the salient features of civil–military relations in these states? How have India and Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons affected the scope and dimensions of their civil–military relations? What does the future hold for civil–military relations in all three states? These are the principal questions that will addressed be drawing on a substantial swath of extant literature.

The New Civil-Military Relations

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

‘Stranger to Relate yet Wonderfully True’

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-70
Author(s):  
Manu Sehgal
Keyword(s):  
Local Administration ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Deep Roots ◽  
Peninsular India ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Early Colonial ◽  
Complete Breakdown ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Building on the preceding chapter’s effort to study war and territorial conquest from the vantage point of peninsular India, this chapter focuses on the Madras presidency at war against the sultans of Mysore (1780–4). In stark contrast to the muted resistance offered by the civilian government of Bombay, when confronted with a vastly expanded military challenge, the Madras civilian power completely imploded. The belligerent Governor George Macartney struggled to wrest control against encroachments over his civilian authority from military commanders, an overweening Bengal administration and the inveterate hostility of the rulers of Mysore. These fissiparous struggles were not merely confined to the high politics of colonial administration. Ideologues like Henry Malcolm argued for the complete inversion of the ideology of civilian control of the military, especially for the local administration in Madras presidency. Taken together—the complete breakdown of civil–military relations at the highest levels of the Madras presidency and the view from the margins of local administration—the experiment of placing the military well above and beyond the civilian components of early colonial rule had taken deep roots in peninsular India.

Egypt and Tunisia: Political Control of the Military Under Mubarak and Ben Ali

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Risa A. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Regime Type ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Alternative Strategies ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Senior Officers ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Civil–military relations varied dramatically in Egypt and Tunisia under their former dictators, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abedine Ben Ali. The leaders relied on alternative strategies of political control to accommodate the military to their rule and maintain themselves in office. Mubarak forged a grand bargain with his senior officers, while Ben Ali sought to contain the military. These strategies had important implications for how they met the imperatives of autocratic civil–military relations—keeping the military from engaging in coups and ensuring it would defend them against societal opponents, while retaining the latitude to govern. The cases illustrate the importance of studying variation in patterns of civil–military relations independently of regime type and of examining the overarching logics through which political leaders control the military.

Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives

2013 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Bruneau
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
National Security ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
South American ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

scholarly journals Mutual Embeddedness: The Architecture of Civil-Military Relations in Vietnam

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vuving
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
The Military

This chapter explores the architecture of civil-military relations in Communist Party-ruled Vietnam. Contrary to the dominant paradigm of civil-military relations in the West, civil-military relations in Vietnam follow a very different logic, that of the Leninist system. The relationship between the military and the party-state in Vietnam is characterized by mutual embeddedness. This is not a zero-sum game as the concept of civilian control implies. In the Leninist system, the military's politicization, political influence and involvement in politics are critical for the Communist Party's hegemony. The Party's absolute, direct, and comprehensive control of the military is the core of civil-military relations in the Leninist system. However, Party control is a reciprocal relationship that gives military leaders more say and more privileges than they would have under more democratic conditions. This reciprocity explains the system’s endurance as well as its internal stability. The Vietnam People's Army is deeply politicized and the political control of the military serves the interests of both the Party and the military leadership. Barring a major political reform in the Vietnam Communist Party itself, the Vietnam People's Army will remain more political than professional and commercial.

A Matter of Trust

2020 ◽  
pp. 137-148
Author(s):  
Heidi Urben ◽  
James Golby
Keyword(s):  
Public Discourse ◽  
American People ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Appropriate Behavior ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

After nearly two decades of war, public confidence in the US military remains high, even though our wars remain inconclusive. There is no shortage of public discourse on the perceived failures of civilians overseeing these wars. Yet this chapter asks: Is the uniformed military increasingly resistant to civilian oversight? Are members of the military making it tougher for political leaders to do their jobs? High public confidence in the military is neither the best measure of the health of civil-military relations nor the same thing as the military’s being trustworthy. This chapter argues that military leaders will best serve the public by focusing on ways they can exhibit appropriate behavior in their dealings with the public and civilian leaders. The trust required for healthy civil-military relations and effective civilian oversight is a two-way street, and those in uniform must recognize their responsibility for introspection, self-policing, and holding themselves to account. This chapter assesses what it might take for the armed forces to “screw up” their relationship with the American people, discussing five potential pitfalls that members of the profession of arms must avoid in order to be worthy of the public’s trust.

The Paradoxes of Huntingtonian Professionalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 17-40
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Officer Corps ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Objective Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Military Activity ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military ◽  
Military Professionalism

Samuel Huntington’s objective control model of civil-military relations has had profound effects on contemporary norms of military professionalism. Huntington anticipated that objective control, premised on a clearly defined division of responsibility between the military and civilians, would create an apolitical ethos among officers. The military’s apolitical character then would ensure its deference to civilian authority and reinforce its professional character. The approach would also enable the military to cultivate expertise in the “management of violence” and guarantee its effectiveness in armed conflict. Those norms, however, are more complex than is sometimes appreciated. They exhibit four paradoxes, producing the very behaviors and outcomes they aim to prevent: they can promote actions and mindsets within the officer corps that work to facilitate political behavior, subvert civilian control of military activity, compromise strategic effectiveness, and even undermine some aspects of military professionalism itself.

scholarly journals Discourse of civil military relations in Nepal

Unity Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 21-32
Author(s):  
Chiranjibi Bhandari ◽  
Rajendra Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Civilian Control ◽  
Multiple Perspectives ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
Military Institution ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

A sovereign nation –state requires a strong military institution and the Nepali Army demands its personnel’s obedience, loyalty, sacrifice and discipline to maintain command and control. However, as an established principle, civilian control of the military is desirable to the military control of the state. The concept of Civil Military Relations (CMR) is dynamic, evolutionary and country specific. Such a bond between an official security organization and the public in general change with regime shifts, external imperatives and technological innovations. The impact of regime changes and political movements has been observed in various aspects of politics, society in Nepal is not an exception. In this line, this article deals on the theoretical discourse of CMR, reviews the constitutional and legal provisions and examines the factors influencing CMR in Nepal from the period of modern nationstate formation to present days. Along with existing debates around the role of the Nepali Army in various non-military jobs, this paper proposes multiple perspectives on how different entities, including bureaucrats, politicians and military leaders perceive CMR. Likewise, the writers argue that sharing the responsibilities among the civil society, citizenry and military organizations is one of the most suitable approaches in response to balancing CMR in Nepal.

Civil-Military Relations Norms and Democracy

2020 ◽  
pp. 41-62
Author(s):  
Marybeth P. Ulrich
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Shared Understanding ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Principles ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Norms

American civil-military relations are rooted in constitutional foundations that distribute and check political power, such as civilian control over the military. Preserving American democracy requires adherence to these foundational democratic principles. This chapter argues that American policymakers, the military, and civilian society lack a shared understanding of the democratic norms that underpin US civil-military relations. Furthermore, poor understanding of democratic norms in general, and of civil-military relations norms in particular, puts American democracy at risk. Consequently, a review of the constitutional foundations of American civil-military relations and an assessment of the normative state of such relations is in order. This chapter defines civil-military relations; reviews the constitutional origins of American civil-military relations; presents the essential civil-military norms for democratic states; and highlights the responsibilities of political leaders, military actors, and civilian society to uphold them. Such a review contributes to improving the shared understanding of democratic civil-military relations norms that is essential to their preservation.

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