scholarly journals Assessing the potential impact on health of the UK's future relationship agreement with the EU: analysis of the negotiating positions

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Fahy ◽  
Tamara Hervey ◽  
Mark Dayan ◽  
Mark Flear ◽  
Mike Galsworthy ◽  
...  

Abstract While policy attention is understandably diverted to COVID-19, the end of the UK's post-Brexit ‘transition period’ remains 31 December 2020. All forms of future EU−UK relationship are worse for health than EU membership, but analysis of the negotiating texts shows some forms are better than others. The likely outcomes involve major negative effects for NHS staffing, funding for health and social care, and capital financing for the NHS; and for UK global leadership and influence. We expect minor negative effects for cross border healthcare (except in Northern Ireland); research collaboration; and data sharing, such as the Early Warning and Response System for health threats. Despite political narratives, the legal texts show that the UK seeks de facto continuity in selected key areas for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], especially clinical trials, pharmacovigilance, and batch-testing. The UK will be excluded from economies of scale of EU membership, e.g. joint procurement programmes as used recently for PPE. Above all, there is a major risk of reaching an agreement with significant adverse effects for health, without meaningful oversight by or input from the UK Parliament, or other health policy stakeholders.

Author(s):  
Ludovic Highman

On such divisive issues as EU membership and, consequently, the post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it is unsurprising that Theresa May’s government has been torn between a “hard” and a “soft” Brexit. As of June 2018, there is still no indication of which approach will prevail, putting at risk UK universities’ participation in the Erasmus+ program, which has provided, among other things, opportunities for over four million Europeans to study, train, and volunteer abroad since its inception. Full access to EU research funds is also at risk. Universities cannot depend on the UK government’s help in securing the frameworks allowing for continuity. In such a context, universities have started to use their limited resources to secure bilateral international and European links to foster research collaboration and staff and student mobility, post-Brexit.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-517
Author(s):  
Kitty Stewart ◽  
Kerris Cooper ◽  
Isabel Shutes

While social policy falls predominantly under national rather than European Union (EU) jurisdiction, there are nonetheless multiple ways in which social policy and social outcomes in EU member states have been affected by EU membership. This paper draws on existing evidence and analysis to review the consequences for UK social policy of the decision to leave the EU. We focus predominantly on the implications of the British government’s pledge to ‘take back control’ of money, borders and laws. Our conclusion is that Brexit is likely to have negative effects on the quality of public services and, for some groups in particular, social rights, and that these effects are likely to be greater the more distant are the future trading and wider relationships between the UK and the EU27.


Subject The package of reforms on a new EU-UK relationship. Significance The agreement between the United Kingdom and its EU partners sets the stage for the UK referendum on EU membership, which Prime Minister David Cameron has set for June 23. Cameron said he had negotiated new terms that would allow the United Kingdom to remain in the EU. Impacts The deal bolsters the campaign to remain in the EU, but the referendum outcome is still highly uncertain. The deal will only come into effect if the outcome is for remaining, forestalling a second referendum for better terms. If the outcome is for leaving, a new relationship with the EU would have to be negotiated during a two-year transition period. It would also probably lead to a second Scottish independence referendum and UK break-up.


Significance The process has been plunged into further uncertainty by the outcome of the June 8 UK general election, which has sparked renewed debate about what kind of Brexit the United Kingdom wants and what kind of future economic relationship with the EU it should seek to negotiate. Impacts The UK government’s weakness is a cause for concern elsewhere in the EU, raising fears that it may not be able to compromise on key issues. Many businesses will begin implementing strategies for dealing with Brexit early next year, before knowing the outcome of the negotiations. Pressure for a lengthy transition period will continue to build. The political turmoil and slowing economic growth in the United Kingdom may increase support for EU membership elsewhere in the bloc.


2018 ◽  
Vol 244 ◽  
pp. R46-R55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Erken ◽  
Raphie Hayat ◽  
Carlijn Prins ◽  
Marijn Heijmerikx ◽  
Inge de Vreede

We analyse the costs of Brexit. The results show that by 2030 a hard Brexit would reduce cumulative GDP growth by 18 percentage points compared to a situation where the UK continued its EU membership. The economic damage in our FTA and soft Brexit scenarios is less severe than in our hard Brexit scenario, although it will still cost the UK economy roughly 12.5 percentage points and 10 percentage points of cumulative GDP growth by 2030, respectively. We find much larger negative effects than most existing studies that use macroeconometric modelling to assess the effects of Brexit. This is due to two reasons. First, we use an improved tariff version of the macroeconometric model NiGEM, which enables us better to assess the negative impact of cost-push inflation resulting from imposed trade barriers. Second, we estimate a new productivity model for the UK, which allows us to gauge adequately the negative UK-specific effects on productivity caused by Brexit.


2018 ◽  
pp. 19-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludovic Highman

On such divisive issues as EU membership and, consequently, the post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, it is unsurprising that Theresa May’s government has been torn between a “hard” and a “soft” Brexit. As of June 2018, there is still no indication of which approach will prevail, putting at risk UK universities’ participation in the Erasmus+ program, which has provided, among other things, opportunities for over four million Europeans to study, train, and volunteer abroad since its inception. Full access to EU research funds is also at risk. Universities cannot depend on the UK government’s help in securing the frameworks allowing for continuity. In such a context, universities have started to use their limited resources to secure bilateral international and European links to foster research collaboration and staff and student mobility, post-Brexit.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Cavallaro ◽  
Benedetto Lepori

AbstractThe aim of this study was to examine how institutional barriers arising from policy decisions influence the level of participation of third-party countries in European Framework Programs (EU-FPs). To achieve this, we contrasted the effect of EU funding restrictions following Switzerland’s 2014 reclassification as a “third country” in Horizon 2020, and the political uncertainties resulting from the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom (UK). We compared the participation patterns of Swiss and UK higher education institutions (HEIs) with control groups of similar European HEIs over time and, complementarily, analyzed changes in the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Our results showed that the Brexit-induced uncertainty had stronger negative effects than the Swiss reclassification, which was, however, characterized by effective EU funding restrictions. In both cases, the negative impact of institutional barriers was stronger for the more central HEIs in EU-FP networks. These results suggest that the effect of institutional barriers is closely linked to consortium building mechanisms, where research collaboration requires stability and projection over the long term. Regarding individual grants, the impact was stronger for Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions than for European Research Council grants, suggesting that a researcher’s mobility is affected by political uncertainties. Finally, in the UK case, we observed a steep decrease in the participation of SMEs. Based on these results, we suggest that a stable framework of participation and a clear ruling on relationships with the EU for what concerns people’s mobility and economic relationships are key to fostering the participation of third-party countries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 269-293
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter describes what is interchangeably called the ‘common market’, the ‘single market’, or the ‘internal market’. These terms all refer to the same concept: a geographical area made up of the territories of the Member States, wherein there are (in theory) no barriers to trade, and which operate an identical external trade policy. The chapter looks at the completion of the single market, considering the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. It also identifies what makes the single market unique, detailing the stages of economic integration and the key components of the EU's internal market. In light of the Withdrawal Agreement, it will be some time before the UK distances itself from the EU's internal market. The transition period created by the Withdrawal Agreement effectively results in a form of ongoing ‘EU membership’ without institutional representation. Both the positive regulations that make up the internal market and the EU's customs union rules will thus continue to apply to the UK until at least the end of 2020.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-104
Author(s):  
Adam Adam

The process of human development is inseparable from the influence of the environment, so the development of adolescents who sit in junior high school will be different from adolescents in high school, or in college, even though human life is definitely not going to be separated from the past and the future. Adolescence is one of the development periods experienced by humans in their lives. During the transition, adolescents are in an unstable condition. There is a feeling of insecurity, because they have to change or change the behavior patterns of adolescents from children to adults. From this transition period the potential for social conflict arises, because of the desire to meet human needs. Sociodrama is one of the techniques in group guidance that aims to solve social problems that arise in human relationships that can be implemented if most group members face similar social problems, or if they want to practice or change certain attitudes. Conflicts can have positive or negative effects, and they always exist in life. The problem is how the conflict can be managed in such a way that it does not cause social disintegration. Therefore, it needs a conflict management, so that the conflict can be controlled and directed


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-88
Author(s):  
James I. J. Green

A custom-made device (CMD) is a medical device intended for the sole use of a particular patient. In a dental setting, CMDs include prosthodontic devices, orthodontic appliances, bruxism splints, speech prostheses and devices for the treatment of obstructive sleep apnoea, trauma prevention and orthognathic surgery facilitation (arch bars and interocclusal wafers). Since 1993, the production and provision of CMDs have been subject to European Union (EU) Directive 93/42/EEC (Medical Device Directive, MDD) given effect in the UK by The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (Statutory Instrument 2002/618), and its subsequent amendments. Regulation (EU) 2017/745 (Medical Device Regulation, EU MDR) replaces the MDD and the other EU Directive pertaining to Medical Devices, Council Directive 90/385/EEC (Active Implantable Medical Device Directive, AIMDD). The EU MDR was published on 5 April 2017, came into force on 25 May 2017 and, following a three-year transition period was due to be fully implemented and repeal the MDD on 26 May 2020, but was deferred until 26 May 2021 due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. In the UK, in preparation for the country’s planned departure from the EU, the EU MDR, with necessary amendments, was transposed into UK law (Medical Devices (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, UK MDR). The UK left the Union on 31 January 2020 and entered a transition period that ended on 31 December 2020, meaning that, from 1 January 2021, dental professionals in Great Britain who prescribe and manufacture CMDs are mandated to do so in accordance with the new legislation while Northern Ireland remains in line with the EU legislation and implementation date. This paper sets out the requirements that relate to the production and provision of CMDs in a UK dental setting.


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