scholarly journals Political institutions, lobbying and corruption

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-939 ◽  
Author(s):  
NAURO F. CAMPOS ◽  
FRANCESCO GIOVANNONI
Keyword(s):  
Government Policy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Institution ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Enterprise Level ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Impact

AbstractAlthough firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.

Presidential Institutions and Electoral Participation in Concurrent Elections in Latin America

2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Carreras
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Electoral Participation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Concurrent Elections

Previous studies of voter turnout in Latin America have found weak and inconsistent evidence for the link between political institutions and electoral participation. In this article, I use data from an expanded dataset of voter turnout in Latin America (1980–2016) to show that institutions do have an impact on citizens’ decisions on whether or not to participate in concurrent elections. Whereas previous studies analyzed the effect of legislative institutions on voter turnout, this article estimates a series of models that demonstrate the impact of presidential institutions and the political context surrounding presidential elections on electoral participation. The findings suggest that when first-order (presidential) and second-order (legislative) elections take place concurrently, electoral participation is influenced primarily by presidential institutions (term length, presidential powers, and electoral rules) and the electoral context in which the presidential elections take place (effective number of presidential candidates).

scholarly journals Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Development: An Empirical Reflection

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (4I-II) ◽  
pp. 657-673
Author(s):  
Karim Khan ◽  
Saima Batool ◽  
Anwar Shah
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Human Development Index ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Development Index ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Impact

Since the recent emphasis on institutions for overall economic development of the countries, the research in this strand has expanded enormously. In this study, we want to see the impact of political institutions on economic development in pure cross-country setting. We take the Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure of economic development and use two alternative measures of dictatorship. We find that dictatorship is adversely affecting economic development in our sample of 92 countries. For instance, transition from extreme dictatorship to ideal democracy would increase HDI by 17 percent. Moreover, our results are robust to alternative specifications and the problems of endogeneity and reverse causation as is shown by the results of 2 Stages Least Squares (2SLS). JEL Classification: P16, H11, H41, H42 Keywords: Economic Development, Human Development Index, Dictatorship

Political connectedness and business performance: evidence from Turkish industry rankings

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gül Berna Özcan ◽  
Umut Gündüz
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Business Performance ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Firm Level Data ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Political Connectedness

This paper examines the degree to which political connections affect business rankings through a statistical analysis of Turkey's industry rankings between 2003 and 2011. The analysis demonstrates that business performance is associated with connectedness through industry and firm level data. We show that political connectedness varies according to the firm's channel of access to obtain favouritism either through direct personal ties or institutional networks. Ideological motivations emerge to be significant in mobilizing, shaping and tying firm behaviour to broader political agendas. In the conclusion we discuss the impact of deepening connectedness on long-term business fortunes and political institutions.

A Neglected Mechanism of Social Movement Political Influence: The Role of Anticorporate and Anti-Institutional Protest in Changing Government Policy

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Young ◽  
Michael Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Effective Strategy ◽  
Progressive Reform ◽  
Progressive Policy ◽  
Mass Protest ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Primary Strategy

Studies of the impact of social movements on government policy usually assume that the most effective strategy to win a reform is to directly pressure the elected politicians responsible for its legislation and implementation. We highlight an alternative, less intuitive way in which movements can exert political influence: by targeting the corporate and institutional adversaries of their proposed reforms. Such targeting can undermine their adversaries' ability or commitment to oppose the changes, thus relaxing the contrary pressure applied to politicians and reducing the resistance within government to progressive reform. We support this proposition by highlighting five instances in which mass pressure applied to institutional adversaries contributed to government policy change. Our analysis demonstrates that mass protest targeting large institutions whose leaders are not elected can be an effective and even primary strategy for compelling elected officials to enact and implement progressive policy change.

Climate Shocks, Political Institutions, and Nomadic Invasions in Early Modern East Asia

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
pp. 1043-1069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwen Yin
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Climatic Conditions ◽  
Political Institution ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Climate Shocks ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Effect

While a large literature argues negative climate shocks can trigger conflicts, recent findings suggest moderate climatic conditions lead to war. This article proposes a conditional theory by incorporating political institution as a moderating variable. I argue that, under the impact of negative climate shocks, centralized societies can mobilize more resources for war, compared to decentralized societies. Thus, the former is more likely to resort to well-organized plundering to address the scarcity problem caused by detrimental climate shocks. Besides, centralized societies have little incentive to plunder when the climatic conditions are moderate, as they can collect taxes regularly through centralized institutions. A comparison between the more centralized Manchurian and the less centralized Mongols on their conflictual behavior serves as an empirical test. I find that temperature was negatively associated with the probability of Manchurian invasion after they embraced centralization but had a positive effect on the likelihood of Mongol invasion.

Race and Reapportionment, 1962: The Case of Georgia Senate Redistricting

2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peyton McCrary ◽  
Steven F. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Adoption And Implementation ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact

Courts, both state and federal, often play a substantial role in the adoption and implementation of changes in public policy. Properly understood, the impact of court decisions must be examined in the context of actions and reactions by other branches of government, political parties, and interest groups. Among the most transformative court decisions over the last half century are those involving legislative reapportionment and minority voting rights. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal courts restructured the nation's political institutions through decisions striking down malapportioned legislatures and local governing bodies through what used to be termed the “reapportionment revolution,” perhaps the only revolution ignored altogether by historians. Shortly thereafter the courts extended their attack on quantitative vote dilution (which the “one-person, one-vote” standard is designed to address) to include protection against electoral rules that dilute the voting strength of racial minorities.

scholarly journals The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1218-1244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley ◽  
Torsten Persson
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
State Capacity ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Institutional Capacity ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Fiscal Capacity ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Political Determinants ◽  
Cross Country

Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where “policy choices” in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)

Impact of external currency exposures on macroeconomic policies

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
I. V. Prilepskiy
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Macroeconomic Policies ◽  
Panel Regressions ◽  
Financial Account ◽  
Currency Exposure ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Impact

Based on cross-country panel regressions, the paper analyzes the impact of external currency exposures on monetary policy, exchange rate regime and capital controls. It is determined that positive net external position (which, e.g., is the case for Russia) is associated with a higher degree of monetary policy autonomy, i.e. the national key interest rate is less responsive to Fed/ECB policy and exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, the risks of cross-country synchronization of financial cycles are reduced, while central banks are able to place a larger emphasis on their price stability mandates. Significant positive impact of net external currency exposure on exchange rate flexibility and financial account liberalization is only found in the context of static models. This is probably due to the two-way links between incentives for external assets/liabilities accumulation and these macroeconomic policy tools.

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