Effect of perspective taking on the cognitive representation of persons: A merging of self and other.

1996 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark H. Davis ◽  
Laura Conklin ◽  
Amy Smith ◽  
Carol Luce
2021 ◽  
pp. 026540752110463
Author(s):  
Laura Stafford ◽  
Susan L. Kline ◽  
Xiaodan Hu

Surname practices in the U.S. are believed to reflect and reinforce the enduring patriarchal nature of U.S. society. Yet, some women and men reject patriarchal expectations. Calls for research accounting for such individual variations have been made. We examine the role that dispositional differences play in preferences for and reasoning about marital surnames in a sample of U.S. heterosexual women and men. With an online survey, we examined 799 heterosexual unmarried emerging adults’ (mean age = 19.9) preferences for their own and a future partner’s surname, reasons for their preferences, and associations with social cognitive dispositions relevant to self- and other-orientations: narcissism and perspective-taking. The findings suggest greater flexibility about women’s surname preferences than previously reported. Approximately one-third of men and women were open to nontraditional options. Reasons for preferences included heritage, tradition, masculinity norms, conceptions of marriage and family, identity, family pressures, and practical reasons. After controlling for age, relational status, traditionalism, autonomy, and career aspirations, lower perspective-taking was predictive of women’s preferences for both partners to retain their birth names, whereas greater narcissism was associated with women’s preferences to retain their birth name. Greater narcissism was associated with men’s desires for both partners to use his name. Taken together, the addition of individual difference dispositions provides greater insight into surname preferences and reasons for those preferences beyond gender masculinity norms.


2020 ◽  
pp. 088626052090619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna R. Hudson ◽  
Lize De Coster ◽  
Hanne Spoormans ◽  
Sylvia Verbeke ◽  
Kaat Van der Jeught ◽  
...  

Experience of childhood abuse (CA) impairs complex social functioning in children; however, much less is known about its effects on basic sociocognitive processes and even fewer studies have investigated these in adult survivors. Using two behavioral tasks, this study investigated spontaneous theory of mind (ToM) and imitative behavior in 41 women with CA and 26 unaffected comparison (UC) women. In the spontaneous ToM task, UCs showed a larger ToM index than CAs, indicating more facilitation by knowledge of another’s false belief. In the imitation–inhibition task, CAs experienced less interference than UCs when observing another’s incongruent movements. After controlling for depression, differences in ToM became marginally significant, yet remained highly significant for inhibiting imitative behavior. The findings suggest CA survivors have altered perspective-taking and are less influenced by others’ perspectives, potentially due to changes in self-other distinction. Clinical implications regarding therapeutic practice with survivors of CA are discussed.


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole David ◽  
Carolin Aumann ◽  
Bettina H. Bewernick ◽  
Natacha S. Santos ◽  
Fritz-G. Lehnhardt ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arndis Simonsen ◽  
Mia Ilsø Mahnkeke ◽  
Riccardo Fusaroli ◽  
Thomas Wolf ◽  
Andreas Roepstorff ◽  
...  

Abstract Characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia, such as thought broadcasting, verbal hallucinations, and delusions of being controlled, suggest a failure in distinguishing between oneself and others. In addition, patients frequently experience mentalizing deficits, which could be related to such a failure. Here we investigated the tendency to distinguish self and other with a visual perspective-taking task that measures to what extent individuals spontaneously take another’s perspective when having to process their own (altercentric intrusion) or vice versa (egocentric intrusion). This was done in 22 patients with first-episode schizophrenia and 23 matched healthy controls. We assessed whether patients displayed altered altercentric or egocentric intrusion and whether such alterations are related to mentalizing deficits—as measured with the Animated Triangles Task (ATT) and The Awareness of Social Inference Task (TASIT) —and/or specific psychotic symptoms, suggestive of problems with self-other distinction. The results showed that patients display similar egocentric intrusion and increased altercentric intrusion compared to controls. Degree of altercentric intrusion was associated with severity of delusions and hallucinations that have been tied to problems with self-other distinction but not with unrelated delusions and hallucinations or negative symptom severity. Higher altercentric intrusion was also associated with better TASIT performance in both patients and controls; suggesting that it may also be beneficial. In conclusion, patients display difficulties inhibiting representations of the other when having to process self-relevant information. A failure to control or distinguish the 2 representations could give rise to the experience that others have access to and control of your thoughts and actions.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.A Seymour, ◽  
H. Wang, ◽  
G. Rippon, ◽  
K. Kessler,

AbstractMentally imagining another’s perspective is a high-level social process, reliant on manipulating internal representations of the self in an embodied manner. Recently Wang et al., (1) showed that theta-band (3-7Hz) brain oscillations within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) and brain regions coding for motor/body schema contribute to the process of perspective-taking. Using a task requiring participants to engage in embodied perspective-taking, we set out to unravel the extended functional brain network and its connections in detail. We found that increasing the angle of disparity between self and other perspective was accompanied by longer reaction times and increases in theta power within rTPJ, right lateral pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Using nonparametric Granger-causality, we showed that during later stages of perspective-taking, the lateral PFC and ACC exert top-down influences over rTPJ, indicative of executive control processes required for managing conflicts between self and other perspectives. Finally, we quantified patterns of whole-brain phase coupling (imaginary coherence) in relation to rTPJ during high-level perspective taking. Results suggest that rTPJ increases its theta-band phase synchrony with brain regions involved in mentalizing and regions coding for motor/body schema; whilst decreasing its synchrony to visual regions. Implications for neurocognitive models are discussed, and it is proposed that rTPJ acts as a ‘hub’ to route bottom-up visual information to internal representations of the self during perspective-taking, co-ordinated by theta-band oscillations. The self is then projected onto the other’s perspective via embodied motor/body schema transformations, regulated by top-down cingulo-frontal activity.Significance StatementHigh-level social processing, such as the ability to imagine another’s visuospatial experience of the world (perspective taking), is a core part of what makes us human. Building on a substantial body of converging previous evidence, our study reveals how concerted activity across the cortex in low frequencies (theta: 3-7 Hz) implements this crucial human process. We found that oscillatory power and connectivity (imaginary coherence, nonparametric Granger causality) at theta frequency linked functional sub-networks of executive control, mentalizing, and sensorimotor/body schema via a main hub located in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Our findings inform neurocognitive models of social cognition by describing the co-ordinated changes in brain network connectivity, mediated by theta oscillations, during perspective-taking.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy I.M. Carpendale ◽  
Charlie Lewis ◽  
Ulrich Müller ◽  
Timothy P. Racine

The ability to take others’ perspectives on the self has important psychological implications. Yet the logically and developmentally prior question is how children develop the capacity to take others’ perspectives. We discuss the development of joint attention in infancy as a rudimentary form of perspective taking and critique examples of biological and individualistic approaches to the development of joint attention. As an alternative, we present an activity-based relational perspective according to which infants develop the capacity to coordinate attention with others by differentiating the perspectives of self and other from shared activity. Joint attention is then closely related to language development, which makes further social development possible. We argue that the ability to take the perspective of others on the self gives rise to the possibility of language, rationality and culture.


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1686) ◽  
pp. 20150079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie de Guzman ◽  
Geoffrey Bird ◽  
Michael J. Banissy ◽  
Caroline Catmur

We review the evidence that an ability to achieve a precise balance between representing the self and representing other people is crucial in social interaction. This ability is required for imitation, perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy; and disruption to this ability may contribute to the symptoms of clinical and sub-clinical conditions, including autism spectrum disorder and mirror-touch synaesthesia. Moving beyond correlational approaches, a recent intervention study demonstrated that training participants to control representations of the self and others improves their ability to control imitative behaviour, and to take another's visual perspective. However, it is unclear whether these effects apply to other areas of social interaction, such as the ability to empathize with others. We report original data showing that participants trained to increase self–other control in the motor domain demonstrated increased empathic corticospinal responses (Experiment 1) and self-reported empathy (Experiment 2), as well as an increased ability to control imitation. These results suggest that the ability to control self and other representations contributes to empathy as well as to other types of social interaction.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110544
Author(s):  
Paola del Sette ◽  
Markus Bindemann ◽  
Heather J Ferguson

Studies of visual perspective-taking have shown that adults can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other peoples’ viewpoints, but they experience difficulties when the two perspectives are inconsistent. We tested whether these egocentric (i.e. interference from one’s own perspective) and altercentric biases (i.e. interference from another person’s perspective) persist in ecologically-valid complex environments. Participants (N=150) completed a dot-probe visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in natural scenes containing real people, first only according to their own perspective and then judging both their own and another person’s perspective. Results showed that the other person’s perspective did not disrupt self perspective-taking judgements when the other perspective was not explicitly prompted. In contrast, egocentric and altercentric biases were found when participants were prompted to switch between self and other perspectives. These findings suggest that altercentric visual perspective-taking can be activated spontaneously in complex real-world contexts, but is subject to both top-down and bottom-up influences, including explicit prompts or salient visual stimuli.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document