House seeks veto power over all NSF grants

1975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Schaar
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.


1946 ◽  
Vol 1 (12) ◽  
pp. 15-16
Author(s):  
David R. Inglis
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  

2022 ◽  
pp. 107769902110665
Author(s):  
Tae Ho Lee

Drawing on the theory of gradual institutional change, this study analyzed the post-Civil War college reform efforts in North Carolina, integrating power with public relations history. Reformers worked under harsh institutional circumstances where resident elites held high veto power, while reformers had a low level of discretion for interpreting college education. Notwithstanding, reformers adopted layering tactics, introducing new rules of education for all alongside existing ones of education as legacy, for gradual institutional change. Specifically, reformers maintained a calm and objective tone, focusing on the universal value of education, both publicly and through anonymous publications in hostile press venues.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-279
Author(s):  
Renata Christha Auli

Abstract The tensions between Muslim and Buddhist communities in Rakhine, Myanmar have escalated and became the international spotlight. Massacre in the Rohingya is a serious violation of human rights. In accordance with the functions of the United Nation, this international organization is expected to prevent and eliminate crimes against humanity that occur in the Rohingya. One of the main organs in charge of maintaining international peace and security is the UN Security Council. However, the fact that the United Nations failed to carry out its duties was because Russia has veto power and has blocked the statement which was expressed by UN Security council concerning this situation to punish Myanmar in resolving the Rohingya case, solely due to the political relationship between Russia and Myanmar. The failure of the United Nations is the world's debt to the Rohingya tribe, accordingly to redeem the debt it is needed reform of the UN Security Council.  Keywords: Humanitarian Crimes, Rohingya, Security Council, United Nations, Veto   Abstrak Perseteruan yang terjadi antara umat Muslim dan Buddha di Rakhine, Myanmar, kembali terjadi dan menjadi sorotan dunia internasional. Pembantaian di Rohingya merupakan pelanggaran berat terhadap hak asasi manusia. Perserikatan Bangsa- Bangsa (PBB) merupakan organisasi internasional yang diharapkan dapat mencegah dan menghapus kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan yang terjadi di Rohingya, sesuai dengan fungsi dari Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa. Salah satu organ utama yang bertugas untuk menjaga perdamaian dan keamanan internasional adalah Dewan Keamanan PBB. Namun fakta yang terjadi PBB gagal dalam menjalankan tugasnya karena Rusia terus melakukan veto terhadap Resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB untuk menghukum Myanmar dalam penyelesaian kasus Rohingya, karena semata- mata hubungan politik antara Rusia dengan Myanmar. Kegagalan PBB merupakan utang dunia terhadap suku Rohingya, sehingga untuk dapat menebus utang tersebut diperlukan reformasi Dewan Keamanan PBB. Kata Kunci: Dewan Keamanan, Kejahatan Kemanusiaan, Perserikatan Bangsa- Bangsa, Rohingya, Veto


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