The age of military leaders and expansion of the Armed Forces.

1956 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. A. McMahan ◽  
J. W. Combs
Author(s):  
Joseph T. Glatthaar

Since the 1970s, the United States has struggled to accept that its economic and military powers are finite. The Conclusion looks at ways the American military might make progress while acknowledging these limitations. The American military could be reinvigorated by better communication between politicians and military leaders, a return to traditional values of prudence and circumspection, and greater support during wartime. Technology may have transformed warfare, but enemies often find low-cost means of reducing their impact. The United States possesses the world’s most sophisticated military force, but sometimes the task is greater than it can fulfill, or the results are not worth the price.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Alic

Management in government differs fundamentally from private sector management, the more so in defense, which differs from other US government missions in that very large sums are spent on high-technology systems and equipment to meet the unknowable contingencies of an uncertain future. Because of technological complexity, the difficulties of program selection, contracting, and oversight exceed those in other parts of government. An underappreciated set of problems aggravates these difficulties, notably a lack of metrics for assessing the performance of military systems. In the absence of such metrics, and given the elastic meanings attached to national security, civilian officials have been unable to exercise effective oversight of defense acquisition, leaving discretionary choices by military leaders largely unchecked. For such reasons, common prescriptions for acquisition reform, such as adoption of “proven business practices,” are unrealistic. Meaningful reform would begin by increasing the influence of civilian officials over acquisition decisions and reducing that of the armed forces.


Author(s):  
Grigoriy Yu. Volkov

The victory over the Axis powers had virtually preserved Russia in world history. It was a great celebration not only of the armed forces, but also of ideas. The article widely uses Soviet and modern publications, by both Russian and foreign scientists, dedicated to the East Front of World War II. The criminal essence of Adolf Hitler’s personality, his personal traits, way of thinking is shown, the analysis of his statements, offi cial speeches, private conversations, «table speeches», «Mein Kampf» is carried out. It also reconstructs the thinking process of other Nazi civil and military leaders who acted together with their Führer in pursuit of the common goal. The article for the fi rst time, taking into account the logic of thinking of the leadership of the third Reich, traces literally by years that the war against the USSR was conceived as a total genocide and carefully worked out in all directions. The author concludes that the bloody and inhuman logic of the leadership of the German Reich, big entrepreneurs and bankers, members of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party and the Schutzstaffel, generals and soldiers of the Wehrmacht, and a virtual legion of various offi cials clearly shows that they were all united in their desire to «stop Russian history».


Author(s):  
Vladimir V. Kanishchev

We consider a new aspect of the well-studied themе, related to objective circumstances and subjective motives for choosing a life position in the Civil war: the entry of former officers of the Russian Imperial army into the ranks of the Soviet or rebel armed forces. First of all, contradic-tions in information about the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary military service of a se-lected circle of persons are revealed. With a sufficient degree of accuracy, 16 former officers who became the leaders of the suppression of the “Antonovshchina” in 1920–1921 and a maximum of 23 rebel commanders from the ranks of officers of the “old” army are identified. Differences of the social and professional image of the commanders of the opposing sides are established. Among the Soviet commanders, career officers from different classes prevailed, including 5 peasants (only 1 – Russian), of non-Tambov origin, who entered the region no earlier than 1917. On the contrary, among the rebel military leaders, all, except for one tradesman, came from the peasant class (only 3 were not from the Tambov Governorate). However, the loyalty of some former rebel commanders to their political leadership was low. Therefore, the study specially analyzes the “psychology of betrayal” of such people who went over to the side of the Soviet troops. The military leaders of the suppression of the Tambov rebellion, who came from the officer environment, made a choice in favor of Soviet power in 1917–1918 and by 1920 they repeatedly showed loyalty to the “workers’ and peasants’ state”. However, for the time being, this state recognized the devotion of, in principle, alien to it “gold-chasers”. In the 1930s almost all officers who took part in the suppression of the Tambov rebellion became victims of political repression.


Author(s):  
John A. Alic

The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins. The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage. The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. If they do not prevail on a particular issue, service leaders expect to outwait their opponents; if they lose one battle over money or some cherished weapon system, they anticipate winning the next.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Nishi Mishra ◽  
Apoorva Ghanekar ◽  
Arunima Gupta

The present selection system of the officer cadre of the Armed Forces has stood the test of time. However, owing to the transformations and developments in the society, a need was felt to upgrade this system. After a number of interactions and deliberations, a new programme called ‘De Novo system for the Selection of Personnel in the Armed forces’ was initiated. To identify the domains that need to be assessed through this system, job analysis was carried out. Data were collected from the presently employed officers of the Armed Forces, and the officers were asked to fill out survey performa, critical incidents record, task inventory and attribute questionnaire. Job analysis identified 5 domains of assessment, namely, cognition, affect, behaviour, psychomotor, and values. 16 Attributes of military leaders under these 5 domains were also identified. Tests were developed under the three techniques (psychological, group testing, and interview) to assess these 16 attributes and the 5 domains. The prototype of the tests was developed following an assessment centre approach and the trials for the same are due in the coming months.


2019 ◽  
pp. 250-272
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee

This chapter discusses contemporary civil–military relations in India, engaging with, and occasionally refuting, a number of narratives. It begins with an overview of four main controversies—the dispute about withdrawal of troops from the Siachen glacier, the contrasting views over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the tenure of General V. K. Singh (chief of army staff from 2010 to 2012), and issues arising from pay commission reports and the equivalence between civilians and the military. These issues highlight the overall theme of this book—that there is considerable distrust and tension between civilians and the military. Next, it briefly discusses civil–military relations under the Modi government. Thereafter, it examines the issue of defense reforms, considered by many as a panacea to overcoming these difficulties. This is followed by an analysis of the divergence in the positions typically taken across all three levels—political, bureaucratic, and the military leaders.


2011 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Jennifer Mittelstadt

AbstractThis article tells the story of an often-forgotten attempt to unionize the United States armed forces in the 1970s. The American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), an AFL-CIO-affiliated union representing federal employees, voted to allow military personnel to join its union in 1976. Military personnel proved far more open to the bid than expected. Nursing grievances from threatened congressional cuts to their institutional benefits, between one-third and one-half welcomed the union. Though a worried Congress, a powerful military leadership, and skeptical public opinion quashed unionization within the year, the brief episode nevertheless left an influential legacy. Coming just after the difficult transition from the draft to the volunteer force, the union bid forced military leaders, soldiers, and supporters in Congress to defend both military service and military benefits from encroachments of an “occupational” model symbolized by unionization. Their successful distinction between military service and employment elevated the former as uniquely honorable and arduous—and thus deserving of unwavering congressional support. Public unions, the embodiment of the occupational threat to military service, emerged bruised by the comparisons to vaunted military service and endured a decades-long decline in membership and congressional protection.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten F. Roennfeldt

Identifying and developing officer competence is important to a nation’s security and a crucial attribute of a legitimate military establishment. Critics have claimed that the U.S. officer corps favors a narrow conception of expertise that limits the armed forces’ utility as an instrument of policy. Drawing from the dialogue between Huntington and Janowitz, as well as Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom, this article proposes a wider understanding of officer competence consisting of four distinct conceptual categories. The U.S. defense establishment favors “military skill” over other categories of competence. As a result, the officer corps is poorly prepared for 21st-century warfare. To remedy this situation, professional military education should cultivate military leaders that, in addition to military skill, have sociopolitical competence and practical wisdom. In this context, this article suggests strategies to develop such competencies that officers need to be able to achieve a diversity of national political goals.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-109
Author(s):  
Mikhail Dmitrievich Tochiony

Since 1956, historians, legal scholars and representatives of other social Sciences and Humanities have been trying to understand what happened to the population of our country in the second half of the 30-ies of XX century. Why did people lose common sense and believe in delusional fabrications of I. V. Stalin about the transformation of millions of Soviet citizens who piously believed in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, into the malignant saboteurs? Why did most of them demand severe punishment of traitors, when the Soviet Newspapers reported the discovery of an enormous conspiracy in the ranks of the Red army? The article is an attempt to assess the General opinions of the so-called military (anti-Soviet Trotskist military organization), which resulted in the shooting of the prominent Soviet military leaders led by M.N. Tukhachevskiy - I.P. Uborevich, I.E. Yakir, A.I. Cork and thousands of brave, talented Soviet soldiers, committed to the cause of socialism. Thus the armed forces of our country, its defense was dealt a severe blow, which, in the opinion of some researchers predetermined the huge losses of the Soviet Union, especially in the first years of Hitler's aggression. We are especially interested in the following aspect of the military - was it fabricated, and the Red Marshal was its innocent victim, or, on the contrary, was it investigated in complete conformity to the law and the perpetrators got the punishment they deserved? The author has assessed the key issues - both liberal-minded researchers and apologists of Stalinism.


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