scholarly journals «The anti-soviet trotskist organization»: historiographical notes

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-109
Author(s):  
Mikhail Dmitrievich Tochiony

Since 1956, historians, legal scholars and representatives of other social Sciences and Humanities have been trying to understand what happened to the population of our country in the second half of the 30-ies of XX century. Why did people lose common sense and believe in delusional fabrications of I. V. Stalin about the transformation of millions of Soviet citizens who piously believed in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, into the malignant saboteurs? Why did most of them demand severe punishment of traitors, when the Soviet Newspapers reported the discovery of an enormous conspiracy in the ranks of the Red army? The article is an attempt to assess the General opinions of the so-called military (anti-Soviet Trotskist military organization), which resulted in the shooting of the prominent Soviet military leaders led by M.N. Tukhachevskiy - I.P. Uborevich, I.E. Yakir, A.I. Cork and thousands of brave, talented Soviet soldiers, committed to the cause of socialism. Thus the armed forces of our country, its defense was dealt a severe blow, which, in the opinion of some researchers predetermined the huge losses of the Soviet Union, especially in the first years of Hitler's aggression. We are especially interested in the following aspect of the military - was it fabricated, and the Red Marshal was its innocent victim, or, on the contrary, was it investigated in complete conformity to the law and the perpetrators got the punishment they deserved? The author has assessed the key issues - both liberal-minded researchers and apologists of Stalinism.


Author(s):  
Fei Wu

Vladimir Putin's annual address as president in 2006 neatly summaries the reason why Russia had to press forward with long-overdue reforms of its armed forces. Two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was still left with an oversized military organization built for large-scale mobilization and the demands of the Cold War, but highly ineffective for the type of conventional military conflicts that Russia was most likely to become involved in. The rationale behind Russia's reforms of the armed forces were thus clear long before the war in Georgia, which has often been pointed to as the reason why the reforms were launched in October 2008. President Vladimir Putin's current period runs out in 2024, when he is due to step down, according to the constitution. Given the fact that the current political system has been carefully crafted for almost 20 years, it is evident that there is uncertainty about its future. First, it no longer produces wealth for the population. For five years in a row, the real disposable income has been decreasing.



1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAFAEL REUVENY ◽  
ASEEM PRAKASH

The breakdown of the Soviet Union surprised most scholars of international relations, comparative politics, and Soviet politics. Existing explanations attribute the breakdown of the Soviet Union to the reformist leadership of Gorbachev, and/or to systemic factors. These explanations do not focus on the key contribution of the war in Afghanistan. This is surprising since many scholars view wars as key causal factors in empire breakdown and regime change. We argue that the war in Afghanistan was a key factor, though not the only cause, in the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The war impacted Soviet politics in four reinforcing ways: (1) Perception effects: it changed the perceptions of leaders about the efficacy of using the military to hold the empire together and to intervene in foreign countries; (2) Military effects: it discredited the Red Army, created cleavage between the party and the military, and demonstrated that the Red Army was not invincible, which emboldened the non Russian republics to push for independence; (3) Legitimacy effects: it provided non-Russians with a common cause to demand independence since they viewed this war as a Russian war fought by non Russians against Afghans; and (4) Participation effects: it created new forms of political participation, started to transform the press/media before glasnost, initiated the first shots of glasnost, and created a significant mass of war veterans (Afghansti) who formed new civil organizations weakening the political hegemony of the communist party.



Author(s):  
А.А. Oskembay ◽  
◽  
F.K. Kabdrakhmanova ◽  

The article provides an assessment of the patriotic education of S. Amanzholov's soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. A comprehensive analysis of S. Amanzholov's activities as a political leader is presented. The article provides new data on the use of heroic deeds of Kazakh batyrs by scientists to raise the military spirit of soldiers. During the Great Patriotic War, patriotism became the most important value in Soviet society. Selfless devotion to their Motherland manifested itself among millions of Soviet citizens and became a source of unprecedented mass heroism. From February 1942 to June 1946 S. Amanzholov was on active military service in the ranks of the Soviet Army. He conducted political and educational work among soldiers of non-Russian nationality, published in the Kazakh language the "Notebook of the Red Army Agitator" and leaflets about the heroes of the Soviet Union.



2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita ◽  
Widya Dwi Rachmawati

The geopolitical security condition of Eastern Europe has undergone a drastic shift from Communist to Democratic ideology. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland immediately joined the Western alliance, which led to the massive structural changes of the country. The shift has had an enormous impact on Russia where it has made various confrontations to regain its influence in the region. Russia continues to increase tensions by increasing the military capabilities of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is directly bordered by Poland. In response, the Polish government made efforts to modernize its military as part of the Defense White Book 2013 to improve its military capabilities in response to Russian military presence in Kaliningrad Oblast. The role of the global players (EU, NATO, and the USA) is key important to the security stability of the region. Poland on its four pillars specifically calls the alliance with the USA and becomes a member of NATO as an important factor in the formulation of its defense policy, in which Poland could increase the capabilities of its Armed Forces.



2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Anne E. Hasselmann

In the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet museum curators began to establish a museal depiction of the war. This article analyzes these early beginnings of Soviet war commemoration and the curtailing of its surprising heterogeneity in late Stalinism. Historical research has largely ignored the impact of Soviet museum workers (muzeishchiki) on the evolution of Russian war memory. Archival material from the Red Army Museum, now renamed the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, in Moscow and the Belarus Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk documents the unfolding of locally specific war exhibitions which stand in stark contrast to the later homogenized official Soviet war narrative. Yet war memory was not created unilaterally by the curators. Visitors also participated in its making, as the museum guestbooks demonstrate. As “sites of commemoration and learning,” early Soviet war exhibitions reveal the agency of the muzeishchiki and the involvement of the visitors in the “small events” of memory creation.



1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-223

The fifteen countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were represented by their defense ministers at a conference held in Paris from October 10 to 12, under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay (Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO). The meeting, which was attended by the Standing Group and the Supreme Commanders, was a preliminary to the full ministerial session, to be held in December; it was the first occasion on which the NATO defense ministers met in Council without the foreign or finance ministers. A communique issued at the close of the meeting stated that the meeting had primarily been for the exchange of information, and that the ministers had heard statements on the strategic situation and on western defensive arrangements from General Sir John Whiteley (United Kingdom), Chairman of the Standing Group, and from his colleagues on the Standing Group, General Joseph Lawton Collins (United States), General Jean Valluy (France), General Alfred M. Gruenther (SACEUR), Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) and several other officers. Following these statements, a useful exchange of views between the defense ministers took place, the communique concluded. It was reported that many of the speakers had concurred in the view that the military potential of the Soviet Union was steadily increasing, especially in the areas of atomic weapons and submarines, that the recently announced decision to reduce the armed forces in the Soviet Union and some of the people's democracies did not modify the potential of communist forces, and that it was therefore indispensable to intensify the NATO military effort, which so far had not met expectations for it.



Worldview ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Roger Hilsman

The President's Reorganization Plan for the Defense Department, so much in the news these past few months, brings before us a fundamental issue that every democracy must face anew in times of threat and crisis. The issue—the role that the military shall play in our society and in the making of our national policy—is familiar. What makes it compelling is the siege the Soviet Union has laid to the United States and the Western world and the peculiarly fearsome dangers of war fought with missiles and thermonuclear warheads.So long as the nations of the world must rely for their security principally on themselves, they will continue to establish armed forces for their protection against outside threats. But every democratic society faces the danger that these forces of arms and of men trained in their use will be used against the society that created them.



2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski

The military had been concerned about military patriotic education for a long time when Putin's Patriotic Education Programme was published. As soon as the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred, followed a few years later by the creation of the Russian armed forces, they had already been developing patriotic education programmes aimed primarily at youth, aided by veterans of local wars, both volunteers and recruits. The aim of this article is to show that the military version of patriotic education aims openly to encourage military service, and that the Russian state will try to enlist veterans of the Afghanistan and Chechen wars in activities linked to military patriotic education and its spread in military and civilian spheres. Our hypothesis is that the determination to bring veterans together around a common project has two aims: (1) to federate veterans around the authorities and (2) to channel a population that escapes government control and some of whose excesses on their return to civilian life (violence towards the population in the context of their function, for veterans of the Interior Ministry in particular) have darkened the image of the ministries known as the “power” ministries.



Author(s):  
K. B. E. E. Eimeleus

The author of this book was ahead of his time with his advocacy of ski training in the Russian armed forces. Employing terminology never before used in Russian to describe movements with which few were familiar, the book gives a breakdown of the latest techniques at the time from Scandinavia and Finland. The author's work is an early and brilliant example of knowledge transfer from Scandinavia to Russia within the context of sport. Nearly three decades after the book was published, the Finnish army, employing many of the ideas first proposed by the author, used mobile ski troops to hold the Soviet Union at bay during the Winter War of 1939–1940, and in response, the Soviet government organized a massive ski mobilization effort prior to the German invasion in 1941. The Soviet counteroffensive against Nazi Germany during the winter of 1941–1942 owed much of its success to the Red Army ski battalions that had formed as a result of the ski mobilization. This volume is a translation of the original and includes most of the original illustrations.



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