De Gaulle and the Paradox of Post-War French Politics

2007 ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
David Goldey
Keyword(s):  
Post War ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (10-3) ◽  
pp. 70-81
Author(s):  
David Ramiro Troitino ◽  
Tanel Kerikmae ◽  
Olga Shumilo

This article highlights the role of Charles de Gaulle in the history of united post-war Europe, his approaches to the internal and foreign French policies, also vetoing the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Community. The authors describe the emergence of De Gaulle as a politician, his uneasy relationship with Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II, also the roots of developing a “nationalistic” approach to regional policy after the end of the war. The article also considers the emergence of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereinafter - CAP), one of Charles de Gaulle’s biggest achievements in foreign policy, and the reasons for the Fouchet Plan defeat.


2011 ◽  
pp. 92-109
Author(s):  
Wanda Jarząbek

France attempted to be consistent in the assertion of her entitlements resulting from her role as one of the four powers responsible for Europe. Franco-German relations in the power-war years were not easy; however, after President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysee Treaty, aempts were made aimed at a rapprochement at the social contacts’ level; the political dialogue was also being developed.France also attempted to build up its position in the East. The return to tradition was impossible because of regime transformations in Central and East Europe; in the case of relations between Poland and France, however, French politicians referred to the past, comparable historical experience and a number of apprehensions regarding Germany’s intentions. France was, actually, comfortable with the post-war reduction of Germany’s territory; it was thus de Gaulle’s declaration of 29th March, to the effect that Germany’s unification will be possible within the borders of the existing German states which became the mandatory position for the French policy which Paris used to remind not only Polish, but also German politicians. A formula suggested in May 1970 to Poland’s Foreign Minister, Mr Stefan Jędrychowski, by the French Minister, Mr Maurice Schumann, envisaged a joint declaration by the Four Powers and the submiing on their part of an assurance that they would support the invariable character of the border on the Oder–Lusatian Neisse rivers’ line, in accordance with a proviso set down in the Polish-German treaty. The idea of such a declaration was inconvenient to the People’s Republic of Poland, which did not wish the rights of the Powers to be given publicity and neither did it suit the Federal Republic of Germany, which did not wish such a declaration to be issued.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-247
Author(s):  
Kazimierz M. Ujazdowski

Contrary to the common belief, the Fifth Republic could not be established as a Republican monarchy. In France the idea of a republic was created by the French Revolution and its values were shaped in the fundamental confrontation with the monarchist tradition. The specifically understood idea of a nation’s sovereignty the formation of which was influenced by Rousseau’s though, as well as the ideas of the indivisibility and lay character of the republic, constituted a completely new model of statehood. In such a situation, the synthesis of antagonistic traditions was not possible. Although de Gaulle had been brought up in a family of pro-monarchist attitudes, he followed the state patriotism idea and was a supporter of the Republic as a durable basis for France’s existence. His views matured under the influence of French Republican nationalists Charles a Peguy and Maurice Barres, who inspired young de Gaulle and shaped his state patriotism. Later in his life de Gaulle’s idea was not so much to reconcile the monarchist and the republican tradition, but to create a republic that would integrate different families of ideas. This concept was also induced by manner of understanding the role of Christian obligations due to the public sphere. Following the spirit of the Catholic-liberal “Correspondent” de Gaulle believed that in the world shaped by the Revolution’s heritage Christian ideas do not need to be deemed to be defeated. During World War II, de Gaulle, then the leader of Free France, consistently strengthened the French Republican tradition in the Vichy dispute. In the years 1944-1946, as head of the temporary government, he made sure that Republican principles constituted the foundations of the post-war France. De Gaulle developed the state model of economy and the social character of the French republic. His decisions laid the Republican principles in the French Constitution and refer clearly to the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1989 in both French post war constitutions. That is why the 5th Republic could only be established as an institutional variation within the framework of the Republican axiology.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina NAROCHNITSKAYA

The imperative of France's grandeur was one of de Gaulle’s national idea essential elements which is as widely known as it is often misinterpreted. Although such classical vocabulary was disappearing from European political discourse, the founder of Gaullism used the notion of greatness strongly rooted in French political culture as a mobilizing symbolic force for meeting crucial domestic challenges. The motive of greatness was also closely linked with the principles of France’s autonomy and global responsibility, on which de Gaulle pivoted the positioning of the Fifth Republic in the post-war world. All this conflicted with the supranational Euro-Atlantic project, which was the main reason for the sharp negativism against de Gaulle's strategy and rhetoric, accused of "archaic thinking" by his opponents. In fact, the "last great Frenchman’s” concept of "greatness" was quite unorthodox in its reasoning and content, which are of particular interest as part of his relevant ideological legacy. Instead of axiomatic superiority, restoration of former power, civilizing mission, he insisted on the importance of high goal setting, vast undertakings and historical actorness, which were in de Gaulle’s view the existential imperative of French history.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Welch

Post-war France was reshaped by a sustained period of spatial planning and modernization. This was particularly so during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958–69), as the country positioned itself as a modern European nation after decolonization. In its approach and execution, French spatial planning represented the sort of imperious state intervention critiqued by radical spatial theorists such as Henri Lefebvre. Yet it remained the case that the planners articulated a rich vision of France’s future, filled with space and light. Not only that, but they had the means to bring their vision into being. During the mid-1960s, the building of New Towns became central to their thinking. This article revisits spatial planning as a realm of the imagination and considers how the nation’s future was portrayed in textual and visual forms. It explores how the translation of dreams into built realities became a source of political tension, and how those tensions found public expression in the visual media.


1980 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-154
Author(s):  
Stanley Hoffmann

After a summer of ill humor came an autumn of scandals, and French political life hesitates between immobility and fragmentation. For many years now it has resembled an endless boxing match with countless rounds ; as soon as the elections to the European Parliament (discussed in the previous issue of this Review) were over, all thoughts and maneuvers moved on to the next round : the Presidential election of 1981. De Gaulle, blasting the Fourth Republic, had talked of its games, poisons and delights. In the current phase of the Fifth Republic, the delights are few, the poisons can be deadly and the games are sterile.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Dyson

This chapter seeks to offer a balanced and nuanced view of conservative liberalism in French and Italian political economy by examining its key figures, the context of their work, what they thought and wrote, and how their thinking evolved. It also compares the significance of conservative liberalism in the discourses, policies, and politics of French and Italian political economy. In the case of France, the chapter examines the ideas and roles of Louis Rougier, Jacques Rueff, Maurice Allais, and Raymond Barre. It also discusses the Lippmann Colloquium in 1938; Rueff’s relations with Raymond Poincaré and Charles de Gaulle, especially in the period 1958–61; and the hard franc (franc fort) policy. The key texts of Rougier and Rueff are examined in detail. In the case of Italy, close attention is paid to the ideas and roles of Luigi Einaudi (including his connections to Wilhelm Röpke), Costantino Bresciani-Turroni, Luigi Sturzo, Guido Carli, and Francesco Forte; to the early post-war reconstruction; to Carli’s concept of the good and bad souls of Italy; and to external discipline (vincolo esterno) as a tool of economic policy. The chapter examines the stabilization traditions of France and Italy; the challenge posed by European economic and monetary union; and the deep hostility that emerged towards Ordo-liberalism in the wake of the euro area crisis after 2009.


2020 ◽  
pp. 29-57
Author(s):  
Stephen Wall

Post-war Labour and Conservative governments saw the UK’s global interests as lying primarily with the United States and the Commonwealth. They took no part in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community or in the proposed European Defence Community, though, when the EDC idea foundered, Prime Minister Anthony Eden played a prominent role in promoting European defence, just as Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had done in fostering the establishment of NATO. The British sent only an observer to the Messina Conference (1956) that negotiated the terms of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community (EEC). The UK set up its own trading bloc (EFTA) but it could not compete politically or economically with the EEC and, in 1961, the government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied for EEC membership, despite the opposition of France’s President de Gaulle.


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