Moral Hazard, Contracts and Social Preferences: A Survey

Author(s):  
Florian Englmaier
2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-443
Author(s):  
Mathias Erlei ◽  
Heike Schenk-Mathes

Abstract We conducted six treatments of a standard moral hazard experiment with hidden action. The behavior in all treatments and periods was inconsistent with established agency theory. In the early periods, behavior differed significantly between treatments. This difference largely vanished in the final periods. We used logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) as a device to grasp boundedly rational behavior and found the following: (1) LAQRE predictions are much closer to subjects’ behavior in the laboratory; (2) LAQRE probabilities and experimental behavior show remarkably similar patterns; and (3) including social preferences in LAQRE does not better explain the experimental data; (4) LAQRE cannot explain the contract offers of some players who seem to choose some focal contract parameters.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. e0244972
Author(s):  
Christian Knoller ◽  
Stefan Neuß ◽  
Richard Peter

When people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort choices under purely monetary incentives. When financial support is provided voluntarily by another individual, we expect recipients to exert more effort to avoid bad outcomes (level effect) and to reduce effort provision to a lesser degree as financial support becomes more generous (sensitivity effect). We conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment and find some evidence for the level effect and strong evidence for the sensitivity effect. This leads to significant gains in material efficiency with expected wealth being 5.5% higher and 37.3% less volatile.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 230-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Biener ◽  
Martin Eling ◽  
Andreas Landmann ◽  
Shailee Pradhan

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


ALQALAM ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Budi Harsanto

The fall of Enron, Lehman Brothers and other major financial institution in the world make researchers conduct various studies about crisis. The research question in this study is, from Islamic economics and business standpoint, why the global financial crisis can happen repeatedly. The purpose is to contribute ideas regarding Islamic viewpoint linked with the global financial crisis. The methodology used is a theoretical-reflective to various article published in academic journals and other intellectual resources with relevant themes. There are lots of analyses on the causes of the crisis. For discussion purposes, the causes divide into two big parts namely ethics and systemic. Ethics contributed to the crisis by greed and moral hazard as a theme that almost always arises in the study of the global financial crisis. Systemic means that the crisis can only be overcome with a major restructuring of the system. Islamic perspective on these two aspect is diametrically different. At ethics side, there is exist direction to obtain blessing in economics and business activities. At systemic side, there is rule of halal and haram and a set of mechanism of economics system such as the concept of ownership that will early prevent the seeds of crisis. Keywords: Islamic economics and business, business ethics, financial crisis 


CFA Magazine ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 20-21
Author(s):  
Osman Ghani
Keyword(s):  

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