Clientelism and distributive politics in Australia: comparing partisan pork barrel with contingency-based vote-buying

Acta Politica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Denemark
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Pork Barrel

The Birth of Pork: Local Appropriations in America’s First Century

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANFORD C. GORDON ◽  
HANNAH K. SIMPSON
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Historical Period ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Historical Factors ◽  
Credit Claiming ◽  
Ideological Structure ◽  
The U.S

After describing a newly assembled dataset consisting of almost 9,000 local appropriations made by the U.S. Congress between 1789 and 1882, we test competing accounts of the politics surrounding them before offering a more nuanced, historically contingent view of the emergence of the pork barrel. We demonstrate that for most of this historical period—despite contemporary accusations of crass electoral motives—the pattern of appropriations is largely inconsistent with accounts of distributive politics grounded in a logic of legislative credit-claiming. Instead, support for appropriations in the House mapped cleanly onto the partisan/ideological structure of Congress for most of this period, and only in the 1870s produced the universalistic coalitions commonly associated with pork-barrel spending. We trace this shift to two historical factors: the emergence of a solid Democratic South, and growth in the fraction of appropriations funding recurrent expenditures on extant projects rather than new starts.

scholarly journals PATRONASE, KLIENTALISME DAN TAHTA PUTRA MAHKOTA PADA PILKADA KOTA KENDARI TAHUN 2017

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rekha Adji Pratama
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Political Machine ◽  
Government Bureaucracy ◽  
The Way

One of the problems that still occur in local government bureaucracy is patronage and clientelism which is still often used by politicians to carry out a specific agenda outside the main duties and functions of the bureaucracy. This paper aims to determine the forms of patronage and clientelism that is formed in relation politicians, the bureaucrats and the community where the mayor actively "Asrun" using bureaucratic apparatus as a political machine in order to win his son “Adriatma Dwi Putra” (ADP) as mayor Kendari on the elections simultaneously in 2017. The findings show, the form of patronage and clientelism in this study can be divided into two. First, relations were awakened in the bureaucracy includes determining the scope of careers and positions in the bureaucracy in Kendari, the first form of this is done in order to consolidate the support of the bureaucracy to win ADP. Secondly, relations that built up in the community include the mobilization voice through vote buying and pork barrel. The second form as a strategy to gain support or voice with the way the bureaucratic apparatus into a figure intermediaries to mobilize voice in society.

The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Hird
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Army Corps ◽  
Army Corps Of Engineers ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Corps Of Engineers ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Legislative Influence

In previous studies of distributive politics scholars have investigated legislative influence without accounting for the policies' independent merits. As a result, they have failed to include a plausible explanation of the counterfactual (i.e., which projects would have been funded in the absence of congressional committee influence), which has led to invalid inferences regarding legislative influence. The model of distributive politics is reformulated to account for an assumed efficient and/or equitable project allocation in the absence of legislative influence. Using data from proposed Army Corps of Engineers' projects and the funding recommendations of three institutions, the findings indicate that pork barrel politics indeed exists and imposes significant efficiency costs but that both equity and economic efficiency play prominent roles in the decision-making process as well. Cost-benefit analysis is seen to play a constructive role by improving the efficiency of project choice; and the corps's cost-benefit analysis guidelines are beneficial from the agency's organizational perspective, as well.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Money Politics Terhadap Pilihan Masyarakat Pada Pilkades Serentak di Kabupaten Muara Enim Tahun 2017 (Studi Kasus di Desa Teluk Limau Kecamatan Gelumbang)

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-144
Author(s):  
Revi Kazali ◽  
Endang Rochmiatun ◽  
Nico Oktario Adytyas
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Behavior Changes ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Village

The paper is “Titled the effect of money politics on community choice in the simultaneous Pilkades in Muara Enim distric in 2017 ( Case studi in the village of Teluk Limau, Gelumbang district)”. The purpose of this studi was to identify or find out how  the influence of money politics on people’s choices in the 2017 Pilkades and identify or find out what faktors influence people’s choices in the 2017 Pilkades with the existence of money politics. The type of date used in this study is quantitative research. The location of this research is in the village of Teluk Limau, Gelumbang district, Muara Enim regency, south Sumatra province. And purely this research is the local community. To obtain date obtained numbered 1382 according to the permanent voter of samples was 93 respondents. To collecy date obtained is descriptive statiscal analyis.  Theory in this study there are two theories used, namely the theory of Patronase and Klientelisme. There are five kinds of Patronase theory namely, Vote Buying, Individual Gifs, Services and Activities, Club Goods, Pork Barrel Projects. Whereas Klientelisme theories are of three kinds, namely the successs team, the social networking engine and political parties. In this study it was elections is very big influence on people’s voting behavior. In the 2017 Pilkades, the people of the village of Teluk Limau on average most of their voting behavior changes when they receive money politics. The faktors that influence the voting behavior of the Teluk Limau village in the 2017 elections are that people the and to choose the reasons because of economic faktors that have changed their choices after receiving money politics.  

Distributive Politics with Vote and Turnout Buying

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 1111-1119 ◽  
Author(s):  
AGUSTIN CASAS
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Incumbent Party

The objective of this paper is to model the incumbent’s allocation of efforts that maximize his electoral chances in the presence of both vote buying (persuasion) and turnout buying (mobilization). The existing literature on distributive politics concludes that political candidates should concentrate their campaigning efforts either on safe districts or on swing districts. This paper shows that when candidates can use both persuasion and mobilization strategies, and the ideology of voters is unknown to the incumbent party, a third option should be taken into account. In fact, the optimal allocation of resources—rather than focusing on safe or swing districts—should target opposition strongholds, that is, the incumbent should try to sway voters in those districts in which the challenger is favored. The intuition for this result is simple. Since the incumbent does not know individual preferences (he only observes the distribution of preferences in the districts), all voters in a given district look identical to him. Hence, when approaching voters in a district to buy their vote, the incumbent always faces the risk of buying the vote of his supporters (who would have voted for him anyway).

Distributive Politics and Party Participation in the U.S. House

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 671-694
Author(s):  
Scott R. Meinke
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Direct Benefit ◽  
Pork Barrel ◽  
The U.S

A range of research shows that distributive spending is allocated disproportionately to members in positions of power or who contribute to collective efforts. In this article, I ask whether House members who participate in their party caucus’ internal organizations enjoy earmarking advantages either as a direct benefit or by avoiding earmarking losses that are usually associated with declining electoral vulnerability. Adding new data on party involvement to several earmarking data sets, I find mixed evidence. Democratic party participants enjoyed somewhat better outcomes in the 1990s, but this result does not hold in other contexts. Evidence from the traditional pork barrel area of transportation earmarks supports the expectation that the electoral vulnerability effect is confined to nonparticipants, but this pattern does not appear for Appropriations earmarks in the 2000s. The results suggest that contributions to party goals can relate to distributive outcomes but that the effects vary by issue and party context.

scholarly journals BENTUK DAN JARINGAN PATRON-KLIEN POLITIK UANG PADA PEMILU LEGISLATIF TAHUN 2019 DI KABUPATEN TASIKMALAYA

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-183
Author(s):  
Perhat Alfaz ◽  
Suswanta Suswanta
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Pork Barrel

Politik uang dalam perhelatan pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya adalah keniscayaan yang sulit dihindarkan. Jauh sebelum pemilu berlangsung, Bawaslu merilis Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu (IKP) 2019 sebagai upaya preventif terjadinya pelanggaran dalam pemilu. Berdasarkan hasil IKP 2019 Kabupaten Tasikmalaya memiliki tingkat kerawanan tinggi menempati urutan pertama dalam subdimensi kampanye dengan skor 77,08, dimana politik uang termasuk bagian di dalamnya. Pasca pemilu berlangsung, laporan pelanggaran banyak diterima Bawasalu, lima diantaranya menyangkut pelanggaran politik uang dan hanya ada satu kasus yang terbukti memenuhi syarat formil dan materil sehingga bisa sampai pada putusan pengadilan.Maksud dari penelitian ini mencoba untuk mengungkap bagaimana bentuk dan jaringan patron-klien politik uang yang terjadi pada pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif, dengan teknik pengumpulan data dengan wawancara, dokumentasi dan studi literatur. Hasil penilitian mengungkapkan bahwasannya praktik politik uang dalam pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya banyak terjadi, hanya saja ada yang dilaporkan secara resmi ke Bawaslu dan ada yang dibiarkan begitu saja tidak dilaporkan. Ada enam jenis politik uang yang ditemukan, diantaranya: Vote buying, Individual gifts, Vote Tradding, Club goods, Services and activities dan Pork Barrel Project. Dari keenam jenis politik uang tersebut, kasus yang paling dominan ditemukan adalah vote buying sebanyak lima laporan yang resmi diterima Bawaslu, dengan pola penyebaran praktiknya melibatkan tim sukses yang didominasi oleh jaringan keluarga dan jaringan sosial. Strategi politik uang juga berpengaruh signifikan terhadap meningkatnya partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. pada pemilu 2014 partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya mencapai angka 65 persen dan terjadi kenaikan partisipasi pemilih pada pemilu serentak tahun 2019 menjadi 71 persen.

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