Deliberate Disease: Biological Weapons, Threats, and Policy Responses

1993 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
M I Chevrier
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
Matrix Analysis ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
The Military ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
Control Regime

The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined. A country's decision to acquire such weapons is analyzed by means of matrix analysis, separating the effects of three parameters: The offensive capability of the aggressor, the retaliatory capability of the target, and the military purpose(s) to which the weapons would be applied. The research identifies those circumstances wherein BTW are most likely to be used. The findings have implications for the type of arms control regime that should be implemented to minimize the probability that these weapons will be used, and to control their proliferation. Specifically, the author makes recommendations concerning proposals to promote compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Comments on the Contributions of Marie Isabelle Chevier and Lynn Marvin Hansen

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhard Geissler
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Terrorist Group ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Military ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
The U.S

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.

scholarly journals Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Natalia Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Competition ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Technological Advances ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
The Military ◽  
Control Regime

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

9 Poison, Poisoned Weapons, Asphyxiating Gases, Biological and Chemical Weapons

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boothby William H
Keyword(s):  
Synthetic Biology ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Novel Technologies ◽  
Chemical Agents ◽  
The Status ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

Chapter 9 looks at a group of weapon technologies. The long-standing and customary prohibition of the use of poisons and of poisoned weapons is examined first. Then the discussion addresses efforts in 1899 to address the use of asphyxiating gases, pointing out that a prohibition on use was only achieved in 1925 with the adoption of the Geneva Protocol. While that protocol also addressed bacteriological methods of warfare, comprehensive arms control provision prohibiting all forms of biological weapon had to await the adoption in 1972 of the Biological Weapons Convention, whereas similar provision in relation to chemical weapons was not achieved until 1993. Both of these conventions are considered, and the status of the prohibition on use, and of related provisions, in both treaties is analysed. Novel technologies including incapacitating chemical agents, synthetic biology and the use of viruses are also considered.

Enforced Transparency: A Solution to Autonomous Weapons as Potentially Uncontrollable Weapons Similar to Bioweapons

2021 ◽  
pp. 219-236
Author(s):  
Armin Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Deep Learning ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Design Standards ◽  
International Regulation ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Autonomous Weapons ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

This chapter argues that in many respects the regulation of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) presents a similar challenge to arms control as biological weapons do and that many lessons learned from the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) could be applied to the control of AWS. AWS that utilize “deep learning” are potentially unpredictable and uncontrollable weapons. International regulation efforts for AWS should focus on the development of safety and design standards for artificial intelligence (AI), should put in place confidence-building measures for enhancing transparency and trust in AI R&D and related applications, and should aim for a ban of offensive AWS. Enforced international transparency in the development of AI could make AI better and safer, including in a military context, which would improve strategic stability.

Biotechnology, International Law, and the National Interest

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-112
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Crump Hanson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Recombinant Dna ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Effective Form ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

On November 25, 1969 Richard Nixon announced that because of the “massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences” of biological weapons, the United States would never use these weapons, would destroy all existing stocks, and would confine its research to strictly defined measures of defense (Harris, 1987:193). This unilateral renunciation followed an extensive review by the National Security Council of U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy, which lasted six months and involved every relevant agency in the U.S. government and which concluded that U.S. biological warfare capabilities provided no compelling military advantages (Tucker, 1984-85:61). Three years later the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed; it was the first postwar arms control agreement to elminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of states (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982:122). The treaty was ratified unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1974, and over 100 nations have acceded to it. This arms control achievement has been attributed in part to the serious doubts which many countries, including the United States, shared about the military value of biological weapons (Harris, 1987:205-6). Within a decade of the signing of this treaty, however, the development of recombinant-DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technology had raised the possibility of a new and more effective form of biological warfare.

United Nations Biological Warfare Inspectors in Iraq: Implications for Biological Arms Control—One Canadian's Perspective

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen A. St-Onge
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
Specific Element ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Canadian Perspective ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

My contribution differs in several aspects from the others in this symposium. To begin, instead of addressing a specific element of future Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) verification operations, I have been asked for my unique “Canadian” perspective on the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in which I have participated, and some of the lessons that I have come away with after having been a member of four inspections in 1994 and 1995.

The Role of International Law in Preventing Military Misuse of the Biosciences and Biotechnology

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winfried Lang
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Transfer Of Technology ◽  
Science And Politics ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Military ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

Recent advances in the biosciences and biotechnology erode confidence in the reliability of the Biological Weapons Convention (1972). During its review conferences (1980, 1986) concerns were expressed as to the military misuse of civil research. Although some improvements were achieved at these conferences, there still exist major deficiencies related to the definition of substances and activities to be controlled, to verification and to cooperation (transfer of technology). It is suggested that in light of the positive international climate an entirely new regime should be built. This endeavor might draw on experience acquired in environmental treaty making. An institution should be entrusted with adapting the scope of the regime (controlled substances and activities) to scientific progress, with monitoring compliance, and with organizing cooperation. Thus would be matched the rigidity of international law with the flexibility required by science and politics.

Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Weapons Systems

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.

Trends in Global Disarmament Treaties

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen ◽  
Tobias Vestner
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
State Party ◽  
Chemical Weapons Convention ◽  
Support Mechanisms ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Core Features

Abstract Since the adoption of the UN Charter, states have concluded numerous international disarmament treaties. What are their core features, and are there any trends in their design? This article discusses the five global disarmament treaties, namely the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It first considers how a broad set of prohibitions of activities with respect to specific weapons has evolved over time. Then, it analyses the treaties’ implementation and compliance support mechanisms as well as their procedural aspects regarding entry into force and withdrawal. This article finds that a pattern has developed over the last two decades to outlaw all and any use of weapons by disarmament treaty, without first instituting a prohibition on their use under international humanitarian law (IHL). It also finds that reporting obligations, meetings of States Parties and treaty-related institutions are generally created, either directly by treaty or by subsequent state party decisions. Finally, there is a tendency to make the treaty’s entry into force easier, and the withdrawal more difficult. It is argued that these trends arise from states’ attempt to establish more easily disarmament treaties, design more robust disarmament treaties and more effectively protect civilians. The article concludes by reflecting whether these trends form the basis of a new branch of international law—international disarmament law—and discusses them in the context of emerging weapons and technologies.

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