United Nations Biological Warfare Inspectors in Iraq: Implications for Biological Arms Control—One Canadian's Perspective

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen A. St-Onge
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
Specific Element ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Canadian Perspective ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

My contribution differs in several aspects from the others in this symposium. To begin, instead of addressing a specific element of future Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) verification operations, I have been asked for my unique “Canadian” perspective on the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in which I have participated, and some of the lessons that I have come away with after having been a member of four inspections in 1994 and 1995.

On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Huxsoll
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Development Support ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Ongoing Monitoring

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

scholarly journals INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Advisory Council ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
The Stability

The article analyzes the legal and institutional framework for the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms control. The competence of the main institutional organs of the United Nations – the General Assembly, the Security Council and the specially created structures that deal with disarmament and arms control issues – are identified, in particular: the Committee on Disarmament and International Security (First Committee), the Disarmament Commission, the Disarmament Advisory Council , Disarmament Office, 1540 Committee for the Prevention of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, or Biological Weapons and their means of delivery. The importance of international forums is highlighted, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, which focuses on the following aspects: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war, including all related issues; preventing the arms race in space and so on. The functions of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research responsible for carrying out independent research on security, disarmament and development at the national, regional and global levels are considered as interrelated aspects of human security in general. The attention is paid to the UN programs, which are a platform that combines the various instruments and approaches of the Organization in the field of comprehensive security, in particular Joint UNDP-DPA Programmes “Strengthening National Capacity for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” and “Coordinating Action on Small Arms” are disclosed. Taking into account the fact that great importance for the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament and the strengthening of the stability and security of its member states plays the role of the United Nations at the regional level, the agreements concluded by the Organization in this area and the regional centers established under its auspices and the ways of improving their work.

Interview with Masood Khan

2009 ◽  
Vol 91 (876) ◽  
pp. 663-673
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Red Cross ◽  
Director General ◽  
Leadership Positions ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Multilateral Diplomacy ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

AbstractMasood Khan has been Pakistan's Ambassador to the People's Republic of China since September 2008. From March 2005 to September 2008, Ambassador Khan served as Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva. As an official of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he has served in Islamabad and abroad for thirty years. In 2009, he was promoted to the highest rank – that of Federal Secretary – in Pakistan's civil service. Earlier, among other functions, he worked as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Director-General for the United Nations and for Disarmament, and as its spokesman. Over the years, he has acquired expertise in multilateral diplomacy, security and disarmament issues, human rights, humanitarian diplomacy, and social development. He has also specialized in international conferences, having held several leadership positions, such as President of the Conference on Disarmament, President of the 6th Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, Coordinator of the Group of the Organisation of Islamic States in Geneva, Chairman of the International Organization for Migration Council, Chairman of the International Labour Conference Reform Committee, and Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

A Bifurcated Global Nuclear Order

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The World ◽  
The United Nations

The very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable for ethical and military reasons. The world has placed growing restrictions on the full range of nuclear programs and activities. But with the five NPT nuclear powers failing to eliminate nuclear arsenals, other countries acquiring the bomb, arms control efforts stalled, nuclear risks climbing, and growing awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war, the United Nations adopted a new treaty to ban the bomb. Some technical anomalies between the 1968 and 2017 treaties will need to be harmonized and the nuclear-armed states’ rejection of the ban treaty means it will not eliminate any nuclear warheads. However, it will have a significant normative impact in stigmatizing the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and serve as a tool for civil society to mobilize domestic and world public opinion against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Weapons Systems

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.

scholarly journals Introduction: International Institutions and Peaceful Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-459
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
T. V. Paul ◽  
Anders Wivel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The United Nations

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.

scholarly journals Coronavirus Is A Biological Warfare Weapon

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 01-06
Author(s):  
Robert Skopec
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
World Health ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
University Of Illinois ◽  
College Of Law ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
The University ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
The U.S

Dr. Francis Boyle, who drafted the Biological Weapons Act has given a detailed statement admitting that the 2019 Wuhan Coronavirus is an offensive Biological Warfare Weapon and that the World Health Organization (WHO) already knows about it. Francis Boyle is a professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law. He drafted the U.S. domestic implementing legislation for the Biological Weapons Convention, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, that was approved unanimously by both Houses of the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.

Biological Sampling and Analysis Procedures for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan J. Mohr
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Environmental Samples ◽  
Biological Research ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Biological Sampling ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
June July ◽  
A Site ◽  
First Time ◽  
Production Facilities

In June/July 1994, I was fortunate in having been selected by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to be the chief inspector (CI) of one of the most interesting inspections conducted by the commission, namely UNSCOM 84/BW6. This particular inspection was fascinating because of its complexity—the team not only conducted inspections of Iraqi biological research and production facilities, it also excavated a site that UNSCOM surmised might contain materials from Iraq's former BW program. As such, this inspection was the first time that UNSCOM collected environmental samples for analysis. In this paper I discuss my experiences during this inspection and comment on the effectiveness of sampling and analysis as a verification measure.

Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Comments on the Contributions of Marie Isabelle Chevier and Lynn Marvin Hansen

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhard Geissler
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Terrorist Group ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Military ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention ◽  
The U.S

In agreement with the overwhelming number of experts, I certainly share the view of Chevier and Hansen that the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. Of course it is still a matter of discussion whether the military utility of biological and toxin weapons (hereafter, respectively, BW and TW) changed after the introduction of biotechnology. It is impossible, however, to ignore the 1986 statement of the U.S. Department of Defense (1988), that:… perhaps the most significant event in the history of biological weapons development has been the advent of biotechnology. It enables the development of new microorganisms and products with new, unorthodox characteristics… Conceptually, then, a nation or terrorist group can design a biological weapon to meet a variety of contingencies or needs… The break through and the subsequent achievements make biological warfare much more feasible and effective for countries which either are not bound by the convention or which choose to violate it.

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