Dennett, Functionalism, and Introspection
1985 ◽
Vol 11
◽
pp. 55-83
Recent functionalist accounts of the mental, at least on the part of philosophers, have often been a result of dissatisfaction with the reductionist accounts championed by such physicalists as Place, Smart and Feigl. In particular this new account gained momentum from the growing belief that our map of the mental, at least in regard to the higher cognitive functions, does not seem to be a map of the brain and its processes. The more we find out about the working brain, the less we are able to cling to the belief that our talk about beliefs, evaluations, intentions, desires and motives gives us information about the structure or functioning of our brains.
2015 ◽
Vol 95
(3)
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pp. 785-807
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2013 ◽
Vol 20
(11)
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pp. 1768-1778
2010 ◽
Vol 20
(2)
◽
pp. 131-139
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Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 28
(2)
◽