The Inward and the Outward: Fantasy, Reality and Satisfaction

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 175-193
Author(s):  
Christopher Cherry

Imagination works upon desires and needs in a variety of ways. Different sensibilities will concentrate upon different of its operations and neglect - or even ignore - others. Thus Rousseau (and in some ways Plato, as we shall see) takes a very gloomy view of the uses of imagination. He sees only its dark aspect, under which it is a prime source of wretchedness:It is imagination which enlarges the bounds of possibility for us … and therefore stimulates and feeds desires by the hope of satisfying them. But the object within our grasp flies quicker than we follow; when we think we have grasped it, it transforms itself and is again ahead of us … Thus we exhaust our strength, yet never reach our goal, and the nearer we are to pleasure, the further we are from happiness ... The world of reality has its bounds, the world of imagination is boundless; as we cannot enlarge the one, let us restrict the other; for all the sufferings which really make us miserable arise from the difference between the real and the imaginary.

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-144
Author(s):  
Badar Alam Iqbal ◽  
Mohd Nayyer Rahman ◽  
Munir Hasan

The difference between growth and development is not subtle but substantially huge and the gap is ever increasing. The dividing line is social indicators. Countries witnessing high growth rates for decades are not equal performers in development when social indicators are observed. India is an emerging economy on the one hand and a developing on the other hand but a lower income country as per World Bank statistic. While India holds economic indicators that appears to be promising to the world and investors that is not the case with social indicators. The present study is an attempt to critically review the social indicators for India and to trace the trajectory of fall or growth in such indicators while comparing with selected countries.


Author(s):  
G. E. R. Lloyd

A sense of the difference between right and wrong and a corresponding recognition of a concept of morality can be widely, maybe even universally, attested, as has been suggested for the Golden Rule (treat others as you would have them treat you). But how far does the great variety of explicit codified legal systems that can be attested across the world and over time undermine any possibility of treating law or even ‘custom’ as a robust cross-cultural category? This chapter investigates the similarities and differences in those systems in ancient societies (Greece, China) and in modern ones (e.g. Papua New Guinea) to throw light on the one hand on the importance of law for social order but on the other on the difficulties facing any programme to secure lasting justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-25
Author(s):  
Vinicio Busacchi

Historical facts are not objects; rather, they are representational processes within other processes that also produced objects and left traces. These latter ones are themselves not historical facts either but are the same as historical facts in a given time and acquire meaning and significance with respect to that particular time. Therefore, the ‘historical-real’ is constitutively representational and constitutively temporal because it is a process. The question of what is a given truth in history then becomes the dilemma of creating a representative reconstruction of the process of (past) events that is close to the ‘real’ events as they are given in that specific time. Those ‘real’ events have been conceived, represented, lived, created, and narrated. The interweaving of the theory of history and the [cognitive] theory of representation is revealed as a central interlacing that could be proposed between the theory of history and the theory of narrative on the one hand and the theory of history and the theory of action on the other. From one perspective, history is about other people, other institutions, other representations and other visions of the world. It is about people who lived in different eras, who have created and inhabited different institutions, who spoke other languages, who embraced other conceptions and beliefs and so on. From another perspective, however, historians are not faced with a radical otherness. History describes people like us, but it is we who are the heirs of those cultures, those institutions, that wealth of knowledge, those skills, those beliefs and so on, and we are not without tools to recover, reproduce or re-present them.


2021 ◽  
pp. 142-176
Author(s):  
Nicholas F. Stang

There is a tension in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics that has received considerable attention in the last several decades of scholarship. On the one hand, there are texts that support a phenomenalist reading, according to which bodies are simply the coordinated phenomena of minds. On the other hand, there are texts that support a realist reading, according to which bodies are aggregates of the real constituents of the world, monads. Likewise, there is a structurally similar tension in Kant’s metaphysics between “two world” and “one world” interpretations of transcendental idealism. This chapter develops an interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics that does justice to both his realism and his phenomenalism, and then shows how that interpretation can be applied to Kant’s transcendental idealism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 517-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Šerpytytė

AbstractThe problem of the relation and difference between things and objects is one of the most decisive issues for the conception of the real. These words are usually used interchangeably – and not only in their everyday usage. There are some contemporary philosophical positions that consider almost “everything” as an object; on the other hand, there are proponents of a strict separation of objects and things. How did it happen that the concept of thing (res) and object (obiectum) not only began to theoretically “compete” with each other but also sometimes came to represent differently conceived realities, and even occasionally came to represent an identical conception of reality? This article, on the one hand, discusses the philosophical strategies that reveal the difference between objects and things and enable such a conception of reality which takes into account the Kantian distinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit. On the other, it reconstructs Giorgio Agamben’s project of modal ontology. Agamben’s take on the question What is real? is oriented toward the modus of being and could be traced back to the recognition of the difference between objects and things as well as the “restoration of the life of things themselves.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-232
Author(s):  
Pietro Terzi

Abstract In Specters of Marx, Derrida suggests that the most fundamental condition of phenomenality lies in the ambiguous status of the noema, defined as an intentional and non-real component of Erlebnis, neither “in” the world nor “in” consciousness. This “irreality” of the noematic correlate is conceived by Derrida as the origin of sense and experience. Already in his Of Grammatology, Derrida maintained that the difference between the appearing and the appearance, between the world and the lived experience, is the condition of all other differences. Unfortunately, Derrida limits himself to a few self-evident remarks, without further elaborating. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to contextualize Derrida’s interpretation of the noema from a theoretical and historical perspective; on the other hand, to show its effects on the early moments of Derrida’s philosophy. The result will shed light on a neglected issue in the relationship between deconstruction and phenomenology.


1993 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent L. Wimbush

“It is important to understand … that the difference between the non-elites (‘the weak’) and the elites in Corinth is not that between a world-rejecting ethic (the ‘weak’) on the one hand and a world-embracing ethic (the pneumatic elites) on the other. Clearly, both groups shared the imperative to renounce the world; the fact of membership in this new social group, the Jesus movement at Corinth, suggests as much.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-100

There is an ambiguity in Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Imaginary (1940). On the one hand, Sartre describes mental images as impoverished in contrast to the fullness and depth of the world of perception. On the other hand, Sartre identifies the imagination with human freedom, and in this sense the imaginary can be seen as an enrichment of the real. This paper explores this ambiguity and its import for understanding both racist and antiracist ways of relating to others. Part One explores Sartre’s argument for the “essential poverty” of the image through examples of racist images. Part Two discusses the enriching power of the imaginary for cultivating more just social and political arrangements in the context of racial oppression. Part Three argues that bad faith can take the form either of fleeing from reality into the impoverished world of the imaginary, or of failing to see the imaginary possibilities implicitly enriching the real.


POETICA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 259-281
Author(s):  
Holger Kuße

Abstract The paper deals with the semantic theory of interpretation of A. F. Losev in his early period up to 1930 as well as in his linguistic investigations in the 70’s and 80’s of the last century. In using a word or some grammatical category, a speaker already interprets some state of affairs. In a sense, all invariant meaning seems to be metaphorical, i.e. meanings are interpretations of the world. This theory is illustrated with some famous examples by Losev himself: Garden, cabinet, the sentence “The sea was laughing”. Reflecting about his garden and his cabinet Losev shows the difference and convergence of parts and the whole: trees, flowers or the cabinet’s doors on the one hand, and the garden or the cabinet as a whole on the other. These relations are related to the meaning of words. In his early works, especially in the Philosophy of the Name and the Dialectics of Myth, Losev sees in meaning a semantic cluster which develops within speech (in sentences, narrations or myths). The works of the late period investigate invariant meanings of words and grammatical categories in the sense of some interpretive force.


2020 ◽  
pp. 168-185
Author(s):  
Alexander I. Ivanitskiy ◽  

In his report at the Lotman Readings at the Russian State University for the Humanities (2019), M. Velizhev showed that the testament that opens Gogol’s Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz’yami [Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends, 1847] bears signs of a notarial will. This reflects the counter spiritualization of the power and service in Correpondence, so its motivation that can clarify the logic of Gogol’s artistic evolution. All power positions in Gogol’s book are sacred, being created by the “government foresight” inspired by heaven. Consequently, Lord signifies Himself in the authority ladder. Therefore, the semantic elevation of love to God follows the same hierarchy of the civil service – to the monarch who transfers it to God. This makes the service hierarchy the main target of the human enemy who invades the world in the form of a doppelganger-official, eroding the meanings of administrative positions and replacing the “divine service” ladder with an antipode doublet. Gogol’s equations of “sacra” and service caused his movement to St. Petersburg (1828), equally alien to the traditional culture of both Little Russia and Russia. In this alienness, Gogol, who preserved the folklore worldview, saw the same daemonic trickery as in Dykanka. It appears as a general hoax in the finale of Nevsky Prospekt, and gets apocalyptic proportions in the first edition of The Portrait. However, in the capital of the empire, which includes the church in itself, Gogol tied the religious principle to the imperial one, which split the meaning of the Petersburg power into “heavenly” and daemonic. The consistent implementation of these meanings forms the plot of The Inspector General – with the visits of Khlestakov and the real inspector. In letters to S.T. Aksakov (1844), to N.F. (1849) Gogol endowed the devil with Khlestakov’s characteristics on the one hand, and on the other, explained the gossip about Khlestakov – “inspector” as the devil’s trick. Khlestakov’s chimericity is noted by Khlestakov’s servant Osip (“a general, only the other way round) and Shpekin (“He’s neither one thing nor another. The devil knows what he is”). Khlestakov not only confirms it, introducing himself as the author of “another ‘Yuri Miloslavsky’”, but in drunken boast endows a demonic background (“I am everywhere, everywhere!”). The Governor translates it from the subtext into the text, congratulating his wife, “. . . to marry into a family of such a devil.” The capital he personifies is also illusory, being a “black hole” in Osip’s praises. The real auditor presents Petersburg as a source of just imperious punishment, which the “silent scene” endows with the symbols of the Last Judgment, since in the Governor’s appeal to the public (“You are laughing at yourself, oh you!”) the bureaucratic vices can be interpreted as panhuman. In Razvyazka “Revizora” [The Resolution of The Government Inspector. 1846], the state is shown equal to the human soul, where officials are “passions”; Inspector is conscience “at death’s door”; Khlestakov is a “secular conscience” with which a person conforms every day. A person equal to the world carries within himself the potentials of all vices, and the death of the soul marks the death of the world. In Correspondence Gogol endowed himself with such a universal “I” creating the potential for spiritual crisis. The inexplicable divergence of Russian reality with the ideal appeared to him as the death of his soul, and with it – of the great world equal to it.


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