What Is the Root Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Program?

2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mun Suk Ahn
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (Extra-A) ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Liailia Aidarovna Gainullina ◽  
Rustem Ravilevich Muhametzyanov ◽  
Bulat Aidarovich Gainullin ◽  
Nadiia Almazovna Galiautdinova

Historically, in the eyes of the Korean people, Japan is an antagonistic state that has brought them many troubles in the past century. Relations between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are fundamental in terms of security in the Northeast Asia (NEA) region, since the decision on the DPRK nuclear missile program and on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is one of the pillars of achieving that very security throughout the region. The period, we consider in this study, from 1996 to 2006, is of significant importance, since a thorough analysis of the events of those years is important for understanding the root of existing problems in bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea. The present analysis on the behavioral lines in the solution of the North Korean nuclear missile program may contribute to the choice the best way to normalize relations between the two countries.    


2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Il-Young Kim ◽  
Lakhvinder Singh

Asian Survey ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 722-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Clay Moltz

Because of its energy reserves and long history of economic links with North Korea, the Russian Far East could provide useful incentives needed to help convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program. For this reason, the United States should begin crafting a regionally based strategy that includes Russia.


Author(s):  
Robert R. Richwine ◽  
G. Scott Stallard ◽  
G. Michael Curley

In recent years some power companies have instituted programs aimed at reducing or eliminating their power plants’ unreliability caused by abnormal events that occur infrequently but result in extended unplanned outages when they do occur, i.e. High Impact–Low Probability events (HILPs). HILPs include catastrophic events such as turbine water induction, boiler explosions, generator winding failures, etc. Many of these successful programs have relied on the detailed reliability data contained in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) Generating Availability Data System (GADS) that contains data collected over the past 25 years from 5000+ generating units in North America. Using this data, these companies have been able to 1) benchmark their fleet’s unreliability due to HILPs against their North American peers, 2) prioritize their peer group’s susceptibility to various HILP modes and 3) use root cause data contained within the NERC-GADS data base to help identify and evaluate ways to proactively prevent, detect and/or mitigate the consequences of HILP events. This paper will describe the methods used in these successful programs in sufficient detail to enable others to adopt the techniques for application at their own generating plants.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-114
Author(s):  
Fumihiko Saito

The world today faces a series of crises, and many observers have started to realize that the root cause of these crises is market capitalism. In such a context, the triple disasters of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant accident hit the north-eastern part of Japan on 11 March 2011. “3.11” has accelerated the long-term structural changes of rural Japan such as depopulation. Nine years since the disasters, one positive sign is the emergence of networks between producers and consumers who are now reciprocally connected. This article pays particular attention to a new monthly delivery package of magazine and food called, Tohoku Food Communication (TFC), first released in July 2013. The experiences of TFC can be interpreted as a fragile yet significant seed to promote social and solidarity economy (SSE). This paper critically examines both possibilities and limitations of SSE, which may contribute to making our society more sustainable than now. Keywords: “3.11”; natural disaster; Tohoku Food Communication (TFC); social and solidarity economy (SSE); sustainability.


Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Millard ◽  
Chae-Deug Yi

AbstractDiscourse on the Six Party Talks has focused solely on denuclearisation. Through the power struggles of the members and the refusal of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) to return to negotiations, the Six Party Talks have been stalled since 2008. Due to current increased tensions and the use of brinkmanship tactics the Talks must be restarted, albeit under a reformed shape. This paper analyses the potential role of the EU in furthering the peace process in Northeast Asia. This paper suggests that the EU needs to be more assertive and the Talks should focus on building trust and cooperation, not on the DPRK’s nuclear program. With its impartiality, experience in integration and use of soft power, the EU can act as an effective mediator building trust.


Author(s):  
Burak KÜNTAY

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO , Turkey agreed to deploy a missile defense radar system in its southern region of Malatya in 2011. In the context of geopolitical developments before and after this pivotal year -namely, Turkey’s reorientation towards the Middle East, the Arab Awakening, and most recently, the Iranian nuclear deal of 2013- Turkey’s decision had far-reaching regional effects. To offer policy implications surrounding this decision, this paper analyzes the interaction between such political developments and the existence of this shield system within Turkey’s borders. Turkey’s decision to allow installation of the NATO defense shield came amid Western suspicions of Iran’s growing military might, nuclear program, and missile technology. Since Turkish foreign policy ever since the turn of the 21st century has shifted increasingly towards its neighbors in the Middle East, the installation and its hostile reception in Iran seemed out of sync with its foreign policy shift. Subsequently, examining the Turkish decision in light of recent regional developments provides insight about Turkey’s increasingly proactive role as not only a regional, but a global actor. Such examination includes an analysis of Turkey’s global environment through a foreign policy lens both before and after its decision to host the NATO defense shield. Paired with the technical reasons why Iran feels threatened by the missile deployment, such analysis shows that despite the growing polarity in Turkey’s neighborhood, Turkey’s NATO membership and nuanced view of international affairs makes it an important mediator moving forward in Iranian rapprochement with the West.


Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Kil Joo Ban

North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balance of insecurity, where the weaker North Korean side faced South Korea and the combined ROK–US forces. The second set was intended to shift the balance of insecurity into an imbalance of terror while ensuring that only Pyongyang would be armed with nuclear weapons in the area. The “gray zone” discourse of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (rather than North Korea) ended up bolstering North Korea’s nuclear program, while South Korea intensified only its conventional weapons program.


2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacques E. C. Hymans

This article develops a novel assessment of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Using a theory-driven approach rooted in comparative foreign policy analysis, the article undermines two common assumptions about the DPRK nuclear threat: first, that the North Korean leadership's nuclear intentions are a measured response to the external environment and, second, that the DPRK has developed enough technical capacity to go nuclear whenever it pleases. In place of these assumptions, the article puts forth the general theoretical hypotheses that (1) the decision to go nuclear is rarely if ever based on typical cost-benefit analysis, and instead reflects deep-seated national identity conceptions, and (2) the capacity to go nuclear depends not only on raw levels of industrialization and nuclear technology, but also on the state's organizational acumen. Applied to the case of the DPRK, these hypotheses suggest that it has long been strongly committed to the goal of acquiring an operational nuclear deterrent, but also that it has been finding it very difficult to successfully implement that wish. The article also demonstrates that these hypotheses are supported by the meager evidence available on this case.


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