Coalition politics and coalition governments in Africa

2006 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter O. Oyugi
2021 ◽  
pp. 357-395
Author(s):  
Paul Mitchell

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy created as a result of a revolutionary secession from the United Kingdom. While Ireland has many institutional and administrative features that are quite similar to the Westminster model, there are also some important departures, most notably the adoption of limited government via a written constitution, and the adoption of PR-STV which has facilitated the formation of coalition governments. For most of the twentieth century (up until 1989 at least) a Fianna Fáil single-party government was the default outcome of the government-formation process, though many of these cabinets were ‘large’ minority administrations. The only method of ejecting Fianna Fáil was for the second- and third-largest parties (Fine Gael and Labour) to form a coalition government, which they did on a number of occasions. The bargaining environment permanently changed in 1989 when Fianna Fáil broke the habit of a lifetime and entered its first coalition with the Progressive Democrats. Since then almost all governments have been coalitions. This chapter examines the life cycle of coalition government in Ireland: formation, governance, and dissolution. Coalition agreements have evolved over the decades and have become much more important, detailed, and hence more lengthy. The coalition programme plays a key role in the work of the cabinet and the relations between the parties. The increasingly detailed coalition agreements are a very important commitment device during the life cycle of coalition governments. The increasing fragmentation of the party system has meant that coalition formation bargaining has become more challenging.


2021 ◽  
pp. 640-679
Author(s):  
Dario Nikic Čakar

Since regaining its independence in 1991, Croatia experienced major transformation of constitutional and political system in 2000, when illiberal semi-presidential rule was replaced with functional parliamentary democracy. These changes also established a new pattern of executive politics, with coalition governments as a norm. Furthermore, in the post-2000 period the prime ministerial government was established as the dominant governance model, with prime ministers taking over the leading role in coalition politics. Building on this notion, this chapter identifies several major features of coalition governance in Croatia: very general and rather brief coalition agreements without written rules on cabinet decision-making and on how to resolve internal conflicts; an informal and personalized way of handling conflicts between coalition parties; the dominant position of the prime minister and limited ministerial autonomy; and the policy and personnel conflicts between coalition parties as the main reason for cabinet termination. Thus, similarly to some other countries in Central Eastern Europe region, all three stages of coalition governance in Croatia are heavily dominated by top party leaders and particularly prime ministers, thus creating the patterns of informal and personalized coalition decision-making. The prime ministerial dominance is reflected in weak coalition arrangements, with very limited coordination established between coalition parties and the lack of broader conflict resolution mechanisms, which makes coalition cabinets especially fragile and unstable, particularly when challenged by the inclusion of new parties in government.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoffer Green-Pedersen ◽  
Peter B. Mortensen ◽  
Florence So

Despite coalition governments being the most widespread form of government, many aspects of coalition politics are still poorly understood. This is especially true for questions relating to the role of the prime minister party within the coalition. Being the prime minister party seems to imply considerable influence, but little evidence actually exists as to the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister. This paper offers a new approach to studying the factors conditioning the influence of the prime minister party in a coalition. The approach is focused on the extent of issue overlap between the party manifesto of the prime minister party and the first government speech after the election. This approach makes it possible to actually analyze the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister party. The results show that the PM party is constrained by the issue emphasis of its coalition partners but less so when it holds dissolution power and more, also when it has many coalition partners when controlling for the seat share of the PM party. The paper, thus, both offers a new approach to study the coalition compromise and new evidence on the factors shaping the influence coming from holding the PM position.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 388-415
Author(s):  
Daniel Finke ◽  
Annika Herbel

According to the literature, parliamentary scrutiny is either used by the opposition to control the government or by a coalition partner to control the leading minister. Yet, neither the opposition alone nor individual governing parties alone can muster a parliamentary majority to adopt recommendations, resolutions or statements. Therefore, we ask which parties coalesce in co-sponsoring such joint position papers on European Union policy proposals and why. Tying in with the existing literature, we offer three explanations. Firstly, position papers are co-sponsored by so-called ‘policy coalitions’, a group of parties that hold similar preferences on the policy under discussion. Secondly, governing parties form coalitions which support their minister’s position vis-à-vis his or her international partners in Brussels. Thirdly, party groups co-sponsor position papers to counterbalance the leading minister’s deviation from the floor median.On the empirical side, we study the statements issued by committees of the Finnish Eduskunta and recommendations adopted by committees of the German Bundestag over a period of 10 years. Though having similarly strong parliaments, the two countries are characterized by very different types of coalition governments. These differences are mirrored in the observed co-sponsorship patterns.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Debus ◽  
Mary Stegmaier ◽  
Jale Tosun

This article analyzes the impact of economic voting in federal elections for the German parliament. It combines theories of coalition politics and cabinet decision making—like prime ministerial government, collective cabinet decision making and ministerial discretion—with theoretical approaches on voting behavior to test which cabinet actor voters reward for improved economic conditions. The empirical results, which are based on data from German national election studies from 1987–2009, show that the party of the chancellor (and, thus, the strongest coalition party) benefits most from a positive evaluation of economic policy outcomes. There is, however, no consistent empirical evidence that the coalition parties collectively benefit from perceived positive economic performance. Therefore the findings demonstrate that economic voting occurs in German parliamentary elections, but is targeted specifically toward the chancellor's party.


Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Hulya Eraslan ◽  
Antonio M. Merlo

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document