Croatia: Strong Prime Ministers and Weak Coalitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 640-679
Author(s):  
Dario Nikic Čakar

Since regaining its independence in 1991, Croatia experienced major transformation of constitutional and political system in 2000, when illiberal semi-presidential rule was replaced with functional parliamentary democracy. These changes also established a new pattern of executive politics, with coalition governments as a norm. Furthermore, in the post-2000 period the prime ministerial government was established as the dominant governance model, with prime ministers taking over the leading role in coalition politics. Building on this notion, this chapter identifies several major features of coalition governance in Croatia: very general and rather brief coalition agreements without written rules on cabinet decision-making and on how to resolve internal conflicts; an informal and personalized way of handling conflicts between coalition parties; the dominant position of the prime minister and limited ministerial autonomy; and the policy and personnel conflicts between coalition parties as the main reason for cabinet termination. Thus, similarly to some other countries in Central Eastern Europe region, all three stages of coalition governance in Croatia are heavily dominated by top party leaders and particularly prime ministers, thus creating the patterns of informal and personalized coalition decision-making. The prime ministerial dominance is reflected in weak coalition arrangements, with very limited coordination established between coalition parties and the lack of broader conflict resolution mechanisms, which makes coalition cabinets especially fragile and unstable, particularly when challenged by the inclusion of new parties in government.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Debus ◽  
Mary Stegmaier ◽  
Jale Tosun

This article analyzes the impact of economic voting in federal elections for the German parliament. It combines theories of coalition politics and cabinet decision making—like prime ministerial government, collective cabinet decision making and ministerial discretion—with theoretical approaches on voting behavior to test which cabinet actor voters reward for improved economic conditions. The empirical results, which are based on data from German national election studies from 1987–2009, show that the party of the chancellor (and, thus, the strongest coalition party) benefits most from a positive evaluation of economic policy outcomes. There is, however, no consistent empirical evidence that the coalition parties collectively benefit from perceived positive economic performance. Therefore the findings demonstrate that economic voting occurs in German parliamentary elections, but is targeted specifically toward the chancellor's party.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
I. N. Pogozhina ◽  
◽  
M. V. Sergeeva ◽  

The links between elements of the decision-making system on the presence of corruption risk (CR) in a situation with the logical component of thinking as a predictor are considered. The hypothesis of the role of logical reasoning component as a predictor of (1) perceptions of corruption, (2) indicators of emotional intelligence and (3) moral judgement was tested on a sample of Moscow university students (N=134; M=35±11 years old). The following diagnostic tools were used: (1) the author's test for recognising CR situations, (2) the method for assessing the content of ideas about corruption (Pogozhina, Pshenichnyuk, Sergeyeva), (3) D. Lucin’s EmIn questionnaire, (4) Molchanov's Justice-Care technique. Correlation analysis and structural modeling were used to process the data. The logical component of thinking was a significant positive predictor of the level of development of perceptions of corruption and understanding one’s own emotions and those of others. Also, the logical component significantly negatively predicted moral judgments based on instrumental individualism, reflexive empathic orientation and unconscious but internalized moral values. The findings suggest that the logical component will play a leading role in the CR decision-making system and should be specifically shaped.


2020 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. 02026
Author(s):  
Yidi Wan ◽  
Wei Xie ◽  
Haihong Du ◽  
Wenming Pan ◽  
Jianqing Li ◽  
...  

in order to thoroughly implement the new energy security strategy of “four revolutions and one cooperation”, meet the requirements of power grid planning and management of energy administration, realize the strategic objectives of State Grid Corporation of China, actively respond to the severe external economic situation, alleviate the impact of policy-based price reduction, and improve the performance of internal investment management, the company needs scientific front-end decision-making, improve the efficiency of investment decision-making, scientifically determine the investment scale, structure and timing, and play a strategic leading role in investment decision-making. Through the analysis of internal and external management requirements, this paper constructs an auxiliary decision-making model of power grid investment to support the determination of investment scale, structure and time sequence, to realize the reasonable investment scale calculation of provincial companies, the calculation of investment structure of different voltage levels and the optimization of project delivery under the condition of given investment scale, which comprehensively considers the external supervision, economic development and internal management objectives, so as to assist the prior investment decision-making, improve the input-output efficiency, effectively improve the Advisory decision-making ability of investment data, and meet the company’s investment decision-making needs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 357-395
Author(s):  
Paul Mitchell

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy created as a result of a revolutionary secession from the United Kingdom. While Ireland has many institutional and administrative features that are quite similar to the Westminster model, there are also some important departures, most notably the adoption of limited government via a written constitution, and the adoption of PR-STV which has facilitated the formation of coalition governments. For most of the twentieth century (up until 1989 at least) a Fianna Fáil single-party government was the default outcome of the government-formation process, though many of these cabinets were ‘large’ minority administrations. The only method of ejecting Fianna Fáil was for the second- and third-largest parties (Fine Gael and Labour) to form a coalition government, which they did on a number of occasions. The bargaining environment permanently changed in 1989 when Fianna Fáil broke the habit of a lifetime and entered its first coalition with the Progressive Democrats. Since then almost all governments have been coalitions. This chapter examines the life cycle of coalition government in Ireland: formation, governance, and dissolution. Coalition agreements have evolved over the decades and have become much more important, detailed, and hence more lengthy. The coalition programme plays a key role in the work of the cabinet and the relations between the parties. The increasingly detailed coalition agreements are a very important commitment device during the life cycle of coalition governments. The increasing fragmentation of the party system has meant that coalition formation bargaining has become more challenging.


Author(s):  
Torbjörn Bergman ◽  
Gabriella Ilonszki ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller

This volume analyses the coalition life-cycle in ten countries in Central Eastern Europe, from pre-electoral alliances to government formation and portfolio distribution, to governing in coalitions, the events that eventually lead to a government termination, and electoral performance of coalition parties. This final chapter summarizes the main patterns of coalition politics and compares among the ten countries. In terms of the three models of coalition governance Hungary comes closest to the Dominant Prime Minister Model, Lithuania and Latvia approach the Ministerial Government Model, and Slovenia comes closest to the Coalition Compromise Model. The chapter also discusses how these findings contrast with the general patterns known from the literature on coalition politics in Western Europe. A few of the patterns of coalition politics are similar, including the relative frequency of different types of coalition governments and the increase and spread of the use of coalition governance mechanisms, such as written coalition contracts. Other features are more distinct: there have been fewer single-party governments and there is a stronger tendency to the Ministerial Government Model than in Western Europe. Over time, processes of learning and adjustment to coalition governance can be identified, however without a linear and general trend. Much of the change is rooted in party system changes, for instance the reversal of the initial growth of new political parties and the recent decline of the effective number of parties (ENP). While a less tangible result, the chapters also stress the role of personalities and animosities to impact coalition considerations.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


1993 ◽  
pp. 223-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang C. Müller ◽  
Wilfried Philipp ◽  
Peter Gerlich

2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikko Mustakallio ◽  
Erkko Autio ◽  
Shaker A. Zahra

Governance of family firms differs from mainstream corporate governance in an important respect: Important owners, i.e., family members, may have multiple roles in the business. In this paper, we develop and test a model of family firm governance that incorporates both formal control and social control aspects of governance. Governance based on the formal control draws on agency theory, whereas the social control aspects draw on social theories of governance, addressing social capital embedded in relationships. Drawing on these theories, we examine the influence of different governance mechanisms on the quality of strategic decision making. The Family Business Governance Model is tested using survey data from 192 family firms in Finland. We use structural equation modeling in testing the empirical validity of the model. The empirical analysis largely supports our hypotheses on formal control and social control as well as their influences on the decision-making quality.


Author(s):  
Michelangelo Vercesi

This chapter deals with the internal decision-making process of political executives in parliamentary systems, that is, how executives take their own collective decisions. The focus is on the cabinet system as a whole, including both cabinet members and other involved party-political and bureaucratic actors. In particular, the chapter reviews literature’s debates about the nature of cabinet government, the role of prime ministers, and variations of decision-making. A special attention is payed to factors explaining intra-cabinet power distribution and the choice of different decision-making arenas. After introducing the topic, an overview of conceptual issues and main research questions is provided. Subsequently, the work discusses the way in which scholars have addressed these issues and the findings they have reached. The final part stresses existing deficits and seeks to set the agenda for future research.


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