Remembering Economics

2003 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Daniel Hammond

I showed a draft of my presidential address to a friend the other day. He read for a few minutes, then looked up at me and said, “Your address will be remembered long after The Wealth of Nations, Ricardo's Principles, and The General Theory are all forgotten, but not until then!”Remembering is what we who read, write, and teach history of economics are about. Historians preserve memory; we collect historical facts, organize them, and store them in conceptual filing systems. Remembering accurately and fully is hard work. Memory is tricky. It is always incomplete. It is well known that different witnesses to an event such as a traffic accident can remember the event quite differently, so that their accounts of what happened seem incompatible with each other. They may even appear not to be reports of the same event.

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP MIROWSKI

This Presidential Address revisits Paul Samuelson’s views on the history of science and history of economics, with the advantage of archival evidence from his papers now deposited at Duke. It suggests he was not impressed with historians in general; but also, that his faith in the orthodox neoclassical profession failed him towards the end of his life, when those in the profession started to treat him the way that he had treated the historians.


Pragmatics ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Farr

Rancheros are presented as a distinct subgroup of Mexican campesinos ‘peasants’ who enact a liberal individualist ideology that centrally values private property, especially land, and hard work as the legitimate route to el progreso ‘progress’. Both male and female rancheros are tough and independent “ranch” people who construct their identities in contrast to indigenas ‘Indians’ on the one hand (whom rancheros view as communally-oriented), and catrines ‘city people’ (whom rancheros see as fancily-dressed, and acting, “dandies”) on the other. A history of frontier isolation and mobility in la sociedad ranchera ‘ranchero society’ facilitated the development of both autonomy and strong ties of reciprocity for mutual support in hostile conditions, as well as common ways of living, dressing, and speaking. This valuing of both autonomy and affiliation undermines the often-invoked dichotomy between “Mexicans” and “North Americans” as being communal, or group-oriented, and individualistic, or self-oriented, respectively. Rather than predominantly one or the other, rancheros value both autonomy and affiliation. This historically constructed identity is enacted in a particular way of speaking, franqueza ‘frankness’, direct, straightforward, candid language that goes directly to a point. Informal verbal performances by members of these families within their homes, both in Chicago and Mexico, are analyzed for their construction of ranchero identity through franqueza.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-172
Author(s):  
Katherine G. Morrissey

The following was the author’s presidential address at the annual meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch, American Historical Association, in Northridge, California, on August 4, 2017. The twentieth-century visual history of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, la frontera, offers a rich set of representations of the shared border environments. Photographs, distributed in the United States and in Mexico, allow us to trace emerging ideas about the border region and the politicized borderline. This essay explores two border visualization projects—one centered on the Mexican Revolution and the visual vocabulary of the Mexican nation and the other on the repeat photography of plant ecologists—that illustrate the simultaneous instability and power of borders.


1998 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Dimand

The history of economics provides many examples of economists, such as A. A. Cournot, and J. H. Von Thunen, whose work became influential only long after it was written. Others, like Francis A. Walker, loomed large during their careers, only to fade in the discipline's memory. Irving Fisher's reputation has followed a much less common trajectory. Once the most cited monetary economist, the subject of major review articles and the center of controversies over theory and policy, Fisher lost the profession's attention, vanished from citation lists in macroeconomics, and was regarded as an embarrassment by colleagues in his university and his discipline. Then, after his death, his contributions to macroeconomics became increasingly cited and influential, as macroeconomics developed in ways that brought it closer to Fisher's approach. New approaches have been found prefigured in Fisher's work, as when a 1926 article of his was reprinted in the Journal of Political Economy in 1973 as “I Discovered the Phillips Curve” (Fisher, 1997, 8). Fisher was once caricatured in introductory textbooks as the supposed exponent of a constant-velocity version of the quantity theory of money, the exemplar of simplistic pre- Keynesian economics swept away in the Keynesian Revolution, but recently there has been attention to Fisher as, in Keynes's phrase, “the great grandparent” of The General Theory, “who first influenced me strongly towards regarding money as a ‘real’ factor” (Keynes, 1971-89, 14, pp. 203 n.; Dimand, 1995; Kregel, 1988).


1985 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
John K. Whitaker

The body of enquiry known as economics grew out of the practical needs of economic life and statesmanship, and also out of philosophical speculation on the nature of man and society. Adam Smith reflects both aspects, but I would locate him predominantly in the philosophical wing. When he switched from considering the theory of moral sentiments to dealing with the causes of the wealth of nations, I don't believe that he saw himself as engaging in a fundamentally different mode of enquiry. He was, of course, concerned with practical questions--of ethical behaviour in the one case and of economic policy in the other--but discussion of both was from a broad philosophic viewpoint. Ricardo, on the other hand, seems to me to exemplify, and at a high level, someone who falls predominatly in the other wing. Although his thought was abstract, it was much more an attempt to deal pragmatically with important issues of practice than it was an attempt, in the philosophical tradition, to understand the general nature of men's interaction in society. Indeed, utilitarianism by then offered a strictly philosophic rationale for concern with practice (albeit a piggish one in some eyes) which did much to confound and confuse the dual origins of economics. Mill and Sidgwick, among others, maintained the tradition of a close connection between philosophical and economic enquiry, within the framework of a broadened utilitarianism, and the continuing affinity of the two disciplines has been exemplified more recently in the work of writers such as Rawls and Sen, not to mention the recent upsurge in discussion of economic methodology.


1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Henderson

I found preparing this presidential address a much greater challenge than I had anticipated. After much deliberation, I decided to explore the historical roots of what we are doing now. The History of Economics Society, like other learned societies, holds an annual conference in different cities; members present papers which are discussed; and the Society sponsors a specialist journal—The Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Why? Where did this tradition begin? I turned to several historians of science—I. Bernard Cohen, Thomas S. Kuhn, Richard Yeo, and Ian Hacking—for some background.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 253
Author(s):  
Jürgen Oelkers

Karl Popper called one of his latest collections of essays All Life is Problem Solving. Little is known about the history of «problem solving» and also Popper did not say much about his references. But his model of four stages of problem solving is clearly anticipated in John Dewey’s psychology of thinking. On the other hand Dewey’s How we Think (1910) cannot be understood without taken into account the contemporary movement in didactics. The article discusses two of them, «nature studies» on the one hand and the «project method» on the other. «Nature studies» is considered to be the counterpoint to problem-solving. William Kilpatrick’s project method is still closely linked with Dewey’s psychology but both concepts have to be studied independently. Dewey’s theory of problem-solving is a general theory of learning that cannot be reduced to didactics. But that reduction might explain why Popper did not pay attention to it.


1959 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
M. D. Knowles

Ayear ago our theme was the work of the Bollandists. Their name suggests immediately, to all acquainted with European historiography, the name of another body of religious, many of them the contemporaries of Henskens and Papebroch, and it would be impossible to omit from even the shortest list of great historical enterprises the achievement of the Maurists. The two bodies of men and their work, nevertheless, have little in common save an equal devotion to accurate scholar-ship. What impresses us in the history of Bollandism is its continuity of spirit and undeviating aim over more than three hundred years, during which a very small but perpetually self-renewing group has pursued a single narrowly defined task, which is still far from completion. With the Maurists, on the other hand, it is the magnitude, the variety and the high quality of the achievement that strikes the imagination. While the Bollandists, a small family in a single house, have in three centuries produced in major work no more than a row of sixty-seven folios, the Maurists, in a little more than a hundred years, published matter enough to stock a small library, and left behind them letters, papers and transcripts which have been used and exploited by scholars for nearly two centuries since. Indeed, it would be both impossible and alien to the scope of our interests to attempt the briefest survey of Maurist scholarship in its entirety, and my remarks to-day will be confined to their publications on European history after the decline of the Roman Empire. Who were the Maurists, and wherein lay their peculiar excellence?


2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (S1) ◽  
pp. 10-27
Author(s):  
Pedro Garcia Duarte ◽  
Yann Giraud

Economists such as Alvin Roth and Esther Duflo have recently argued that economics in the late twentieth century has evolved from (social) science to engineering. On the other hand, historians such as Mary Morgan and Michel Armatte have argued that the transformation of economics into an engineering science has been a century-long development. Turning away from the “economics as engineering” analogy, our introduction suggests an alternative approach to account for the presumed transformation of economics into an engineering science. We encourage the development of a history of “economics and engineering,” which depicts how these two types of knowledge–and the communities who produce them–have interacted in various institutional and national contexts. Drawing on the contributions to this 2020 annual supplement of HOPE, we show how these narratives may help change the historiography of twentieth-century economics.


2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Klaes

According to a commonly held view, doctrinal history formed a largely uncontested part of the discipline of economics in the early years of the twentieth century. Economists like Edwin Cannan, Jacob Viner, and Joseph A. Schumpeter were at the same time respected economists and historians of economics. Contemporary historians of economics, on the other hand, tend to feel defensive about their field of study. The questions of why, how, and in which discipline one should pursue the history of economics is hotly debated among practitioners, while the number of universities and curricula still offering history courses is in steady decline. This is matched by a corresponding attitude among orthodox economists aptly summarized by Frank H. Hahn (1992, p. 165): “What the dead had to say, when of value, has long since been absorbed, and when we need to say it again we can generally say it much better.”


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