Brave New Borders: The EU’s Use of New Technologies for the Management of Migration and Asylum

Author(s):  
Jorrit J. Rijpma

This chapter shows how in the 21st century new technologies and new bureaucracies have become part and parcel of the EU’s migration and asylum policy, and how these two are intimately linked. Together they have allowed the EU and its Member States to tighten their grip over the movement of people. The use of technology has transformed the nature of the European border and has reinforced the agencies in charge of its management. This has largely been done without a clearly defined vision or grand design. Rather, it was technology itself that enabled this development and has greatly helped to shape it. While technology has often been portrayed as value-neutral, it may now pose challenges to some of the EU’s fundamental rights, most notably the right to data protection.

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-494
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Zell

With the negotiation of its Data Protection Regulation, the European Union seeks to reform an outdated set of laws that has failed to address the evolving data protection challenges inherent in new technologies such as social networks, e-commerce, cloud computing, and location-based services. This article addresses the forthcoming Data Protection Regulation as well as the current state of data protection law in the EU, with a particular focus on Germany. The first part of the article examines Germany's robust data protection framework and the EU's existing authority. The article then raises key issues related to data protection in Germany and the EU—namely, discrepancies in data protection standards and enforcement among EU Member States—as illustrated by recent, high profile cases involving household names like Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon. Through this analysis, the article attempts to explain how and why companies doing business in Germany, but established in other EU Member States, are subject to less stringent data protection standards than German companies. Lastly, the article synthesizes the issues in debate with regard to the draft Data Protection Regulation and offers perspectives on what the Regulation could and should mean for data protection in the EU.


This book addresses the relationship between EU law and new technologies. Its aim is to address two groups of questions. First, how does EU law approach the relation between science and regulation and what part do conceptions of risk play in this approach; is there a distinctive character to EU law in this domain? And second, what challenges do new technologies pose for the EU internal market and for fundamental principles of EU law, including fundamental rights? Do new technologies represent potential new barriers to freedom of movement? How are EU instruments used to direct and orientate EU policy on new technologies, and how do new technologies shape EU policy, including—but not only—EU policy on privacy and data protection? The book is organized into two parts. The first part, ‘The EU, Scientific Risk, and Regulatory Design’, addresses some of the more horizontal questions, helping us to unpack and to understand the EU’s approach to the regulation of scientific/technological risk and the impact on regulatory design of the close link between the regulation of technology and the internal market. The second part, ‘EU Law and New Technologies—Challenge and Response’, uses different policy fields to exemplify the different ways in which technology and EU policy interact, by posing new regulatory challenges (data protection; internet governance), and by shaping the regulatory response to new challenges (the use of technology for border management and migration control).


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


Author(s):  
Cristina Pauner Chulvi

La aplicación indiscriminada de la normativa sobre el derecho a la protección de datos de carácter personal a los medios de comunicación puede suponer una restricción excesiva de la libertad de información, uno de los elementos más característicos del patrimonio jurídico de las sociedades democráticas. En el intento de lograr un equilibrio entre ambos derechos fundamentales, el régimen europeo en materia de protección de datos —la actual Directiva 95/46/CE y la Propuesta de Reglamento General de Protección de Datos— contemplan la denominada excepción periodística que autoriza a los Estados miembros a establecer limitaciones a la aplicación de determinadas disposiciones. El presente artículo analiza el concepto y alcance de la mencionada excepción en las normas europeas y en las legislaciones de los Estados miembros que, en transposición de la Directiva, han incorporado el reconocimiento de la excepción periodística.Indiscriminate application to the media of the rules on the right to data protection may cause excessive restriction of freedom of information, one of the most characteristic items of the legal heritage of democratic societies. In an attempt to strike a balance between the two fundamental rights, the European legal framework for the protection of personal data — the current Directive 95/46/EC and the proposed General Data Protection Regulation — provide for the so-called journalism exemption which allows Member States to establish exemptions to the application of certain provisions. This article analyses the concept and scope of this exemption in the European regulations and in the legislation of the Member States which have transposed the Directive into their national law and have thus incorporated recognition of the journalism exemption.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orla Lynskey

AbstractArticle 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-104
Author(s):  
Maria Teresa Heredero Campo

SUMMARY Legislators legislate as needs arise; it is the present moment and society itself, through its demands, which sets the path and provides them with the keys as to what matters to legislate on and what aspects need to be developed in greater detail. Contemporary societies try, with greater or lesser success, to adapt to the changes that are taking place, both those reflected in daily customs and habits, and those related to the generation, dissemination and use of information and knowledge. Today's society consumes and handles an excessive volume of information and data, often without assessing its veracity or analysing the source from which it comes, without considering the importance of the data it provides at any given time, and much less thinking about the consequences that misuse of such data may have for privacy, for example. These are issues that, despite being the order of the day, have already given cause for concern. A fact that is reflected in an increasingly prolix jurisprudence. An example of this, as we will have the opportunity to point out below, is the SAN of 6 April 2018, which, with regard to the problems that arise in relation to medical records, highlights the importance of defending the right to the protection of personal data and the need to obtain consent in an appropriate manner. In these times of pandemic, it is important to seek a suitable approach and to know some fundamental aspects of the aforementioned right to data protection, starting from such extremely important concepts as: personal data or consent itself. Moreover, the development of this right, so much questioned lately due to the use of COVID applications, in terms of the possible effects on privacy or image, or any of the controversies that are arising around data protection in the management of the coronavirus, almost forces us to think about its limits. In this respect, we must bear in mind that many of the answers to the questions that are being raised about the problems associated with current practices lie in the legitimising bases of data processing. In this study, I conclude that despite the great importance of some personality rights, including privacy, honour or self-image, and among which is the right to data protection, the right that deserves the greatest protection is the right to life. Let us not forget that the function of law is to serve the person to whom the reason for its existence must be attributed. KEY WORDS Law and New Technologies; Data Protection; Fundamental Rights; Personality Rights; Data Protection; Right to privacy; Right to honour; Right to image; General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); Organic Law on Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights (LOPDyGDD); COVID-19 (Coronavirus).


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 899 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Villani

Abstract:Over the last decades, it has arisen the need for increased cooperation betweenlaw enforcement authorities in making more systematic use of the data furnished by those moving to and from the States in order to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorism and other serious crimes. On 21 April 2016 the Council adopted Directive 2016/681 in order to regulate PNR data transfer from the airlines to the Member States, as well as the processing of this data by the competent authorities. Its validity, with particular reference to the balance between needs of security and the respect of fundamental rights, such as the right to respect for private life and the right to the protection of personal data, could be challenged after the conclusions reached by the CJEU in its Opinion on the EU-Canada agreement on PNR transfer.Summary1. INTRODUCTION. 2. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND: ASSESSING THE NECESSITY OF AN ACT ON PROCESSING PNR DATA AT EU LEVEL. 3. DIRECTIVE 2016/681 ON PNR DATA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. 4. THE CJEU OPINION 1/15 ON THE EU-CANADA AGREEMENT: WHAT CHALLENGES FOR THE PNR DIRECTIVE? 5. FINAL REMARKS Resumen:En la última década, ha surgido la necesidad de una mayor cooperación entre las autoridades nacionales de los diferentes Estados para hacer un uso más sistemático de los datos entre ellos para luchar contra el terrorismo y otros crímenes. El 21 de abril de 2016, el Consejo adoptó la Directiva 2016/681 para regular la transferencia de los datos PNR de las líneas aéreas a los Estados miembros, así como el tratamiento de estos datos por las autoridades competentes. Su validez, en relación con el equilibrio entre las necesidades de seguridad y el respeto de los derechos fundamentales, como el derecho al respeto de la vida privada y el derecho a la protección de los datos personales, podría ser impugnada como consecuencia de la opinión emitida por el TJUE sobre el acuerdo UE-Canadá en relación a la transferencia de datos personales.Sumario:1. Introducción; 2. Panorama histórico y jurídico: evaluaciones sobre la necesidad de un acto de la UE en la utilización de datos; 3. Directiva 2016/681: un análisis crítico; 4. La Opinión 1/15 del Tribunal de Justicia: qué desafíos para la Directiva 2016/681? 5. Observaciones finales. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Mario Rosentau

While the EU General Data Protection Regulation, which entered force on 25 May, is generally good and necessary in its vigorous protection of the fundamental rights of self‑determination and identity of European people, the article identifies a core issue that has gone unnoticed: the GDPR violates EU treaties. It is, at base, a ‘European law’, yet European laws are banned under the TEU and TFEU. The article examines the background for this conflict. The ambitious plan for ratification of 2003’s draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe fell at the first hurdle in 2005. The draft Constitution envisaged a legislative innovation: the European law and European framework law, directly applicable in the Member States and superior to them. These legal instruments, envisaged as replacing EU regulations, could readily be cited as a major federalist pillar of the draft. Yet there would be no European laws – they were rejected with the draft constitution in the 2005 referenda, and the current treaties do not foresee any law-like European legislation. The author outlines the GDPR’s nature as a European law thus: the regulation 1) potentially concerns all residents of Europe, albeit by adding to the rights of individuals and protecting their freedoms; 2) addresses virtually all legal entities and undertakings acting, physically or through a network, in the European judicial area; 3) addresses the Member States and the EU itself; 4) and has cross-border applicability and covers the whole EU. Furthermore, its reach extends to service providers outside the EU if their service targets EU data subjects. There are substantial impacts on subjects on whom obligations are substantial. Hence, the author concludes that the GDPR’s scope, depth, and impacts exceed all the limits that the EU treaties permit for regulations. Furthermore, the treaties do not even know the term ‘general regulation’. Since the GDPR possesses the characteristics of a ‘European law’ – and even is ‘seamlessly’ positioned in a place reserved by the draft EU Constitution for the ‘European law on data protection’ – while such laws have been rejected, a key issue is highlighted: how deep an EU-level political integration and relinquishment of the individual European nations’ sovereignty do the Member States actually want? For instance, most analyses of the causes of Brexit cite loss of sovereignty of the UK as one of the main factors in the decision. The author concludes that, since the GDPR is with us to stay, amendment of the EU treaties can no longer be avoided. Noble objectives cannot justify infringements of the present ‘European Constitution’ and the constitutions of the Member States.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 27-44
Author(s):  
Ewa Kulesza

The right to the protection of personal data, which is part of the right to privacy, is a fundamental human right. Thus, its guarantees were included in the high-level regulations of the European Union as well as the legal norms of the EU Member States. The first Polish law regulating the protection of personal data was adopted in 1997 as the implementation of EU Directive 95/46. The law imposed a number of obligations on public and private entities which process personal data in order to protect the rights of data subjects and, in particular, to guarantee them the ability to control the correctness of processing of their personal data. Therefore, the law obliged data controllers to process data only on the basis of the premises indicated in the legislation, to adequately secure data, and to comply with the disclosure obligation concerning data subjects, including their right to correct false or outdated data or to request removal of data processed in violation of the law. However, as complaints directed by citizens to the supervisory body—the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection—showed, personal data controllers, especially those operating in the private sector, did not comply with the law, acting in a manner that violated their customers’ rights. In the hitherto existing unfair business practices of entrepreneurs, the violations of the data protection provisions that were the most burdensome for customers were related to preventing them from exercising their rights, including the right to control the processing of data, as well as the failure to provide the controller’s business address, which made it impossible for subjects whose data were used in violation of the law or for the inspecting authorities to contact the company, a lack of data security and a failure to follow the procedures required by law, the failure to secure documents containing personal data or their abandonment, a lack of updating customer data, the use of unverified data sets and sending marketing offers to deceased people or incorrect target recipients, and excessive amounts of data requested by controllers. The violations of the rights of data subjects recorded in Poland and other EU Member States—among other arguments—provided inspiration for the preparation of a new legal act in the form of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (which entered into force on 25 May 2018). The extension of the rights of people whose data are processed was combined in the GDPR with the introduction of new legal instruments disciplining data controllers. Instruments in the form of administrative fines and the strongly emphasised possibility to demand compensation for a violation of the right to data protection were directed in particular against economic entities violating the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Campina ◽  
Carlos Rodrigues

The unexpected pandemic 2020 context brings to humanity the effective relevance to the minimum existential, to the human rights, more than the discourse, but the real need of the protection from the main legal instruments. The paper proposes and discusses the connection with the need for tax collection by the states to meet the expenses of the social state, namely for education expenses, and whether the economic limitation caused by the current pandemic in face of the sharp decline in GDP and which has necessarily associated with a large decrease in the collection of tax revenues, which may compromise the right to education. From the findings of the study, concerning the new technologies and their dependence, the actual context shows that it is not an option but an effective need for everyone, so the states and the international community have the obligation to generate conditions of the best access and should promote the pedagogical need in this subject.   Keywords: Fundamental rights, social state, taxes, property protection, education.


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