Self-determination and the Human Right to Democracy

Author(s):  
Thomas Christiano
Author(s):  
Samrita Sinha ◽  

According to John Quintero, “The decolonisation agenda championed by the United Nations is not based exclusively on independence. It is the exercise of the human right of self-determination, rather than independence per se, that the United Nations has continued to push for.” Situated within ontologies of the human right of self-determination, this paper will focus on an analysis of The Legends of Pensam by Mamang Dai, a writer hailing from the Adi tribe of Arunachal Pradesh, to explore the strategies of decolonisation by which she revitalizes her tribe’s cultural enunciations. The project of decolonisation is predicated on the understanding that colonialism has not only displaced communities but also brought about an erasure of their epistemologies. Consequently, one of its major agenda is to recuperate displaced epistemic positions of such communities. In the context of Northeast India, the history of colonial rule and governance has had long lasting political repercussions which has resulted not only in a culture of impunity and secessionist violence but has also led to the reductive homogeneous construction of the Northeast as conflict ridden. In the contemporary context, the polyethnic, socio-cultural fabric of the Northeast borderlands foregrounds it as an evolving post-colonial geopolitical imaginary. In the light of this, the objective of this paper is to arrive at the ramifications of employing autoethnography as a narrative regime by which Mamang Dai reaffirms the Adi community’s epistemic agency and reclaims the human right towards a cultural self-determination.


Author(s):  
Pablo Gilabert

This chapter addresses two interconnected questions about human rights and the pursuit of global justice: Is there a human right to democracy? How does the achievement of human rights, including the human right to democracy, contribute to the pursuit of global justice? The chapter answers the first question in the affirmative. It identifies three reasons for favoring democracy and explores the significance of those reasons for defending it as a human right. It answers important worries that acknowledging a human right to democracy would lead to intolerance and lack of respect for peoples’ self-determination, exaggerate the importance of democracy for securing other rights, generalize institutional arrangements that only work in some contexts, and tie human rights to specific ideas of freedom and equality that do not have the same universal appeal and urgency. Regarding the second question, the chapter distinguishes between basic and non-basic global justice and argues that democracy is significant for both. It claims that the fulfillment of human rights constitutes basic global justice, explains how a human right to democracy has significance for the legitimacy of international besides domestic institutions, and shows how forms of global democracy and the exploration of cosmopolitan and humanist commitments underlying human rights may enable and motivate the pursuit of non-basic demands of global justice (such as those concerning socioeconomic equality). The key claim in the chapter is that the fulfillment of the human right to democratic political empowerment is crucial for the pursuit of global justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Munafrizal Manan

This paper discusses the right of self-determinationfrom  international  law  and international human rights law perspective. It traces the emergence and development of self-determination from political principle to human right. It also explores the controversy of the right of self-determination. There have been different and even contradictory interpretations of the right of self-determination. Besides, there is no consensus on the mechanism to apply the right of self-determination. Both international law and international human rights law are vague about this.


Author(s):  
Adom Getachew

This chapter turns to the United Nations, where anticolonial nationalists staged their reinvention of self-determination, transforming a secondary principle included in the UN Charter into a human right. Through the political thought of Nnamdi Azikiwe, W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, and George Padmore, the chapter illustrates that this reinvention drew on a distinctive account of empire as enslavement. The emergence of a right to self-determination is often read as an expansion of an already existing principle in which anticolonial nationalists universalize a Westphalian regime of sovereignty. In contrast to this standard account, the chapter argues that the anticolonial account of self-determination marked a radical break from the Eurocentric model of international society and established nondomination as a central ideal of a postimperial world order.


Author(s):  
Luara Ferracioli

This book focuses on three key questions regarding the movement of persons across international borders: (1) What gives some residents of a liberal society a right to be considered citizens of that society such that they have a claim to make decisions with regard to its political future? (2) Do citizens of a liberal society have a prima facie right to exclude prospective immigrants despite their commitment to the values of freedom and equality? And (3) if citizens have this prima facie right to exclude prospective immigrants, are there moral requirements regarding how they may exercise it? The book therefore tackles the most pressing philosophical questions that arise for a theory that does not endorse a human right to immigrate: the questions of who exercises self-determination in the area of immigration, why they have such a right in the first place, and how they should go about exercising it.


Author(s):  
Mohammad Hasan Ansori

Aceh conflict is widely recognized as one of the most protracted and violent conflicts not only in Southeast Asia, but also in the globe. This study intends to look at the secessionist conflict from he social movement perspective, and specifically from the theoretical instrument of framing process. This study goes a little further by getting engaged with the strategic issue of Islam in the region. In lieu of commonly adopted macro and structural analysis of the conflict, this study methodologically instead applies micro and dynamic analysis of the conflict. In general, this study primarily argues that the framing strategy adopted by Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is clearly secular in nature, and/or far away from the Islam-nuanced religiosity and spirit. However; Islam is often exploited particularly for mass mobilization. The movement"s framing strategy mainly includes natural resources exploitation, ethnic-nationalist vision, universal value of self-determination, the history of Aceh Kingdom and human right violation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanoch Dagan ◽  
Avihay Dorfman

AbstractFor private property to be legitimately recognized as a universal human right, its meaning should pass the test of self-imposability by an end. In this Essay, we argue, negatively, that the prevailing (libertarian) understanding of private property cannot plausibly meet this demanding standard; and develop, affirmatively, a liberal conception which has a much better prospect of meeting property’s justificatory challenge. Private property, on our account, is an empowering device, which is crucial both to people’s personal autonomy (understood in terms of self-determination) and to their relational equality (understood in terms of reciprocal respect and recognition among persons). The liberal conception of the human right to property has both vertical and horizontal significance — it implies respect from both the public authority and other individuals — which means that it is thoroughly political but not necessarily statist.Our account generates important implications, both domestic and transnational. Domestically, it implies that whereas some property rights should be subject to strong constitutional protection, state law should facilitate other types of private and non-private property institutions, and these property institutions may well be subject to non-owners’ claims to access and, more broadly, to being treated respectfully. Furthermore, our conception of the human right to property requires that everyone have the unusual authority typical of full-blown private ownership. Transnationally, our analysis highlights a freestanding dimension of relational justice, which is relevant across borders even given that our distributive obligations are statist. This injunction of relational justice in transnational interactions brings into question the adequacy of the current state of the law, according to which these interactions are mainly governed by choice-of-law rules that conceptualize them as wholly subsumed under the capacities of the parties as citizens of their respective polities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il presente contributo si muove nell’ambito della riflessione giuridica e si chiede se risponde a giustizia la “libertà” di scegliere la morte quale diritto umano essenziale. Il principio “non uccidere”, ovvero “non cagionare la morte”, posto alla base di tutti gli ordinamenti giuridici moderni e democratici, viene esaminato sia con riferimento alla vita altrui sia quando il soggetto non si esprime o addirittura non vuole la morte; sia quando il soggetto esprime la volontà di porre fine alla propria vita e chiede che altri adempiano tale volontà. L’Autrice osserva che nel secondo caso, si chiede che il “terzo” (medico) assecondi l’autoderminazione di chi vuole disporre della propria vita solo quando la vita versa in condizioni di malattia inguaribile e devastante disabilità. È evidente, allora, che la vita umana propria diventa disponibile quando prevale la sofferenza e il criterio decisivo non è l’autodeterminazione individuale, ma la valutazione sociale del valore della vita. In questa prospettiva viene toccato anche il tema del “rifiuto delle cure” e posta la distinzione tra “autodeterminazione sui trattamenti” e “autodeterminazione sulla vita”. Nel delicato e complesso ambito del “fine vita”, se la morte è il limite inesorabile dell’esistenza che occorre saper accettare, occorre anche saper armonizzare il principio di autonomia e il principio del “non cagionare la morte”, fondato sul riconoscimento dell’uguale dignità del vivere. ---------- This contribution deals with the legal reflection and wonders whether “freedom” to choose death as an essential human right is fair. The “no kill” principle, at the base of all modern legal and democratic systems, is examined with reference to both someone else’s life and the situation in which a person is unable to express himeself or he does not want death; or when a person wants death and asks other people to fulfil this wish. The author notes that in the latter case, one asks the “third” (physician) fulfil the self-determination of persons who want to dispose of their own life when life is compromised. Therefore, human life is disposable when pain prevails. Finally, treatment refusal is dealt.


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