Iceland and European Integration

Author(s):  
Baldur Thorhallsson

Iceland’s European policy is a puzzle. Iceland is deeply embedded in the European project despite its non-EU membership status. Iceland is a member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (1970), the European Economic Area (EEA) (1994), and Schengen (2001). Moreover, Iceland applied for membership in the European Union (EU) in 2009. Nonetheless, the Icelandic political elite have been reluctant to partake in the European integration process. They have hesitated to take any moves toward closer engagement with Europe unless such a move is seen as necessary to deal with a crisis situation. Decisions to engage with the European project have not been made based on outright economic and political preferences. They have primarily been based on economic or political necessity at times when the country has faced a deep economic downturn or its close neighboring states have decided to take part in European integration. The country has essentially been forced to take part in the project in order to prevent crises from emerging or to cope with a current crisis situation. For instance, in 2009, Iceland unexpectedly applied for membership in the EU after the collapse of its economy nine months earlier. However, four years later, after a swift economic recovery and after Iceland having been “betrayed” by the EU in the so-called Ice-save dispute with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the accession process was put on hold. The EU was no longer seen as an economic and political savior. Iceland’s close relationships with its powerful neighboring states, the United States and the United Kingdom, have also had considerable influence on the country’s European policy. Iceland’s membership in the EFTA, the EEA, and Schengen was largely dictated by the Nordic states’ decisions to join the organizations and because of crisis situations their lack of membership would have meant for Iceland were it to be left out. Moreover, the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the Union has firmly frozen Iceland’s accession process and contributed to increased criticism of the transfer of autonomy from Reykjavik to Brussels that takes place with the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, many at the right of center in Icelandic politics do not see any security reasons for joining the EU, as Iceland’s defense is guaranteed by a bilateral defense treaty with the United States and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). European debates about partial and full participation in the European project have led to harsh opposition in Althingi (the National Parliament), deep divisions in society at large, and public protests. Opposition has been driven by an overwhelming focus on sovereignty concerns. The political discourse on sovereignty and self-determination prevails except when the country is faced with a crisis situation. To prevent a crisis from emerging or to deal with a current crisis, Icelandic politicians reluctantly decide to take partial part in the European project. They are determined to keep autonomy over sectors of primary political importance, sectors that are close to the heart of the nation, those of agriculture and fisheries.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kubin

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (so-called Brexit) is one of the most important events in the process of European integration. It has a lot of extremely remarkable implications – both for the EU and for the United Kingdom. Among other, Brexit will affect the security of the United Kingdom and the EU. The aim of the study is to answer the research question: how will Britain’s exit from the EU influence the EU common security and defence policy? In order to answer this question, the factors that are most relevant to the United Kingdom’s significance for the EU’s security and defence policy will be identified. This will show how the EU’s potential of the security and defence policy will change, when the UK leaves this organisation. The most important conclusions are included in the summary.


Subject MiFID II implementation and compliance Significance The EU’s flagship investor protection reform -- the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) -- will come into force on January 3, 2018, Valdis Dombrovskis, the EU Commissioner responsible for financial stability, confirmed on October 17, saying that there would not be a further delay. Despite already having been given an extra year's extension, banks are struggling to comply in time because of the directive's complexity. Regulators, too, are behind in expanding their capacity to enforce it. Impacts Firms across the world that do any of their business within the EU will have to comply, not just those registered in the EU. All firms trading in financial instruments must comply but those where this is a small part of their business may be caught unawares. MiFID II will come into effect before the United Kingdom leaves the EU and is likely to be written into UK law post-Brexit. The United States is keen to deregulate, but US firms whose EU activity is not compliant will be punished, possibly harming US-EU relations.


Subject Outlook for the Five Eyes alliance. Significance The stability of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States is under stress over Chinese participation in the members’ 5G telecommunications networks. Impacts Possible US concessions on the supply chains of Chinese firms would ease strain within the Five Eyes alliance. European corporates will redouble efforts to burnish their security credentials to capture 5G market share. London’s eventual decision on Huawei will influence the EU and Asian democracies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 558-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wyn Rees

The Obama administration played a surprisingly interventionist role in the UK referendum on membership of the European Union (EU), arguing that a vote to leave would damage European security. Yet this article contends that US attitudes towards the EU as a security actor, and the part played within it by the United Kingdom, have been much more complex than the United States has sought to portray. While it has spoken the language of partnership, it has acted as if the EU has been a problem for US policy. The United Kingdom was used as part of the mechanism for managing that problem. In doing so, America contributed, albeit inadvertently, to the Brexit result. With the aid of contrasting theoretical perspectives from Realism and Institutionalism, this article explores how America’s security relationship with the United Kingdom has helped to engineer a security situation that the United States wanted to avoid.


2018 ◽  
pp. 39-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Józef M. Fiszer

There is no doubt that Brexit is an unprecedented event in the history of European integration and the European Union (EU). It will certainly be a turning point not only in the history of the EU but also in Germany and France. It will affect their place and role in the new international order that is currently being shaped. Today, however, it is very difficult to present an accurate diagnosis, and even more difficult to predict the future of the EU, Europe and the whole world after Brexit. Currently, the opinions of researchers and experts on this subject are divided. Many fear that Brexit will be the beginning of the end of the EU and that it will lead to so-called diversified integration and then to its disintegration. Others believe that Brexit, nolens volens, may accelerate the EU’s modernisation process. This will require the adoption of a new revision treaty. This treaty will be developed under the dictation of Germany and France, which are the most influential countries in the EU.The purpose of this article is to answer a few questions, particularly what role  Germany and France can and will play in the EU after Brexit. Will these countries  again become the driving force in the process of European integration and the EU’s modernisation, or will they remain passive and contribute to the break-up of the EU? Moreover, the author intends to show the opportunities and threats for the EU  without the United Kingdom, which counterbalanced the influence of Germany and France in Europe.


Significance The celebration came just days before the United Kingdom is set to begin the withdrawal process. Precisely what path the EU will take over the next decade remains uncertain and the European Commission has kicked off a process of dialogue on various scenarios for its future. Impacts Debates about the future of the EU will occur simultaneously with Brexit negotiations and be coloured by them. EU leaders will be keen to continue to demonstrate their commitment to press forward with European integration despite Brexit. Brexit will not lead to an unravelling of the EU and thus far has served to enhance support for the Union in other member states. Yet Brexit will not lead to any sudden deepening of integration.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This chapter assesses the European Union besides Brexit, shedding light on the multiple other crises that the EU has recently faced in addition to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. In the last decade, the EU has weathered the euro-crisis, the migration crisis, and the rule of law crisis, each of which has continued to sour throughout the Brexit negotiations. In addition to these old crises, the EU has now faced new ones—as shown by the difficulties of dealing with the issue of enlargement, the problem of climate change, and particularly the catastrophic Covid-19 pandemic. All of these crises have exposed the disunity of the EU—a counter-point to the unity that emerged in the Brexit negotiations. The chapter explains the difficulties of the EU27 in successfully tackling once and for all any of these crises, and the growing centripetal pulls at play, owing to the rise of very different visions of European integration—what can be called a ‘polity’, a ‘market’, and an ‘autocracy’ conception of the EU, which are competing with each other.


Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This book examines how the European Union has changed during Brexit and because of Brexit, while also reflecting on the developments of the EU besides Brexit and beyond Brexit. It argues that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU—the first ever case of disintegration since the start of the European integration process—creates an urgent need to reform the EU. In fact, while the EU institutions and its Member States have remained united in their negotiations vis-à-vis the UK, Brexit has created transitional problems for the EU, and exposed other serious fissures in its system of governance which need to be addressed moving forward. As the EU goes through another major crisis in the form of the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the case for increasing the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU grows stronger. In this context, the book analyses the plan to establish a Conference on the Future of Europe, considering its precedents and discussing its prospects.


Subject Bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and the United States. Significance UK Prime Minister Theresa May has been criticised for her eagerness to form a close relationship with US President Donald Trump, at a time when the new administration in Washington is lurching from crisis to crisis. However, as the United Kingdom heads towards negotiations on leaving the EU, it needs good relations across the Atlantic more than ever. Impacts Trump’s plans to roll back financial regulations will increase pressure for similar moves in the City of London. Good UK links with Republicans in Congress will be just as important as good relations with the White House. Investigations into links between the Trump administration and the Kremlin have the potential to overshadow other bilateral relations. The tone of the relationship will also be affected by the success or failure of Trump’s state visit to the United Kingdom later this year.


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