The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Its Aftermath

Author(s):  
Oscar Palma

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC) was an insurgent group that emerged in the 1960s as a consequence of struggles between the Conservatives and the Liberals, as well as the consolidation of a Communist party that promoted an armed insurrection. A relative absence of state institutions in farther regions, the uneven distribution of land, and an impoverished peasant class were elements fueling rebellious movements. By the 1980s, however, FARC had become something more complex than an insurgent organization. After initially opposing the idea, the group accepted the generation of income through the taxation of activities in the cocaine-illicit economy. An unprecedented process of growth experienced by the insurgency, with this income, allowed a remarkable offensive against the security forces, in specific regions, by the end of the 1990s. Since then, an explanation of the organization as a “pure” political insurgency would be inaccurate; the motivation and purpose of some fighters within the group was profit. Although an explanation radically separating political and criminal (economic) agendas may be flawed, at least a concept which portrays the organization as something more than just an insurgency seems helpful. The concept of hybrid group, in which armed, political, and criminal dimensions coexist, invites exploring different types of motivations, purposes, and tasks that fighters might have. The observation of these dimensions also contributes to an understanding of the evolution of FARC after the Havana Agreement. A strong military offensive during the 2000s was one of the factors motivating the group to engage in peace negotiations with the Colombian government. With the Agreement, FARC as an armed insurgency ceased to exist, but the continuation of factors which motivated the existence of a hybrid group have triggered the emergence of a myriad of smaller groups, several of which claim to be the real successors of FARC, mixing in diverse ways the political and criminal agendas.

Author(s):  
Robert Mickey

This chapter examines how the southern authoritarian enclaves experienced different modes of democratization in light of the deathblows of federal legislation, domestic insurgencies, and National Democratic Party reform in the 1960s and early 1970s. As enclave rulers came to believe that change was inevitable, most sought to harness the revolution, striking a fine balance between resisting federal intervention without appearing too defiant, and accepting some change without appearing too quiescent. Pursuing a “harnessed revolution” meant influencing the pace of seemingly inevitable change; it served the overarching goals of protecting the political careers of enclave rulers and the interests of many of their political-economic clients. The chapter considers how prior responses to democratization pressures, factional conflict, and party–state institutions shaped modes of democratization. It shows that the growth of Republicans in the Deep South was to varying degrees both consequence and cause of rulers' responses to democratization pressures.


Author(s):  
Jorge I. Domínguez

Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), founded in 1959, have been among the world’s most successful military. In the early 1960s, they defended the new revolutionary regime against all adversaries during years when Cuba was invaded at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, faced nuclear Armageddon in 1962, and experienced a civil war that included U.S. support for regime opponents. From 1963 to 1991, the FAR served the worldwide objectives of a small power that sought to behave as if it were a major world power. Cuba deployed combat troops overseas for wars in support of Algeria (1963), Syria (1973), Angola (1975–1991), and Ethiopia (1977–1989). Military advisers and some combat troops served in smaller missions in about two dozen countries the world over. Altogether, nearly 400,000 Cuban troops served overseas. Throughout those years, the FAR also worked significantly to support Cuba’s economy, especially in the 1960s and again since the early 1990s following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Uninterruptedly, officers and troops have been directly engaged in economic planning, management, physical labor, and production. In the mid-1960s, the FAR ran compulsory labor camps that sought to turn homosexuals into heterosexuals and to remedy the alleged socially deviant behavior of these and others, as well. During the Cold War years, the FAR deepened Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, deterred a U.S. invasion by signaling its cost for U.S. troops, and since the early 1990s developed confidence-building practices collaborating with U.S. military counterparts to prevent an accidental military clash. Following false starts and experimentation, the FAR settled on a model of joint civilian-military governance that has proved durable: the civic soldier. The FAR and the Communist Party of Cuba are closely interpenetrated at all levels and together endeavored to transform Cuban society, economy, and politics while defending state and regime. Under this hybrid approach, military officers govern large swaths of military and civilian life and are held up as paragons for soldiers and civilians, bearers of revolutionary traditions and ideology. Thoroughly politicized military are well educated as professionals in political, economic, managerial, engineering, and military affairs; in the FAR, officers with party rank and training, not outsider political commissars, run the party-in-the-FAR. Their civilian and military roles were fused, especially during the 1960s, yet they endured into the 21st century. Fused roles make it difficult to think of civilian control over the military or military control over civilians. Consequently, political conflict between “military” and “civilians” has been rare and, when it has arisen (often over the need for, and the extent of, military specialization for combat readiness), it has not pitted civilian against military leaders but rather cleaved the leadership of the FAR, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), and the government. Intertwined leaderships facilitate cadre exchanges between military and nonmilitary sectors. The FAR enter their seventh decade smaller, undersupplied absent the Soviet Union, less capable of waging war effectively, and more at risk of instances of corruption through the activities of some of their market enterprises. Yet the FAR remain both an effective institution in a polity that they have helped to stabilize and proud of their accomplishments the world over.


1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (10) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
James Painter

In March 1986, when Vinicio Cerezo became Guatemala's first elected civilian president since 1966, there were high hopes that he could bring an end to the political violence which had disfigured the country's recent past. Over two years later, it is plain that he has been unable to wrest real power from the armed forces, and though the human rights situation has improved, there are still numerous reports of disappearances and of violence used by the security forces against people from allwalks of life. Nor have the Guatemalan human rights groups had any satisfaction in response to their demands that those responsible for the thousands of deaths which occurred under previous military governments be brought to justice. Some Guatemalan exiles returned home to take advantage of the promised democratic opening under Cerezo, and attempted to widen the space for political debate. But, as the coup attempt on 11 May showed, the possibilities for such freedoms have again narrowed abruptly. Here a London-based researcher who recently travelled to Guatemala describes the current situation.


Author(s):  
Virginie Baudais

Since the independence of Niger in 1960, Nigerien armed forces have played a prominent role in the country’s history, either because of their recurrent “nonpolitical” interventions in the political arena or based on their involvement in the stabilization process of the Sahel and the fight against terrorism. Nigeriens have lived under civil, military, and authoritarian regimes, experienced four coups d’état (1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010), four political transitions, nine presidents, and have voted on seven constitutions. The Nigerien population lived under military rule for 23 out of 60 years following independence. Thus, Nigerien contemporary politics cannot be analyzed without a sound understanding of the Nigerien Army, how the institution became an “entrepreneur politique,” and how institutional, economic, and social factors may encourage the intervention of a nonpolitical institution in the political arena. Politics and the military are definitely connected in Niger. Each coup has had a different motive. The 1974 military coup is one of the many successful military seizures of power that occurred in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. This first “praetorian” intervention resulted from intramilitary and domestic factors and lasted 17 years under the rule of Seyni Kountché and his successor Ali Saibou. The second intervention in politics occurred in 1996 and also resulted from institutional factors and the inability of the newly elected authorities to overcome their divisions. The 1996 coup d’état was a classic case: a time-limited military intervention using violence to convert itself into a civilian regime. In 1999 the army overthrew a military regime, whereas in 2010 militaries put an end to the democratically elected president’s shift toward authoritarianism. In 2010, the shift in the security situation in the Sahel marked the armed forces’ return to strictly military functions, such as national defense and security and providing support for external operations. Consequently, the security situation in the Sahel strip deteriorated and the major economic and social challenges of the poorest country in the world were neglected. This has led to recurrent political and social tensions that reinforce the fact that addressing the basic needs of the people is as, important as Niger’s security policy.


Author(s):  
Anthony Ashbolt ◽  
Glenn Mitchell

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and into the 1960s decade of rebellion, the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) developed significant relationships with cultural and artistic movements. The youth wing of the CPA, The Eureka Youth League (EYL), played a particularly important role in the attempt to forge an alliance between musicians and communism. First through jazz, and then through two folk music revivals, the EYL sought to use music to recruit members and to foster its ideological and political struggles. In the end, the EYL's and CPA's relationship with both jazz and folk was tenuous. Yet along the way, the music itself flourished. This, then, is a story of tensions between and paradoxes surrounding the Party and musicians sympathetic to it. Yet it is also a story about how the cultural life of Australia was greatly enriched by the EYL's attempt to use music as a political tool.


1989 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Decalo

If during the 1960s the coup d'état emerged as the most visible and recurrent characteristic of the African political experience, by the 1980s quasi-permanent military rule, of whatever ideological hue, had become the norm for much of the continent. At any moment in time, up to 65 per cent of all Africa's inhabitants and well over half its states are governed by military administrators. Civilian rule is but a distant memory in some countries. Few at some stage or another have not been run by an armed-forces junta, and fewer still have not been rocked at least once by an attempted coup, putsch, or military-sponsored plot. According to one tabulation, ‘only six states have not witnessed some form of extra-legal armed involvement in national politics since 1958’.1 The phenomenon has even reached the non-state Homelands of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and Ciskei in South Africa. Rule by civilians is very much the statistical ‘deviation’ from the continental norm, as military leaders lay a permanent claim to the political throne in much of Africa


1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Arthur Steiner

With the proclamation on October 1, 1949, of the establishment of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Communism formally passed into its constitutional phase. Prior to that date, the Chinese Communist Party had been the only political organization exercising authority throughout all of the territories held by Communist armed forces; thereafter, to all external appearances, it became but one of several political parties and groups participating in the coalition government of the “people’s democratic dictatorship.” Nevertheless, the new constitutional fagade does not alter the political realities in Communist China.


Author(s):  
Isabela Marín Carvajal ◽  
Eduardo Álvarez-Vanegas

Women’s participation in the Colombian peace process constitutes an outstanding case in comparison with other peace negotiations processes, due to the efforts made by unofficial actors. Nevertheless, during the negotiation period, selective violence against social leaders increased, affecting their mobilizations and capacity to meaningful contribute. This chapter critically evaluates developments in scholarship and policymaking that considers the WPS pillars of participation and protection and their inclusion in peace agreements. To do so, the chapter draws upon the case of the Havana peace process, led by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), between 2012 and 2016. The analysis derives from a research experience at the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Bogotá, Colombia), exploring women’s participation in Columbia’s peace negotiations. Drawing on examples from the Colombian case, the chapter demonstrates the importance of accounting for women’s preexisting forms of participation and knowledge. It also argues that affirmative measures that encourage women’s meaningful participation in peace negotiations will be ineffective if the underlying structural factors that exclude women from decision-making processes more broadly remain unaddressed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-87
Author(s):  
Adriana Calderon

This article examines the main leadership components of peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana, Cuba. It identifies the leadership factors associated with the success of the four-year peace process that started in 2012; while comparing it to previous peace dialogues in Colombia to draw out the political learning process. The hypothesis is that three components, namely political learning in its complexity, the inclusion of women, and the inclusion of victims, have been crucial for the success of the peace process. Firstly, the concept of political learning is understood as materialising as a political leadership function. Second, in an idiosyncratic and to some extent patriarchal culture like Colombia’s, it is essential to examine the role of women in the peacebuilding process as engaging negotiators and mediators, rather than as only being passively exposed to politics. Third, the inclusion of victims in peace negotiations was an uncommon decision, and it appears to have eased the Accords. This article also contends that leadership as process, and in particular leadership styles, are fundamental to understanding the complexity that led to ending the world’s longest-running civil war.


Modern Italy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-84
Author(s):  
Walter Stefano Baroni

This article compares the autobiographical practices used by the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) in the aftermath of the Second World War with those developed by Italian neo-feminism from the late 1960s onwards. The former involved a repeated injunction for activists to write about and express themselves upon joining the party, in what amounted to self-criticism. The latter, meanwhile, took shape as a result of self-consciousness exercises practised by feminist groups in various cities across Italy. The terms of comparison of this article aim to describe what changed and what remained the same in the technologies used to produce the political self within the Italian Left in the twentieth century, beginning from its split in the 1960s. In this context, the paper reveals that the communist and feminist experiences were supported by the same discursive mechanism, which hinged on a paradoxical enunciation of the self. Communist activists and feminists thus faced the same difficulty in political self-expression, which was resolved in two different ways, both equally unsatisfactory. In conclusion, examining the communist autobiographical injunction allows a radical critical reappraisal of the idea that the use of the first person and the political affirmation of subjectivity are determining features exclusively bound to the feminist experience.


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