10. Viruses past, present, and future

2018 ◽  
pp. 126-132
Author(s):  
Dorothy H. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Yellow Fever ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Virus Infections ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Novel Treatments ◽  
Pathogenic Viruses ◽  
Chemotherapy Patients ◽  
New Research

‘Viruses past, present, and future’ looks at the changing pattern of virus infections through the ages and speculates about how humans and viruses might interact in the future. Viruses, such as smallpox and yellow fever, have debilitated populations across the globe throughout history. New research technologies will allow a greater number of ‘new’ viruses to be identified, leading to preventive vaccines and novel treatments. However, we may also face potential man-made virus threats from biological weapons of mass destruction to the unwitting promotion of pathogenic viruses, possibly through xenotransplantation, immune-suppressed chemotherapy patients, or viruses escaping from laboratories due to poor safety measures.

scholarly journals Threat of biological weapons

Securitologia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Bogdan Michailiuk
Keyword(s):  
Current Level ◽  
Biological Weapon ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Biological Terrorism ◽  
Unpublished Information

The biological weapons often is defined as ‘weapons of mass destruction poor’, because this is relatively cheap and easy in the production, hidden and relocation. The risk of the use biological weapons still seems to be very real. A possibility of using weapons of mass destruction (biological weapon) is arousing special danger by contemporary terrorist organizations. In this article in a synthetic, based on the available references and the unpublished information, author present the current level of threat of biological terrorism.

Unconventional Weapons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg
Keyword(s):  
International Atomic Energy Agency ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Energy Agency ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Device

The chapter deals with the Iraqi efforts to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological and nuclear. It describes the various projects in each field, their history, the foreign assistance they got, the infrastructure the Iraqis built for them, their achievements and types of weapons the Iraqis produces and their arsenals, especially of the Chemical and Biological weapons. The efforts of the U. N. supervisory commissions (UNSCOM) and the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to disarm Iraq from those weapons and capabilities to renew the development and production of them by Iraq after 1991. The use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis against the Kurds and the Iranian forces during the war between the two countries, and the possibility of using them against coalition forces during the wars in 1991 and 2003. The Iraqi efforts to achieve a nuclear device in a crash program before the war in 1991.

On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews

1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Huxsoll
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Special Commission ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Development Support ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Ongoing Monitoring

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Efforts to Address Iraqi Compliance with UN Weapons Inspections

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Medical Supplies ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
On Site Inspection

At the conclusion of the 1991 UN enforcement action against Iraq, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting the terms for a cease-fire. The resolution required, among other things, that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision,” of all chemical and biological weapons, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and associated materials and facilities. Further, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN special commission to carry out “on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities,” and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for “destruction, removal or rendering harmless.” Similar requirements were imposed with respect to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. While maintaining the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Council allowed exports to Iraq of foodstuffs and medical supplies (on the condition that a UN sanctions committee had been notified) and also other commodities (if approved by the same committee). The Security Council decided that the sanctions regime would be lifted, however, once Iraq complied with its obligations on the destruction and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction.

29. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

2019 ◽  
pp. 466-480
Author(s):  
Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Keyword(s):  
World Politics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Intervention ◽  
Nuclear Disaster ◽  
Chemical And Biological Weapons ◽  
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster

This chapter focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It examines the patterns that can be observed in the spread and use/non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons since 1945, how nuclear weapons have changed world politics, and whether non-proliferation efforts have been successful. The chapter first provides an overview of WMD technology and its spread before discussing biological and chemical weapons. It then considers theoretical debates about nuclear proliferation and the evolution of non-proliferation efforts. Two case studies are presented, one dealing with the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the other with the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran. There is also an Opposing Opinions box that asks whether the use of chemical weapons in 2013 should have been a red line triggering international intervention in Syria.

Arms Technology and Disarmament

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-54
Author(s):  
Dr.Kamaljit Singh
Keyword(s):  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
United Nations General ◽  
The World ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
United Nations General Assembly ◽  
19Th And 20Th Century

In 19th and 20th century many scientific and technological developments have occurred in many fields. The positive developments have proved very beneficial for humankind. But the advent of science and technology in the field of armaments have resulted in the invention of weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the biological weapons, the missiles and conventional weapons development and improvement have created many problems of destructive nature. The new emerging technologies have made the situation worst for mankind. The United Nations General Assembly has made many attempts to protect the world and convert the destructive measures to peaceful measures so that humanity can benefit from it. The need of the time is to develop new scientific and technological devices to destroy the existing weapons of mass destruction and save the mankind, and these technologies should be developed for peaceful purposes.

Can Biological, Toxin, and Chemical Warfare be Eliminated?

1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meryl Nass
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Similar Chemical ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

Is it possible to prevent biological, chemical, and toxin warfare from occurring? The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an international treaty banning the possession and hostile use of biological and toxin weapons, already exists; and a similar chemical weapons treaty is currently being negotiated. The older Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the “first use” of these weapons in war. It might seem that the threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction is nearly at an end.

Let’s Make a (Smart) Deal: Biodiplomacy in the Age of Trump

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Noah Blaine Hearn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Comprehensive Strategy

Abstract North Korea poses significant risks to national security as it continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). On February 28, 2019, United States President Donald Trump announced that he would be departing his second summit with Kim Jong Un without having reached a deal regarding the denuclearization of North Korea. This anticlimactic outcome followed weeks of media buildup surrounding the two leaders’ meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam; however, negotiators from both countries have pledged to continue their efforts at crafting a deal. As they continue this endeavor, those with a seat at the negotiating table must recognize that the most prudent path forward for the United States is to ensure that any such disarmament deal also address North Korea’s capacity to develop of biological weapons (BWs) in addition to nuclear and chemical capabilities as part of a comprehensive strategy.

scholarly journals The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Beard
Keyword(s):  
Great Powers ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Foreign State ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Anthrax Spores ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Biological Weapons Convention

In 1972 a historic attempt to create the world’s first international legal regime banning the development and possession of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) culminated in the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Crippled by key compromises made by the great powers in pursuit of various self-interested security objectives in the context of the Cold War, the Convention is fundamentally flawed. Although the BWC purports to oudaw the development and possession of all biological weapons, deadlier and more sophisticated biological weapons than were imaginable in 1972 can now be and have been produced, as evidenced in October 2001 by two letters sent to the Capitol Hill offices of Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. These letters reportedly contained direatening notes and a dangerous and sophisticated form of “weapons-grade” anthrax spores. Even though both die sender of these letters and the source of the anthrax remain unknown, the technical sophistication of the spores led some experts to suggest that the attacker was supported by a U.S. “biodefense” laboratory or an advanced foreign-state-run biological weapons (BW) facility because the spores could not have been produced by an amateur working in his basement.

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