scholarly journals Vote trading in power-sharing systems: A laboratory investigation*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolas Tsakas ◽  
Dimitrios Xefteris ◽  
Nicholas Ziros
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Laboratory Investigation ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Welfare Effects ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Vote Trading

Abstract Vote trading in power-sharing systems—i.e., systems in which a voter’s utility with respect to the election’s outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party—is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters’ preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently lose from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.

scholarly journals Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Xefteris ◽  
Nicholas Ziros
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Strategic Vote ◽  
Strategic Market Games ◽  
Market Games ◽  
Generic Existence ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Strategic Market

This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). Moreover, we argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare. (JEL C72, D71, D72, D82)

scholarly journals Rallies around the flag-draped coffins: the electoral effects of security force casualties in terror attacks

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Resul Umit
Keyword(s):  
Political Violence ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Security Force ◽  
Random Assignment ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Terror Attacks ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Similar Percentage ◽  
General Elections

Abstract Security forces are one of the main targets of political violence. This paper examines the effect of their casualties on electoral outcomes. Between two general elections in 2015, Turkey experienced a series of attacks that killed 153 members of its security forces. Based on the as-if random assignment of their funerals across the country, I estimate that government vote share increases in the funeral places of security force terror victims. However, in the localities with recurring funerals, it decreases by a similar percentage. These non-linear changes provide strong evidence for the rally theory.

Understanding the Impact of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (03) ◽  
pp. 379-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Women's Representation ◽  
Women’S Representation ◽  
The Impact

The study of electoral systems is a key area of research within political science. In part, the attention paid to electoral systems reflects their importance to democratic political systems. Electoral systems define “what constitutes” a vote, establish “a rule for how votes are totaled,” and create a mechanism for “translating vote share into seat allocations” for representative institutions (Bawn 1993, 966). These roles mean that electoral systems impact not only how interests are represented, but also how accountability is structured.

Minority Over-representation through Seat-cap Imposition and Regressive Representation: Self-determination Versus Pre-determination in Consociational Democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-215
Author(s):  
Masataka Kimura
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Consociational Democracy

This article explores ways to realize minority over-representation through elections without pre-determination, and presents new options in designing electoral systems for consociational democracy. Specifically, the article considers seat-cap imposition and regressive representation, which are compatible with the principle of self-determination in deciding what ethnic groups should participate in power sharing, to overcome pre-determination-related problems in consociationalism. The pertinent questions to be discussed include how minority over-representation can be justified, how it can be balanced with the principle of ‘one person, one vote, one value’, and how to prevent possible collusive strategies by parties to artificially increase seats.

scholarly journals Is There Observational Evidence for the Evaporation of the Inner Accretion Disk in Dwarf Novae at Quiescence?

1996 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 81-84
Author(s):  
C. La Dous ◽  
E. Meyer-Hofmeister ◽  
F. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Accretion Disk ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Observational Evidence ◽  
Dwarf Novae ◽  
Evaporation Model ◽  
Preliminary Results ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

AbstractWe present the preliminary results of a comparison of observed general patterns of quiescent dwarf novae and theoretical predictions of the disk evaporation model. We demonstrate that, even though details still have to be clarified, on the whole there is strong evidence that observations and theory are in agreement.

How opposition parties sustain single-party dominance

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 262-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld ◽  
Maya Tudor
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Crucial Part ◽  
Opposition Parties

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party’s origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

New Results on Double Charmonium Production in e+e- Annihilation at $\sqrt{s} \approx 10.6~{\rm GeV}$ with the Belle Detector

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (16) ◽  
pp. 3617-3620
Author(s):  
◽  
T. Ziegler
Keyword(s):  
Cross Section ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Previous Analysis ◽  
Charmonium State ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Charmonium Production ◽  
Belle Detector ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
The Cross

Extending a previous analysis1 the double charmonium production [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] has been investigated with a data set of 155 fb-1 with the Belle detector. Theoretical predictions for the cross section are one order of magnitude lower than the measured value and this discrepancy is still not understood. In a very recent update with a dataset of 285 fb-1 strong evidence for a new charmonium state at a mass of 3.940 GeV was found.

scholarly journals Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox ◽  
Jon H. Fiva ◽  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
District Level ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Runoff Elections ◽  
Electoral Competitiveness

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).

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