Minority Over-representation through Seat-cap Imposition and Regressive Representation: Self-determination Versus Pre-determination in Consociational Democracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-215
Author(s):  
Masataka Kimura
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Consociational Democracy

This article explores ways to realize minority over-representation through elections without pre-determination, and presents new options in designing electoral systems for consociational democracy. Specifically, the article considers seat-cap imposition and regressive representation, which are compatible with the principle of self-determination in deciding what ethnic groups should participate in power sharing, to overcome pre-determination-related problems in consociationalism. The pertinent questions to be discussed include how minority over-representation can be justified, how it can be balanced with the principle of ‘one person, one vote, one value’, and how to prevent possible collusive strategies by parties to artificially increase seats.

scholarly journals Reputation, concessions, and territorial civil war

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 671-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils-Christian Bormann ◽  
Burcu Savun
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Territorial Conflicts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Future Demands ◽  
Reputation Building

Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.

scholarly journals Bridging Regionalism and Secessionism: Territorial Autonomy Movements in the Iberian World

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Matthias vom Hau ◽  
Hana Srebotnjak
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Santa Cruz ◽  
World Region ◽  
Regional Comparison ◽  
Movement Theory ◽  
Political Exclusion ◽  
Autonomy Movements

Abstract In comparative works on nationalism, Latin America is usually portrayed as a world region that is devoid of nationalist and separatist movements, while in Europe nationalist movements seeking greater self-determination or separate statehood can be easily observed. This article takes a different perspective. Applying the concept of territorial autonomy movements, it pursues a cross-regional comparison of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, Guayas in Ecuador, and Catalonia in Spain to show that movements strikingly similar with regards to their core claims, diagnostic frames, and tactics do in fact exist across the Iberian world. The chapter then draws on social movement theory to account for the recent intensification of territorial autonomy mobilizations in these cases. We argue that in all three substate units (1) threats of political exclusion emanating from contestations over established power-sharing arrangements triggered territorial grievances; (2) the formation of dense associational networks and new alliances with subnational party and state representatives enhanced the organizational resources of territorial challengers; and (3) broader protest cycles, and their concern with direct democracy and/or multicultural group rights, provided territorial challengers with new framing strategies to justify their demands.

INTERACTION OF DOMINANT PARTY WITH ETHNIC GROUPS IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN MALAYSIA

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-113
Author(s):  
Tatiana Lavrova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
The State ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Competitive Authoritarianism ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Stability ◽  
And Control

The author covers the question of the stability of competitive authoritarianism in Malaysia. In this case, such a regime is particularly stable, possibly due to the developed and institutionalized model of interaction between the dominant party and ethnic groups, implemented in the conditions of the polyethnic composition of the state. It was crucial to take into account the historical context of the British colonization of Malaysia, which had led to the influx of migrants, and the presence of a political party in power for 61 years, which was practically merged with the state apparatus and fully represented only one ethnic group. "Ethnic outbidding" implemented by the dominant party UMNO provided a numerically greater population with benefits in exchange for support of the ruling party. Simultaneously, the incorporation of ethnic groups into the state's political structure and the use of the power-sharing model allowed UMNO to act as an umbrella party and to maintain the status quo. The unspoken Treaty, first, was based on granting the privilege to the indigenous Malay population, and, second, protected the interests of non-Malays. Thus, granting bumiputera and non-Malays certain privileges, the establishment was able to consolidate a non-democratic regime and control over complex Malaysian society.

15. Institutional Design in New Democracies

2018 ◽  
pp. 228-238
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Ethnic Conflicts ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
Electoral Law

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as an independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages, and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.

scholarly journals Democracy, ethnoicracy and consociational demoicracy

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Nenad Stojanović
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Stability Problem ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Shaky Ground

This article questions the notion of ‘consociational democracy’. It argues that it rests on shaky ground, empirically and conceptually. As an empirical matter, a consociation is inherently unstable because it tends either to collapse into ethnoicracy (where the power is shared by the main ethnic groups so that citizens who do not belong to them are politically marginalized) or to become a non-consociational, liberal democracy. At the conceptual level ‘consociational democracy’ is an impossibility because a polity cannot be both consociational and democratic. This article argues that consociations can be at best demoicracies – that is, polities composed not of a single demos but of multiple demoi. Yet the problem of stability remains. The article concludes with the suggestion that the stability problem can be addressed by adopting a weak form of demoicracy – the ‘demoi-within-demos’ constellation – where a thin demos coexists with multiple demoi.

scholarly journals Federalism in Pakistan: A Conflict Management Tool to Manage Ethnic Diversities (2002-2012)

2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 96-104
Author(s):  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Mughees Ahmad ◽  
Zab Un Nisa
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Dimensional System ◽  
Federal System ◽  
Federal States

Federations can be different at the level of centralism and in practices of governance. Due to such idiosyncratic features, states can be considered as centralized on the basis of the powerful federal government at the centre or decentralized because of the implementation of the theory of devolution of power and majoritarian federations due to the influential position of majority ethnic groups of the society. Certain federal states can apply a multi-dimensional system of governance, power and authority, while some other states can ascent more centralized and powerful governance. Some scholars alleged that the capability of the Federal state to meet the issue of ethnic diversity diverges transversely to its commitments and different structures. The aforementioned is further claimed that “a formal federal system functions in practice as a unitary system; the system's capacity is not according to the needs to accommodate ethnic and national cleavages” (Kohli, 2004). On the basis of such suggestions, this research paper endeavors to examine federalism as a tool to manage ethnic diversities in Pakistan. This paper argues that a more effective paradigm of the power sharing mechanism can be fruitful to enable federalism in Pakistan to manage ethnic diversities more exclusively.

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