13. Specific conflicts—CA 2006, Part 10, Ch 4, and Ch 4A

2021 ◽  
pp. 253-269
Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan

This chapter considers provisions of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), Pt 10, Ch 4, and Ch 4A. These provisions regulate transactions with directors where there is an acute conflict of interest between the director’s personal interests and his duty to the company and so, typically, the statute requires prior shareholder approval of the transaction. The relevant provisions address: directors’ service contracts (CA 2006, ss 188–189); payments for loss of office (CA 2006, ss 215–221); for quoted companies (which must have a directors’ remuneration policy)—remuneration payments and payments for loss of office (Ch 4A); substantial property transactions (CA 2006, ss 190–196); and loans and similar financial transactions (CA 2006, ss 197–214).

Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan

This chapter considers provisions of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), Pt 10, Ch 4, and Ch 4A. These regulate transactions with directors where the conflict of interest between the director's personal interests and his duty to the company is thought to be particularly acute such that it is appropriate to seek shareholder approval for the following transactions: directors' service contracts (CA 2006, ss. 188–189); payments for loss of office (CA 2006, ss. 215–221); quoted companies—remuneration payment and payments for loss of office (Ch 4A); substantial property transactions (CA 2006, ss 190–196); and loans and similar financial transactions (CA 2006, ss 197–214).


2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick Johnston

An analyst who owns stock in the company she covers may be tempted to protect or enhance her personal interests. This paper examines how this potential conflict of interest affects the reporting of sell-side analysts by identifying and collecting two samples, the first from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 144 filings, and the second from voluntary ownership disclosures. Ordered probit analyses show that owning analyst recommendations are slightly more cautious than those of the control analysts. There is little robust evidence that stock ownership leads to optimistic analyst reporting, however findings indicate that analysts who are consistently optimistic are owners. The results are consistent with a conclusion that analyst stock ownership, unlike other potential incentives, may not be a significant concern since in many cases multiple nonowning analysts also provide reports. Being an outlier potentially reduces any benefit to the owning analyst and risks her personal reputation. In the absence of a detrimental effect, ownership offers a potential benefit as a credible signal of an analyst's conviction in a company's prospects.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (34) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
Adriatik Llalla ◽  
Fjorida Ballauri

In Albania the issue of conflict of interest is present at today’s public debate, as in many other countries. Due to this phenomenon, public funds, state property, public service, etc., are at risk at any time, and therefore there is obligation of the state to establish the appropriate legal instruments to prevent such situations. In principle, while exercising official duties and functions, the elected person or the public official should not be influenced by personal interests. In this sense, through actions, inactions or decisions, they cannot gain benefits or advantages for themselves, their family members, relatives or other persons, in case they share economic or political interests with them. In Albania, the domestic legislation provides restrictions and prohibitions for several private interests of the officials exercising public functions, depending on their functions, responsibilities and competencies in public decision-making. Also, the law provides specific prohibitions and restrictions in cases of entering into administrative contracts, considering a contract as a special public decision, which is vulnerable to be damaged by the action of officials’ private interests. This paper aims to make an analysis of the legislation in terms of restrictions of private interests of public officials to prevent specific cases of conflict of interest while concluding administrative contracts. Also, the paper leads to conclusions on how conflict of interest is related to other criminal offences like abuse of office, corruption or violation of equality of participants in public tenders or auctions etc.


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-202
Author(s):  
Fernando Portela Câmara

This article discusses the relationship between personal interests and medical research. The presence of research professionals who conduct studies which will later be used for market investments through new pharmaceutical products or procedures has brought up a number of issues, especially regarding the neutrality of the use of such products. The fact that some researchers receive shares in stocks and profits of some companies, and the way the companies finance them and use their credibility in scientific marketing have been a source of concern to scientific journals, the academic community and the better-informed public as to the validity of the results presented and the reliability of the pharmaceutical products themselves. The question of how neutrality can be preserved without the inevitable involvement of these interests is an ethical issue that has yet to be carefully examined by agencies that regulate the medical profession.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (7) ◽  
pp. 641-646
Author(s):  
Mirendy Wahyu Ferary

This study provides an overview of the disharmony of the regional head pairs starting from the administrative formation of Central Bangka Regency to its third period. This study applies the conflict theory proposed by Ralf Dahrendorf who explains that the conflict of interest of each elite can be categorized as a struggle of position by the group that owns the authority position. The disharmony of the regional head pairs of Central Bangka is included in the authoritative conflict model that causes the occurrence of latent conflict between both of them to compete for position structure. This study used a descriptive qualitative method with the primary data obtained from the interview results with the informants including related officials, board members, civil servants, and the regional head pairs. The results of this study portray that the obtained data provide an overview regarding the conflict potential that results in the limited access for the vice-regents to perform government duties that have been regulated by law. Therefore, public and personal interests can no longer be distinguished since both interests are related to the matter of competition or race for the local election. In other words, the regents have another underlying interest to limit the vice-regents’ access to perform the government duties. Meanwhile, the last period has a different case regarding the authority role of the vice-regent to run the government since the regent concentrates individually more on his duties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-268
Author(s):  
Murad JAFARLI

One way to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers in publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership is supplementation of independent outside directors to the board, who can monitor the top executives and prevent them from malfeasances. However, in conflict of interest situations, independent board members are not always enabled to oppose senior managers, particularly CEOs, who put their personal interests above those of shareholders. In such cases, the efforts of independent directors to monitor managers will be unsuccessful, which, in turn, may result in the latter receiving unjustified personal benefits at the expense of shareholders. Active participation of independent directors in resolving situations where interests of these groups do not align ensures the mitigation of tension and the proper functioning of the company. Thus, the establishment of cases where independent outsiders cannot fulfill their basic duties of shielding shareholders appears to be rather a significant issue.


Author(s):  
M. D. Nauryzbek

The article raises the issue of conflict of interest and its prevention. The first threat of a conflict of interest in general is a violation of the balance between the personal interests of civil servants and the public interest. And the second risk is that a conflict of interest reduces the level of public trust and confidence in the loyalty and impartiality of public officials. This article analyzes and studies the real form of conflict of interest in Kazakhstan, namely two gift policy options. In particular, the zero gift policy and the limited gift ban policy are the subject of this research. On the one hand, the gift policy may completely prohibit accepting the gifts in order to prevent conflicts of interest. This zero gift policy implies that there is a ban for any gifts, regardless of the price. The establishment of a zero gift policy affects the level of confidence in the government, since citizens know that no factors affect the performance of a civil servant’s work. However, this will significantly restrict the freedom of action of civil servants. On the other hand, the gift policy can determine the rules for accepting the gifts both at workplace and after the work hours. If a gift is permissible, then there is a question of establishing an acceptable price. This means adopting a policy of limited prohibition on gifts and such a policy promotes the development of civil servants' consciousness. As a result, the author suggests a more favorable policy for Kazakhstan.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUNITA SAH

AbstractAdvisors, such as physicians, financial advisors, lawyers and accountants, often face a conflict of interest – that is, a clash between their professional and personal interests. Such conflicts can lead to biased and corrupt advice. In this paper, I focus on how conflicts of interest can cause good people to unintentionally cross ethical boundaries and how we can avoid succumbing to this bias. I first discuss two mechanisms through which advisors may convince themselves to accept conflicts of interest while vehemently believing that they remain unbiased: (1) a sense of entitlement; and (2) a sense of invulnerability created by their belief in their own professionalism. I then discuss several proposed policy solutions to manage conflicts of interest, such as education and training, sanctions, second opinions and disclosure policies. These proposed solutions for dealing with conflicts of interest are largely based on inaccurate intuitions regarding the psychological processes that underlie them; consequently, these policies tend to fail or have unintended consequences. In the absence of eliminating conflicts of interest, solutions that are more likely to be successful consist of identifying and changing the professional norms that exert powerful influences on employee behaviour.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Anderson

Employee silence constitutes a significant threat to organizational success. This article argues that silence is a by-product of a structural Conflict of Interest (COI) between employees and their employers. This argument turns on the claim, also defended here, that employees are in a privileged position vis-à-vis knowledge of their work and that leaders—whether they recognize it or not—are dependent on their employees for reliable information about the work they are doing. Employee voice, therefore, is an organizational necessity. It is also a moral achievement as it involves risking one’s personal interests for the sake of the organization. Leaders must take steps to mitigate COI and encourage employee voice; this article provides several strategies for doing exactly that.


2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 368-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachariah Sharek ◽  
Robert E. Schoen ◽  
George Loewenstein

A wide range of medical institutions have developed and implemented policies to mitigate the adverse consequences of conflicts of interest. These newly implemented policies, which include regulation of industry contact with physicians and hospitals, controls on gifts from industry, and greater transparency in industry sponsored activities, have generated considerable controversy.Formulating and evaluating policies in a neutral, unbiased fashion can be difficult for those personally affected. When people have a stake in an issue, they tend to process information in a selective fashion that supports their personal interests, a phenomenon known as “motivated reasoning.” When decision makers with preexisting opinions are exposed to information, they are inclined to selectively use the information to arrive at conclusions that justify their prior beliefs. When confronted with information that contradicts existing views, people evaluate it with greater skepticism. Additionally, once decision makers have reached a decision, they are likely to evaluate subsequent evidence in a biased manner that supports their decision.


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