Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
See Seng Tan

Abstract This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.

Significance The preferential US trade programme faces renewal or lapse by December 31. South-east Asia’s economies are structured to take advantage of the GSP and many of the products exported to the United States under GSP (such as light manufactures and seafood) are important for South-east Asia’s supply chains. Impacts Vietnam may make another application for inclusion in the US GSP programme. The more authoritarian South-east Asian countries could find it easier to gain US GSP preferences under Trump. The Trump administration could use the GSP as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations or renegotiations.


Subject Development of South-east Asian coastguards and their geopolitical implications. Significance Senior coastguard officers from Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States will meet later this year to discuss cooperation and capacity-building -- and the assertive actions of China's coastguard in littoral waters. With external partners' support, South-east Asian states are developing their coastguards to fight crime and assert maritime territorial claims. Impacts Fishing activities will probably trigger spats between South-east Asian and China's coastguards. Gradually, inter-operability between South-east Asian coastguards will expand. Tokyo and Washington will use coastguards to deepen ties with South-east Asian countries. There could be frictions between Indonesia's and Malaysia's coastguards over waters around Ambalat.


Significance The kings of Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, are at the centre of attention amid their countries’ ongoing political crises. The pandemic-related state of emergency declared by Malaysia’s king has eased pressure on the beleaguered prime minister. Pro-democracy protesters in Thailand continue to press for reform of the country’s monarchy. Impacts Under President Joe Biden, the United States will urge several South-east Asian countries to improve their human rights records. Malaysia’s premier will face pressure from governing partners and opponents alike to call snap elections as soon as the emergency ends. The Thai establishment will steadfastly resist calls for monarchical reform.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (05) ◽  
pp. 1550066
Author(s):  
EU CHYE TAN ◽  
CHOR FOON TANG

This paper aims to ascertain whether direct macroeconomic linkages exist between some East Asian (EA) countries on the one hand and the United States (US) and Europe on the other, based upon quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) series spanning from the early 1990s. Long-run and short-run lead-lag relations are explored within a trivariate modeling framework. Contrary to popular belief, the empirical evidence suggests generally either very nominal or no direct links at all between these EA countries and the US in terms of GDP. Direct links with Europe are completely ruled out. All these would allude to a very limited susceptibility of these EA economies to shocks in the US and Europe, barring a global economic crisis of catastrophic proportions. The growing belief that if China sneezes, the world catches the flu is also not borne out by the empirical results.


Subject The outlook for the current migrant crisis in South-east Asia. Significance Over the last three weeks, an estimated 25,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants have sought to reach Indonesia and Malaysia, on boats mostly abandoned by people smugglers based in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand. Malaysia and Indonesia have received around 3,000 such migrants so far. Seeking a solution, a regional summit will be held in Bangkok on May 29, including representatives from Myanmar, Australia and the United States. Meanwhile, suspected people-smuggling camps discovered in Thailand and Malaysia in May have led to allegations of official complicity. Impacts Amid allegations of official complicity in people smuggling and trafficking, scrutiny of the Thai and Malaysian governments will increase. Discovery of further people smuggling camps in other ASEAN countries, and allegations of official complicity, are possible. Capacity-building for ASEAN states' police forces, and ASEAN itself, is needed to counter people smuggling and trafficking. South-east Asian countries will enhance maritime patrols to search for other migrants.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Biba

Abstract As the Sino-American Great Power competition continues to intensify, newly-elected US President Joe Biden's administration now seeks to enlist the support of its allies and partners around the world. As Europe's largest economy and a, if not the, leading voice within the European Union, Germany represents an important puzzle-piece for Biden. But Germany, at least under outgoing chancellor Angela Merkel, has been reluctant to take sides. It is against this backdrop that this article looks into Germany's past and present trilateral relationships with the US and China through the theoretical lens of the so-called strategic triangle approach. Applying this approach, the article seeks to trace and explain German behaviour, as well as to elucidate the opportunities and pitfalls that have come with it. The article demonstrates that Germany's recently gained position as a ‘pivot’ (two positive bilateral relationships) between the US and Chinese ‘wings’ (positive bilateral relations with Germany and negative bilateral relations with each other) is desirable from the perspective of the strategic triangle. At the same time, being pivot is also challenging and hard to maintain. Alternative options, such as entering a US–German ‘marriage’ directed against China, are also problematic. The article therefore concludes that Germany has tough decisions to take going forward.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 92-106
Author(s):  
Vitaly KOZYREV

The recent deterioration of US–China and US–Russia relations has stumbled the formation of a better world order in the 21st century. Washington’s concerns of the “great power realignment”, as well as its Manichean battle against China’s and Russia’s “illiberal regimes” have resulted in the activated alliance-building efforts between Beijing and Moscow, prompting the Biden administration to consider some wedging strategies. Despite their coordinated preparation to deter the US power, the Chinese and Russian leaderships seek to avert a conflict with Washington by diplomatic means, and the characteristic of their partnership is still leaving a “window of opportunity” for the United States to lever against the establishment of a formal Sino–Russian alliance.


2021 ◽  

Politics in the United States has become increasingly polarized in recent decades. Both political elites and everyday citizens are divided into rival and mutually antagonistic partisan camps, with each camp questioning the political legitimacy and democratic commitments of the other side. Does this polarization pose threats to democracy itself? What can make some democratic institutions resilient in the face of such challenges? Democratic Resilience brings together a distinguished group of specialists to examine how polarization affects the performance of institutional checks and balances as well as the political behavior of voters, civil society actors, and political elites. The volume bridges the conventional divide between institutional and behavioral approaches to the study of American politics and incorporates historical and comparative insights to explain the nature of contemporary challenges to democracy. It also breaks new ground to identify the institutional and societal sources of democratic resilience.


Author(s):  
Gérard Camy ◽  
Camilla Wasserman

Here, representations of suicide in fiction film from the United States, Europe, and South East Asia are presented. Films are helpful in addressing discourses on suicide worldwide. Typically, the sufferings of the characters considering suicide or taking their lives occupy a minor part of the plot in scenarios highlighting action, cultural, and social reflection or existential interrogations. In Hollywood dramas, redemption, punishment, lost love, and solitude are major reasons for suicides; often the consequence of genuine injustice. In the European films discussed, suicides on screen often open to comments and reflections on many tragic circumstances explaining the protagonists’ actions. Not recognizing oneself in and by society seems an important reason for suicide. Wanting to understand the motives behind the voluntary death of a peer is recurrent. Much South East Asian cinema reflects the malaise of a society, its interiorized violence, death’ fascination, and the distress of a youth lacking excitement.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Charlie Laderman

This introductory chapter outlines why the American response to the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians offers such critical insights into the US rise to world power, its evolving relationship with Britain, and the development of ideas on humanitarian intervention and global order at the turn of the twentieth century. It introduces the Armenian question, setting it within the larger Eastern question, and explains why the Ottoman Empire became a target for outside intervention by the European great powers in the nineteenth century. It explains why the United States, which had traditionally avoided political entanglement in the Near East even while its missionaries established an exceptional role there, began to take a greater interest in the region as its emergence as a great power coincided with the first large-scale Armenian massacres.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document