Part VIII The Government’s Legal Personality, Ch.53 Government Contracts

Author(s):  
Varottil Umakanth

This chapter examines the Indian constitutional position relating to the formation of contracts and the substantive elements of government contracting. In particular, it considers the key issues and controversies surrounding government contracts and the contracting power of the government. It first discusses the formation of contracts to which the government is a party, along with the circumstances when the government can enter into a contract that binds it into a contractual obligation. It then describes the manner in which the government arrives at a decision to enter into—or award—a contract with (or to) a specific individual or business. It also comments on the nature and extent of judicial review of government contracting. Finally, it explains how the Indian Supreme Court has struck a balance to protect public interest from unauthorised government contracts, while also providing protection to contracting parties to a certain extent.

Author(s):  
Menachem Hofnung ◽  
Mohammed S. Wattad

The contemporary perception of Israel’s judiciary as an independent branch does not coincide with Israel’s first government’s perception after establishing the first Supreme Court. To a great extent the executive branch deemed the court its long arm. Until the mid-1950s judges were appointed by the government, and questions of conflicts of interest and political affiliation—in the wide sense of the term—were not compelling. However, since the 1990s the court’s power of judicial review and the legitimacy of its decisions have become issues of heated public debate. Consequently the process of appointing justices to the court has become subject to very strict public and political scrutiny. This chapter asks whether the Israeli judiciary truly constitutes a third independent branch of government. This is relevant considering the continuous attempts to change the existing balance of power, aiming to limit the court’s capacity to apply universal judicial doctrines and legal standards to executive and legislative decisions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Juan Santiago Ylarri

There is broad consensus among legal scholars about the existence of a permanent economic emergency in Argentina. This article examines the origin of the doctrine of economic emergency and its evolution in the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice decisions. Various regulatory devices implemented to face the economic crises are analyzed, and it is emphasized that the declaration of a state of emergency has not been made only by means of Congress formal legislation, but through the legislative powers of the President. The requirements for the validity of regulations of emergency are set forth in this article, including the actual existence of a state of emergency, a public interest, that the measure be reasonable, and the provisional nature of the emergency. Considering that courts have not exerted proper judicial review over the regulations of emergency, guideli¬nes to implement adequate judicial review over the subject at issue are presented. It is stated that the declaration of economic emergency and the factual circumstances underlying such declaration is a question subject to judicial review. In exercising the judicial review about this issue, two dimensions may be considered. First, timing, and, second, the correlation that must exist between a regulation —law, legislative delegation, or a decree of necessity and urgency— and the emergency situation it is intended to fight against. Finally, specific features of judicial review depending on the type of regulation that has declared the emergency are studied.


Author(s):  
Jalan Prateek ◽  
Rai Ritin

This chapter examines the concept of administrative review in the context of the Indian Constitution, with particular emphasis on how administrative actions are reviewed under Article 14. It first considers whether administrative review is different from legislative review, and especially whether the grounds of judicial review under Article 14 apply to the same extent when it comes to the validity of legislation compared with administrative action. It then discusses the scope of the power of administrative review under the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and whether this concept has been applied on a consistent basis. It also comments on the inherently abstract and imprecise nature of the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and how this has contributed to the lack of a judicially manageable test or standard for analysing the various cases adjudicated by the Indian Supreme Court. Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of executive power and how it may influence an adjudication of reasonableness.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 906
Author(s):  
Cholidin Nasir

Salah satu unsur terpenting negara hukum menurut Sri Soemantri adalah pengawasan dari badan-badan peradilan. Salah satu bentuk pengawasan adalah judicial review yang dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Agung dan Mahkamah Konstitusi. Namun, tidak semua tindakan pemerintah berdasarkan peraturan perundang-undangan yang telah ada. Beberapa tindakan atau kebijakan pemerintah justru lahir lebih dahulu sebelum adanya peraturan perundang-undangan yang mengatur dan bahkan beberapa peraturan perundang-undangan dibentuk untuk melahirkan kebijakan pemerintah yang justru merugikan warga negara.Terkadang sengketa hukum terjadi bermula dari kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh pemerintah, yangseharusnya mempertimbangkan kepentingan umum atau kepentingan orang banyak (publik)dan bukan hanya kepentingan orang per orang saja, namun kenyataannya banyak terjadi suatu kebijakan merugikan kepentingan umum, sehingga acapkali kepentingan umum diabaikan yang pada akhirnya kepentingan umum tidak lagi menjadi prioritas utama. Hal inilah yang menjadi penyebab pelanggaran hukum yang dilakukan oleh penguasa. Terjadinya pelanggaran hukum inilah yang menimbulkan daya dorong bagi masyarakat untuk ikut berperan serta dalam upaya menyelesaikan sengketa guna menegakkan hukum.Dalam tulisan ini penulis hanya akan membahas penyelesaian melalui badan peradilan sebagai salah satu syarat dari negara hukum (rechtstaat) yaitu judicial control. Badan peradilan merupakan suatu badan yang memegang peranan penting dalam penyelesaian sengketa. Salah satu gugatan kelompok yang dilakukan oleh para pencari keadilan adalah gugatan citizen lawsuit;One of the most important elements of state law by Sri Soemantri is the supervision of the judicial authorities. One form of oversight is judicial review conducted by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, not all government action based on legislation that has been there. Some activities or government policies born before the legislation that governs and even some legislation established to give birth to government policies that harm the citizens. Sometimes a legal dispute occurs stems from policies issued by the government, which should take into consideration the public interest or the interests of many (public) and not just the interests of individuals. There were many cases of a policy detrimental to the public interest so that often the public interest is ignored that the ultimately the public interest is no longer a top priority. This is the cause of the violation committed by the authorities. Violations of the laws are what caused the impetus for the public to participate in efforts to resolve the dispute to enforce the law. In this paper, the authors will only discuss a settlement through the judiciary as one of the requirements of state law (rechtstaat) is judicial control. The judiciary is a body that plays important role in the settlement of disputes. One of a class action carried out by those seeking justice is a citizen lawsuit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Firdaus Firdaus

Peraturan Daerah (Perda) sebagai produk hukum pemerintahan daerah untuk mengatur dan memerintah sendiri sebagai manifestasi otonomi, tetapi dalam praktiknya sering kali dihadapkan dengan penundaan atau pembatalan akibat fungsi pengawasan preventif atau represif oleh Pemerintah. Melalui Putusan Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) meneguhkan fungsi pengawasan preventif dan membatalkan fungsi pengawasan represif dengan harapan: pertama mengakhiri dilema konstitusional fungsi Pengawasan Pemerintah terhadap Perda; kedua, memperkuat otonomi daerah; dan ketiga, meneguhkan pengujian perda sebagai kompetensi Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun hal tersebut justru menciptakan dikotomi baru, baik terkait hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dengan pemerintahan daerah maupun dalam memaknai fungsi pengawasan represif dihubungkan dengan kompetensi MA menguji peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Bentuk dikotomi baru yang dimaksud; pertama, merevitalisasi instrumen sentralisme; dan kedua mereduksi otonomi dan fungsi kekuasaan Pemerintah dengan karakteristik yang bersifat aktif, sepihak (bersegi satu) dalam mengawasi dan memastikan pelaksanaan undangundang. Dimensi konstitusional yang harus dipastikan, bahwa pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan represif terhadap Perda memberi kedudukan hukum bagi Pemerintah Daerah otonom untuk dapat mengajukan permohonan pengujian kepada MA.Local Regulation (Perda) as a legal product of local government is to regulate and govern itself as a manifestation of autonomy. Yet, in practice it is often confronted with delays or cancellations due to the Government's preventive or repressive supervision functions. Through Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015, the Constitutional Court (MK) affirmed the function of preventive supervision and canceled the repressive supervision function in the hope of: first, ending the constitutional dilemma of the Government Oversight function on Local Regulations; second, strengthening local autonomy; and third, confirm the perda review as Supreme Court (MA) competency. However, this actually creates a new dichotomy, both in relation to the relationship between the Central Government and the local government and in interpreting the repressive monitoring function associated with the MA competency in examining the legislation under the regulations toward the statute. The form of the new dichotomy in intended; firstly, revitalize the instrument of centralism; and secondly reducing the autonomy and function of the Government's power with active, unilateral (onesided) characteristics in supervising and ensuring the implementation of the statute. The constitutional dimension that must be ensured is that the implementation of the repressive oversight function of the Local Regulation gives a legal standing for the autonomous local Government to be able to submit an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court.


Author(s):  
Maitra Neelanjan

This chapter examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the related ‘Sovereign Functions’ doctrine in India. It begins with an overview of the text of Article 300 of the Indian Constitution and proceeds with a brief survey of the case law on sovereign immunity that preceded the adoption of the Constitution. It then revisits some early attempts to revise the law on sovereign immunity in the post-Independence period, before discussing the judicial treatment of sovereign immunity and how the Indian Supreme Court has dealt with the constraints imposed by its own precedents, along with the Court’s difficulties in providing a coherent account of sovereign immunity. In particular, it considers the Supreme Court’s attempt to bypass the constraints that it had placed upon itself through the evolution of new doctrines in fundamental rights cases.


Author(s):  
Menachem Hofnung ◽  
Mohammed S. Wattad

The contemporary perception of Israel’s judiciary as an independent branch does not coincide with Israel’s first government’s perception after establishing the first Supreme Court. To a great extent the executive branch deemed the court its long arm. Until the mid-1950s judges were appointed by the government, and questions of conflicts of interest and political affiliation—in the wide sense of the term—were not compelling. However, since the 1990s the court’s power of judicial review and the legitimacy of its decisions have become issues of heated public debate. Consequently, the process of appointing justices to the court has become subject to very strict public and political scrutiny. This chapter asks whether the Israeli judiciary truly constitutes a third independent branch of government. This is relevant considering the continuous attempts to change the existing balance of power, aiming to limit the court’s capacity to apply universal judicial doctrines and legal standards to executive and legislative decisions.


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