The Judicial Branch in Israel

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Hofnung ◽  
Mohammed S. Wattad
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Political Affiliation ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
The Government ◽  
Independent Branch

The contemporary perception of Israel’s judiciary as an independent branch does not coincide with Israel’s first government’s perception after establishing the first Supreme Court. To a great extent the executive branch deemed the court its long arm. Until the mid-1950s judges were appointed by the government, and questions of conflicts of interest and political affiliation—in the wide sense of the term—were not compelling. However, since the 1990s the court’s power of judicial review and the legitimacy of its decisions have become issues of heated public debate. Consequently the process of appointing justices to the court has become subject to very strict public and political scrutiny. This chapter asks whether the Israeli judiciary truly constitutes a third independent branch of government. This is relevant considering the continuous attempts to change the existing balance of power, aiming to limit the court’s capacity to apply universal judicial doctrines and legal standards to executive and legislative decisions.

The Judicial Branch in Israel

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem Hofnung ◽  
Mohammed S. Wattad
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Political Affiliation ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
The Government ◽  
Independent Branch

The contemporary perception of Israel’s judiciary as an independent branch does not coincide with Israel’s first government’s perception after establishing the first Supreme Court. To a great extent the executive branch deemed the court its long arm. Until the mid-1950s judges were appointed by the government, and questions of conflicts of interest and political affiliation—in the wide sense of the term—were not compelling. However, since the 1990s the court’s power of judicial review and the legitimacy of its decisions have become issues of heated public debate. Consequently, the process of appointing justices to the court has become subject to very strict public and political scrutiny. This chapter asks whether the Israeli judiciary truly constitutes a third independent branch of government. This is relevant considering the continuous attempts to change the existing balance of power, aiming to limit the court’s capacity to apply universal judicial doctrines and legal standards to executive and legislative decisions.

Reforms will strengthen policy implementation in China

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Debt Burden ◽  
Key Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship

Subject Reforms to the relationship betwen central and local government in China. Significance The government last month issued two blueprints for a sweeping reorganisation of the country's bureaucracy (here and here, links in Chinese). They include policies that significantly alter the balance of power between central and local government institutions. These aim to overcome foot-dragging and poor policy implementation at local levels by improving incentives and supervision, and eliminating overlapping responsibilities and conflicts of interest. Impacts With the backing of an increasingly powerful Xi, much of the agenda is likely to be implemented. In key policy areas such as the environment, local bureaus should have more reliable access to funding. New taxes and constraints on borrowing should strengthen local government finances and help reduce their debt burden. Local governments may have less leeway to offer business incentives such as tax breaks and other regulatory incentives.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

The Philippine Supreme Court and Regime Response, 1970–2000

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stacia L. Haynie ◽  
Tao L. Dumas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Major Influence ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
The People ◽  
Personal Politics ◽  
The Government ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Political Actions

AbstractThe behaviour of appellate courts has long fascinated scholars. Specifically, scholars have been attentive to the effect of the political context on judicial outcomes. This paper focuses on the decision-making of the Philippine Supreme Court (“Court”) over multiple decades with particular attention to the influence of changes in the executive branch on the outcomes of cases brought to the Court. The analysis evaluates the decisions of the Court from 1970 through 2000, encompassing the turmoil of the Marcos years through the first few years of the tumultuous tenure of Joseph Estrada. We test the hypothesis, grounded in Galanter’s seminal work, that the government has substantial advantages in the legal system and thus enjoys greater success than other litigants. The government has theoretically unlimited resources with which to litigate, control over the staffing of the bench, and authority over, or at least major influence on, the laws that the courts interpret. As a result, the government is expected to win the majority of the challenges that come before the Court. The Philippines provides an excellent laboratory to test this thesis. In the Marcos era the Court faced a dictator professing “constitutional authoritarianism” whose regime ultimately was toppled by the People Power Revolution. His successor, Corazon Aquino, was initially embraced as the popular wife of an assassinated hero, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., but later faced a series of attempts to topple her regime. President Fidel Ramos served for 6 years leading the nation through a period of economic growth. Elected by a wide margin in 1998, President Joseph Estrada quickly lost the confidence of the Filipino people as well as the business and military sectors. By 2001, he was removed from office through political actions which some consider the People Power II. This analysis evaluates the winners and losers before the Philippine Supreme Court across the tenures of these presidencies with particular focus on the ability of the Filipino government to succeed when compared to individuals and businesses and the success of different regimes over time as the executive’s popularity surges and wanes. The results suggest, that like other institutions, the Philippine Supreme Court responded to the rise and fall of the personal politics that dominates the distribution of power in this Asian archipelago.

Execution of Judgments and Means of Enforcement Available to a Court in Nigeria

1988 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. O. Fabunmi ◽  
O. O. Akai
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The State ◽  
Financial Loss ◽  
Judicial Process ◽  
Civil Process ◽  
Rapid Changes ◽  
Court Orders ◽  
The Government ◽  
Judicial Actions

SUMMARYAlthough the judiciary is the weakest branch of the government and must depend on the executive branch to enforce its judgments, it is not the integrity, or prestige of the judiciary that is at stake when the executive fails to comply, or to comply satisfactorily with court orders and judgments. In such situations, the authority of the state is called into question.Clearly, where private persons are unable to concretise their remedies by enforcement, the relevance of the whole judicial process is called into question. In this regard one may say that the existing rules of enforcement are sufficiently geared to prevent that anomaly.In actions involving private parties the judiciary is an impartial arbiter and it is up to the party aggrieved to pursue his claim to the logical conclusion. The Sheriffs and Civil Process Laws are designed to facilitate this. Not only are officers of state placed at his disposal but he has the ultimate weapons, in an action for committal of an irresponsible judgment debtor. Yet, the formalities appurtenant to the issuance and execution of the various writs have appropriately built in devices, that allow the respondent to comply at any stage and thus save himself financial loss, or loss of his liberty.In the field of enforcement of non-money judgments the ultimate weapon is an action for committal initiated at the suit of the plaintiff. The same safety devices are available. In particular, where possible, the Court will employ another means of enforcing the judgment, or order.Although, there is provision for the appointment of commissioners (eg. in sequestration proceedings) and referees (in enquiries) there is little resort to these provisions, not only because sequestration proceedings are extremely rare but probably also because there is seldom need for the appointment of referees in our courts.It is in the enforcement of judgments against the state and government functionaries that rapid changes have occurred. Although, injunctions and mandamus will still not lie against government, it can now be sued and indirectly be made to obey court orders through actions directed against state functionaries. There is increasing willingness on the part of the courts to subject judicial, or quasi-judicial actions of government to judicial review. The problem remains as usual that of giving teeth to such orders since the very executive against which orders are made, is depended on to enforce such orders. Hence the judiciary has developed safety valves in actions for judicial review to prevent collision with the executive. Utmost discretion is exercised by judges in granting orders for review and they will generally do so only as a last resort

scholarly journals Refleksi Konstitusionalitas Pengawasan Peraturan Daerah Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Firdaus Firdaus
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Relationship

Peraturan Daerah (Perda) sebagai produk hukum pemerintahan daerah untuk mengatur dan memerintah sendiri sebagai manifestasi otonomi, tetapi dalam praktiknya sering kali dihadapkan dengan penundaan atau pembatalan akibat fungsi pengawasan preventif atau represif oleh Pemerintah. Melalui Putusan Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) meneguhkan fungsi pengawasan preventif dan membatalkan fungsi pengawasan represif dengan harapan: pertama mengakhiri dilema konstitusional fungsi Pengawasan Pemerintah terhadap Perda; kedua, memperkuat otonomi daerah; dan ketiga, meneguhkan pengujian perda sebagai kompetensi Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun hal tersebut justru menciptakan dikotomi baru, baik terkait hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dengan pemerintahan daerah maupun dalam memaknai fungsi pengawasan represif dihubungkan dengan kompetensi MA menguji peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Bentuk dikotomi baru yang dimaksud; pertama, merevitalisasi instrumen sentralisme; dan kedua mereduksi otonomi dan fungsi kekuasaan Pemerintah dengan karakteristik yang bersifat aktif, sepihak (bersegi satu) dalam mengawasi dan memastikan pelaksanaan undangundang. Dimensi konstitusional yang harus dipastikan, bahwa pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan represif terhadap Perda memberi kedudukan hukum bagi Pemerintah Daerah otonom untuk dapat mengajukan permohonan pengujian kepada MA.Local Regulation (Perda) as a legal product of local government is to regulate and govern itself as a manifestation of autonomy. Yet, in practice it is often confronted with delays or cancellations due to the Government's preventive or repressive supervision functions. Through Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015, the Constitutional Court (MK) affirmed the function of preventive supervision and canceled the repressive supervision function in the hope of: first, ending the constitutional dilemma of the Government Oversight function on Local Regulations; second, strengthening local autonomy; and third, confirm the perda review as Supreme Court (MA) competency. However, this actually creates a new dichotomy, both in relation to the relationship between the Central Government and the local government and in interpreting the repressive monitoring function associated with the MA competency in examining the legislation under the regulations toward the statute. The form of the new dichotomy in intended; firstly, revitalize the instrument of centralism; and secondly reducing the autonomy and function of the Government's power with active, unilateral (onesided) characteristics in supervising and ensuring the implementation of the statute. The constitutional dimension that must be ensured is that the implementation of the repressive oversight function of the Local Regulation gives a legal standing for the autonomous local Government to be able to submit an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court.

“Contract Clause” Litigation in Colombia; A Comparative Study in Judicial Review

1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 1103-1126 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. C. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government

The 1910 amendments to the Colombian constitution provided:Art. 40. In every case of incompatibility between the Constitution and the law the constitutional provisions shall be applied by preference.Art. 41. To the Supreme Court of Justice is confided the guardianship of the integrity of the Constitution. Consequently, in addition to the powers conferred upon it by this Constitution and the statutes, it shall have the following: To decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional by the Government, or as to all laws and decrees accused before it by any citizen as unconstitutional, first hearing the Attorney-General of the Nation.The first function, “to decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional,” was merely a restatement of the plan copied from Ecuador in 1886 and still in use, although it has proved a major disappointment.

Subsidies, Strings, and the Courts: Judicial Action and Conditional Federal Spending

1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-509
Author(s):  
Laura S. Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Financial Aid ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Federal System ◽  
Federal Spending ◽  
Federal Financial Aid ◽  
The Past ◽  
Judicial Action ◽  
Direct Legislation

The ability to attach conditions to federal financial aid has contributed significantly to the establishment of federal hegemony in policymaking, allowing Congress and the executive branch to exact from those dependent upon government largesse behavior which could not be compelled through direct legislation. While questions concerning the legitimacy of conditional spending in our federal system are properly directed to the courts, problems inherent in the judicial review of allocational decisions make constitutional challenges of the national spending power no more likely to succeed in the future than they have in the past. Thus, for all practical purposes, the balance of power between levels of government as well as the rights of individual citizens may be permanently impaired.

Criminal Law in Internal Conflict of Laws in Malaŵi

1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matembo Nzunda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Criminal Jurisdiction ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Appeal Courts ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Malaŵi has two sets of courts which run completely parallel to each other. One set forms the Judicial Branch of the Government and consists of magistrates’ courts (which have original civil and criminal jurisdiction only), the High Court (which has unlimited original and appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (which has original criminal jurisdiction for contempt of court but otherwise has appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court of Appeal is a final appellate court in this set of courts. These courts are here called Received Courts because they apply the received (English) common law as the basic law.The other set of courts is a section of the Ministry of Justice (which is part of the Executive Branch of the Government). The set consists of Traditional Courts of Grades A and B, the Traditional Appeal Courts (which hear and determine appeals from Traditional Courts of Grades A and B), District Traditional Courts, Regional Traditional Courts and the National Traditional Appeal Court (which hears and determines appeals from Traditional Appeal Courts, District Traditional Courts and Regional Traditional Courts). The civil and criminal jurisdiction of Traditional Courts is set out in the warrant establishing the Court and is supplemented from time to time by published ministerial orders under the authority of the Traditional Courts Act (the 1962 Act). The National Traditional Appeal Court is a final appellate court in this set of courts.

scholarly journals A SKETCH OF THE MAIN MODELS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (5) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Жерар Марку ◽  
Zherar Marku
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Experience ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Organization ◽  
Council Of State ◽  
National Systems ◽  
Administrative Justice

Administrative justice exists in most countries as a function in the State organization. But its scope and its forms differ widely among countries, in particular as regards the place of judicial review and the powers of judges. We can sort out three main models of administrative justice, based on judicial review institutions, from historical experience and main national systems. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights had a significant influence on the evolution of administrative justice towards more judicial oversight upon administrative bodies. The expansion of these models gave rise to a number of variants based on national and political context. The first model is the council of State, joining judicial review and advisory functions for the government. Initially an ancillary body it turned to be an independant supreme administrative court, with broad competence, including contracts and torts, while exercising further advisory functions. Another model is based on a unique administrative supreme court, with exclusive judicial review functions of a narrower scope, although some exceptions can be found where judicial review was transferred from a former council of State. A last model, probably most widespread nowadays, can be characterised as judicial review by the general supreme court. Institutionally there no dualism. The judiciary is also vested with judicial review of administrative authorities. Typical of common law countries, this organization can be found also in countries of administrative law. In reality, there is dualism as regards procedures, substantial law and the powers of judges in administrative matters. In numerous cases administrative courts are organised inside of ordinary courts. Whatever the form of administrative justice it is essential to secure the independence of judges, to give them the capacity of substantial review of administrative acts, to facilitate the access to administrative judges and to guarantee the execution of courts decisions.

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