Science and Religion

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Brian Pitts

The science–religion interaction spans so many fields, years, sources, etc., that a comprehensive view is no small task. This survey will be especially oriented to the discussion that has grown primarily out of the intellectual tradition of Western Christendom, but which aspires to universality. The Western Christian discussion, of course, profited in the late medieval era from Arabic transmission of Greek texts, whether pagan or Christian, as well as more distinctively Islamic and Jewish contributions. The Western Christian tradition, however, ultimately took some dramatic turns in response to the 16th-century Protestant Reformation and its aftermath. The history of science lately has produced many informed and balanced treatments. One important theme is the rejection of “Whiggish” history, which portrays the past with a bias to ratify the present. Instead, one must aim to enter sympathetically into the mindsets of the historical actors. Can one then return to the present in a more critical way? One major task of philosophy is to assess the types and bases of knowledge claims in other disciplines. Thus, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion, broadly construed to include certain traditional parts of theology (prolegomena, apologetics), are relevant, as is much of medieval philosophy. Besides sciences and theologies (including church history), one thus also needs an adequate command of the history of science, the philosophy of science, the sociology of science, and relevant parts of general intellectual history. Such, at least, were some of the aspirations involved in this article’s compilation. The question of whether science(s) has, or needs, a logic is important. Certainly, deductive logic is inadequate. Bayesianism, making systematic use of the probability calculus, might be adequate. A key issue is Hume’s problem of induction. Many philosophers agree that it cannot be solved, and some—generally those who are still working on a solution—think that the lack of a solution would render science no more justifiable than fortune telling (or Bible reading, for that matter) as a source of beliefs. This article is organized more or less chronologically in terms of the issues discussed, forming a selective slice of the intellectual history of the West since the medieval period, while encouraging critical reflection using methodological insights available in the early 21st century. It is hoped that this organization facilitates both a non-Whiggish history and a useful critical understanding for contemporary application.

Author(s):  
Yiftach Fehige

Thought experiments are basically imagined scenarios with a significant experimental character. Some of them justify claims about the world outside of the imagination. Originally they were a topic of scholarly interest exclusively in philosophy of science. Indeed, a closer look at the history of science strongly suggests that sometimes thought experiments have more than merely entertainment, heuristic, or pedagogic value. But thought experiments matter not only in science. The scope of scholarly interest has widened over the years, and today we know that thought experiments play an important role in many areas other than science, such as philosophy, history, and mathematics. Thought experiments are also linked to religion in a number of ways. Highlighted in this article are those links that pertain to the core of religions (first link), the relationship between science and religion in historical and systematic respects (second link), the way theology is conducted (third link), and the relationship between literature and religion (fourth link).


Author(s):  
James Livesey

This chapter talks about the aftermath of the collapse in authority of positivist models where scholars became highly sensitized to the implication of strategies of inquiry and interpretation with strategies of control. Even in areas of the social sciences that did not commit to discourse as a master category, the suspicion that the claim to a form of truth, or knowledge, entirely distinct from power, was in fact nothing more than a mystification that had explosive consequences. The history of science in its many forms has been transformed. In turn, the challenge to an easy universalism in the sciences has been foundational to the emergence of global intellectual history. The philosophical and methodological challenges of even the most mediated and subtle kinds of constructivism create dual fundamentalist temptations, toward a self-refuting reductivism or an overstated idealism. The “strong program,” associated with the Edinburgh University Science Studies Unit, pursued a wholehearted sociology of science and argued that the truth-value of particular scientific ideas was itself social in origin, thus collapsing the discovery/validation dichotomy.


I. Academic life. By R. Robson II. Contributions to science and learning. By Walter F. Cannon [Plates 19 TO 22] I. Academic life By R. Robson Fellow oj Trinity College, Cambridge A S the centenary of his death approaches there are signs that the oblivion which overcame Whewell so soon after it is being dispelled. The increasing concern of scholars with the history and philosophy of science has naturally led some of them to an interest in one of their distinguished predecessors, and those who study the history of science in Whewell’s lifetime have sometimes seen him at the centre of what Dr Cannon has called a ‘network’ of Cambridge scientists. Some day these men may loom as large in the intellectual history of nineteenth-century England as Oxford theologians do now, and it may not be too bold to claim that in the academic history of the period the Master of Trinity should command equal attention with the Master of Balliol. But to how many of those acquainted with Jowett’s career is even the name of Whewell familiar? Whewell’s benefactions to Trinity and to Cambridge have, of course, kept his name at least in memory there, but he was widely known outside the University in his lifetime and has claims on the interest of those outside it even now. In the second part of this article Dr Cannon will discuss Whewell’s intellectual achievement. By way of introduction a brief account will now be given of Whewell’s academic career. Whewell came up to Trinity in 1812 as a sub-sizar, ‘a tall, ungainly youth, with grey worsted stockings and country made shoes’.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Brad Wray

Thomas Kuhn (b. 1922–d. 1996) was an American historian and philosopher of science. He completed a Ph.D. in physics at Harvard University. While a student at Harvard, Kuhn worked as a teaching assistant for James B. Conant, who was the president of Harvard University from 1933 to 1953 and who designed and taught the general education history of science courses at Harvard. This experience led Kuhn to become a historian of science. After Kuhn completed his Ph.D., he taught the history of science for a brief period at Harvard. Subsequently, he taught at the University of California, Berkeley, then at Princeton University, ending his teaching career at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (cited under Kuhn’s Work), was a very influential and widely read book, selling more than a million copies. It had a profound impact on philosophy of science. It was part of the new historical turn in philosophy of science that looked to the history of science to better understand how science works. The book took on a life of its own, which, at times, caused Kuhn much dismay. Much of Kuhn’s career was spent refining and clarifying the position he initially developed in Structure. He especially sought to defend his account of science from the charge of relativism and to distinguish his view from the view of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). Until the end of his life he was working on a book that would clarify his view, tentatively titled The Plurality of Worlds. Four years after his death, James Conant and John Haugeland edited a collection of papers by Kuhn that represent the direction his view was developing at the end of his life (see Kuhn 2000, cited under Kuhn’s Work). James Conant is the grandson of James B. Conant. Kuhn’s influence extended far beyond the philosophy of science, into the history of science, the sociology of science, and the broader culture. “Paradigm” and “paradigm shift,” two key concepts he popularized in Structure, are now used by the educated public and scientists as well.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-287
Author(s):  
Renan Springer de Freitas

Abstract The sociology of knowledge that became established as an academic discipline ‘lives’ alongside another that never did so, but nevertheless manifests itself within other disciplines, including the philosophy of science, the history of science, and intellectual history. I discuss the ways in which each of them has evolved. I argue that while the former works by reflecting on the conditions of possibility of the production of knowledge about knowledge itself, the nature of the knowledge produced under these conditions, the metatheoretical ‘dilemmas’ that supposedly plague the production of this knowledge, the means by which these dilemmas can be ‘overcome,’ the conceptual problems supposedly involved in the production of this knowledge, and the ways through which these conceptual problems can be solved, the latter works by offering solutions to specific empirical problems.


George Gabriel Stokes was one of the most significant mathematicians and natural philosophers of the nineteenth century. Serving as Lucasian professor at Cambridge he made wide-ranging contributions to optics, fluid dynamics and mathematical analysis. As Secretary of the Royal Society he played a major role in the direction of British science acting as both a sounding board and a gatekeeper. Outside his own area he was a distinguished public servant and MP for Cambridge University. He was keenly interested in the relation between science and religion and wrote extensively on the matter. This edited collection of essays brings together experts in mathematics, physics and the history of science to cover the many facets of Stokes’s life in a scholarly but accessible way.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.


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