Moral Epistemology

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Frameworks ◽  
Biased Judgments

Moral epistemology is the study of moral knowledge and related phenomena. The recorded history of work in the field extends (at least) 2,500 years to Socrates’s inquiries into whether virtue and expertise in governance can be taught. Every major moral theorist since then has advanced theses about the possibility of moral knowledge and those modes of thinking, feeling, and reasoning that are most conducive to improvements in moral outlook. Though the study of moral language and the metaphysics of morality received more attention by Western philosophers in the 20th century, interest in moral epistemology has grown in recent years as theorists have turned to advances in the scientific study of moral development and moral judgment—and their origins in biological and cultural evolution—in the hopes of shedding new light on the old questions. By further understanding the processes that give rise to our moral beliefs, and the critical evaluation and consequent evolution of moral frameworks, we hope to gain further insight into what distinguishes those rational, reasonable, or well-considered moral views that would seem to comprise moral knowledge from those irrational, false, or unduly biased judgments that fall short. This article begins by describing general overviews of moral epistemology, moves on to consider historically important accounts of moral knowledge, and then addresses contemporary scientific accounts of moral judgment, moral development, and the foundations of moral response in our evolved biology. With these elements in place, it moves on to moral skepticism and the question of whether we have any moral knowledge; moral nihilism, or the view that there are no moral truths to be known; and the extent and nature of fundamental moral disagreement: perhaps the most common route to skepticism about morality. The “special” topics that follow these core concerns demonstrate the breadth and richness of the field. We would seem to have “intuitions” of the morality of certain actions, people, or institutions. Some (non-skeptical) theorists liken these intuitions to perceptions of color or beauty. Others argue that desires provide non-inferential knowledge of value, that basic moral principles are self-evident, or that we can directly infer “ought” from “is.” Theorists discuss, among other things, the reliability of ordinary processes of moral judgment, the role of coherence and reflection in augmenting the rationality of folk moral views, the possibility of theoretical moral knowledge akin to scientific knowledge, and the rationality of basing one’s moral views on testimony.

scholarly journals The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May ◽  
Clifford Ian Workman ◽  
Hyemin Han ◽  
Julia Haas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Brain Development ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Childhood And Adolescence ◽  
Brain Areas ◽  
Shed Light

We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development.

scholarly journals Ethical and Moral Competences of Upper Secondary Students: A Comparative Study

2020 ◽  
pp. 209653112097395
Author(s):  
Zhengmei Peng ◽  
Dietrich Benner ◽  
Roumiana Nikolova ◽  
Stanislav Ivanov ◽  
Tao Peng
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
Secondary Students ◽  
Chinese Students ◽  
Educational Background ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Action Plans ◽  
Upper Secondary ◽  
Moral Competences

Purpose: This article presents the theoretical framework, research design, methodology, and main findings of the comparative measurement of ethical–moral competences of 15-year-old upper secondary students in Shanghai, under the ETiK-International-Shanghai project. Design/Approach/Methods: By dividing the ethical–moral competences into the categories of basic ethical–moral knowledge, ethical–moral judgment competence, and competence in developing ethical–moral action plans, a survey of 2,036 students was conducted, using a reliable and valid testing instrument. Findings: In general, 15-year-olds from homes with more educational resources perform higher in all three scales across all countries taken under consideration in our study. Furthermore, school practices, teaching, as well as quantity and quality of instruction play a very important role in the moral education process and especially in developing students’ proficiency levels of ethical–moral knowledge, reasoning competence, as well as students’ high abilities in developing moral action plans. When relevant educational background factors are held constant, Chinese students show lower average scores on basic ethical–moral knowledge and moral judgment competence. With exception of the tested Vienna students, all other European samples scored better than the Chinese students—also on the test for developing ethical–moral action plans. However, Chinese students are especially able to display outstanding empathy when dealing with suffering, misfortune, and sorrow, as well as in their willingness to help others. Originality/Value: The findings of this article can foster thinking about which topics should be further discussed to improve the ethical–moral knowledge and competences of Chinese students and highlight requirements for the further development of moral education in China at the levels of teaching, curriculum, teacher education, and research.

The Effect of Different Teaching Strategies on the Moral Development of Physical Education Students

1997 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra L. Gibbons ◽  
Vicki Ebbeck
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Physical Education ◽  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Teaching Strategies ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Moral Reason ◽  
Education Students ◽  
Physical Education Students ◽  
And Behavior

This study examined the effectiveness of social learning (SL) or structural developmental (SD) teaching strategies on the moral development of elementary-age students. Participants were 204 physical education students in Grades 4,5, and 6; three classrooms in each grade were randomly assigned to control, SL, or SD groups. Self-report measures assessed moral judgment, reason, and intention; teachers rated prosocial behavior. By mid- and postintervention class-level analyses, the SL and SD groups scored significantly higher than the control on moral judgment and/or intention; by postintervention, the SD group was significantly higher on moral reason. Mid- and postintervention student-level analyses showed that the SL and SD groups scored significantly higher on moral judgment, intention, and behavior; the SD group was significantly higher on moral reason. These results provide support for the effectiveness of both social learning and structural-developmental teaching strategies on the moral development of children in physical education.

scholarly journals Association Between Severity of Adolescents’ Peer Problems and Moral Judgment Development

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Najia Zulfiqar
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Problem Behavior ◽  
Peer Relations ◽  
Development Theory ◽  
Behavior Theory ◽  
Peer Problems ◽  
Problem Behavior Theory ◽  
Older Adolescents ◽  
Growing Age

Previous studies supported that adolescents’ moral judgment decreases as their peer problems increase in severity. The objective of the present research was to examine peer problems as a predictor of adolescents’ moral judgment development based upon Jessor’s problem behavior theory and Gibbs moral development theory. It was hypothesized that moral judgment increases with growing age and thus, older adolescents are expected to be at higher stages of moral judgment development than younger adolescents. It was also assumed that adolescents with severe peer problems will be at lower level of moral judgment development than their counterparts. The younger adolescents (n = 140; M = 13.1 year) and older adolescents (n = 147; M = 19 year) were compared on measures of Index of Peer Relations and Padua Moral Judgment Scale. The findings showed that adolescents’ moral judgment development declined with an increase in peer problems, particularly during late adolescence. Adolescents who reported having moderate and severe peer problems had lower level of moral judgment development than those with no and mild peer problems. Findings provided guideline for future researchers and practitioners.

Moral Perception: Causal, Phenomenological, and Epistemological Elements

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Do So

This chapter analyzes how perception is a kind of experiential information-bearing relation between the perceiver and the object perceived. It argues that even if moral properties are not themselves causal, they can be perceptible. But the dependence of moral perception on non-moral perception does not imply an inferential dependence of all moral belief or moral judgment on non-moral belief or judgment. This kind of grounding explains how a moral belief arising in perception can constitute perceptual knowledge and can do so on grounds that are publicly accessible and, though not a guarantee of it, a basis for ethical agreement. The chapter also shows how perceptual moral knowledge is connected not only with other moral knowledge but also with intuition and emotion.

Kohlberg’s Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 91-110
Author(s):  
John C. Gibbs
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Life Span ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Cognitive Moral Development ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
American Psychology ◽  
Specific Stage

Given this cognitive-developmental concern with superficiality-to-depth in moral judgment or understanding, Kohlberg was particularly concerned to discover and articulate an age trend and possible sequence of developmental advances or stages that may be universal. Our critique of Kohlberg’s theory notes that, although his specific stage typology was misguided, he almost single-handedly put cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology. He encouraged attention to the continued development of moral judgment beyond the childhood years. Finally, he speculated from case studies of mature moral thinkers in existential crisis that there may be a deeper reality (“cosmic perspective”), one that underlies profound moral perception and can support the moral life. Building from Kohlberg’s and others’ contributions, we propose in this chapter a new view of life-span sociomoral development.

Traditional Moral Knowledge and Experience of the World

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedict Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Demands

AbstractMacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of subjectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically examines some aspects of MacIntyre’s account of how knowledge is related to tradition, and suggests ways in which the formation of moral subjectivity involves the ability to experience the world.

scholarly journals Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-273
Author(s):  
JP Messina ◽  
David Wiens
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Standard Conception ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Theoretic Argument ◽  
Game Theoretic

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

Butler's Theory of Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 199-225
Author(s):  
Roger A. Shiner
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Main Interest

It is something of a commonplace of Butlerian interpretation that the main interest and achievements of Butler's moral philosophy are in normative ethics, and not metaethics. He wishes to bring moral enlightenment to citizens and not, to philosophers, epistemological enlightenment. Nonetheless for that he makes a number of remarks which, if we were collecting for some bizarre purpose metaethical forms of words, we would note down and include in our collection. Thus he makes some progress towards the development of a moral epistemology, a theory of moral judgment. My purpose here is to assess those steps, and to see how far the structure which results can be called a theory. I have the impression that much of the reluctance among scholars to allow that Butler does have a theory of moral judgment is caused by the metaethical blinkers that they themselves wear; what is in fact the beginnings of an unfashionable and unconventional theory is seen as unsophisticated confusion. But I shall not overdo praise of Butler. I shall suggest that Aristotle does a somewhat better job of developing this type of theory.

scholarly journals The Role of the Holy Will

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Callanan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Immoral Action ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractIt is well known that Kant uses the notion of the holy will in the Groundwork so as to contrast it with the finite wills of human beings. It is less clear, however, what function this contrast is supposed to perform. I argue that one role of the holy will is to illustrate transcendental idealism’s account of the relation between moral knowledge and moral practice. The position is one intended to negotiate between ostensibly competing traditions. Kant uses the holy will as a way of endorsing the metaphysical picture of the scholastic tradition’s so-called ‘ethics of freedom’, whereby the ideal of moral perfection is conceived as the perfection of one’s power of freedom to the point where one is constitutively incapable of immoral action. This position is married however with the claim that the holy will’s inaccessibility to human cognition motivates a subject-oriented moral epistemology more usually associated with Enlightenment humanism. I conclude by claiming that the nuanced role for the holy will can be understood as part of Kant’s expansion of the value of religious faith [Glaube] to the domain of practical inquiry in general.

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