Moral Development, Moral Identity, and Prosocial Behavior

This chapter focuses on some of the variables accounting for individual differences in the likelihood of prosocial behavior. “Prosocial behavior” can range from a particular intervention to a lifetime dedicated to just and good causes. Highly prosocial individuals (moral exemplars) tend to be morally mature and highly empathic but field-independent (Moral Type B, internal locus of control, high self-efficacy) persons who perceive morality as central to their sense of self (high moral identity). Moral identity can join the main primary (affective and cognitive) sources of moral motivation. Finally, to take effective sustained action, even highly prosocial individuals need grit or ego strength, defined in terms of affect-regulating follow-through skills. Distinguishing features of genuine (versus spurious) moral exemplars are considered at the end of the chapter.

Kohlberg’s Theory

Given this cognitive-developmental concern with superficiality-to-depth in moral judgment or understanding, Kohlberg was particularly concerned to discover and articulate an age trend and possible sequence of developmental advances or stages that may be universal. Our critique of Kohlberg’s theory notes that, although his specific stage typology was misguided, he almost single-handedly put cognitive moral development on the map of American psychology. He encouraged attention to the continued development of moral judgment beyond the childhood years. Finally, he speculated from case studies of mature moral thinkers in existential crisis that there may be a deeper reality (“cosmic perspective”), one that underlies profound moral perception and can support the moral life. Building from Kohlberg’s and others’ contributions, we propose in this chapter a new view of life-span sociomoral development.

Introduction

This chapter introduces not only the social perspective-taking central to morality, but also our theory-based exploration of moral development, behavior, and reality. Perspective-taking relates to both “the right” (justice, reciprocity, equality; Kohlberg’s theory) and “the good” (welfare, beneficence, empathy; Hoffman’s theory) of morality. The right (condition of reversibility) provides an objective basis for morality not recognized in relativistic moral theories such as Haidt’s (Chapter 2). The good may provide the broad moral referent for differentiated intuitions (e.g., loyalty, authority, purity) specified by Haidt. Chapters 3 and 4 address “the right” or the cognitive strand of moral motivation and development, whereas Chapter 5 addresses “the good” or the affective strand. Subsequent chapters (6 through 10) relate the theories of moral development to social behavior (prosocial, antisocial) as well as to a deeper reality of human connection

“The Good” and Moral Development

Social perspective-taking and development beyond the superficial also entail caring or feeling. Accordingly, we shift in this chapter from the right to the good, from justice to empathy, from the primarily cognitive to the primarily affective strand of moral motivation and development. We draw heavily on Hoffman’s theory, even as we also consider recent refinements, issues, and challenges (de Waal, Decety, Zahn-Waxler, Bloom). Much more than did Haidt, Hoffman has focused our attention on the role of empathy in moral development. Thanks to cognitive development, language development, and moral socialization, empathy progresses from biologically based responses to surface cues to a more complex and veridical emotional responsiveness to the joys, sufferings, and life situations of others. Attributions, inferences, and biases influence whether empathy eventuates in prosocial behavior. Within moral socialization, Hoffman focuses on parental practices of discipline (especially, “inductions” that make salient the perspectives of others hurt by the child’s transgression). The chapter concludes that Hoffman’s theory withstands recent challenges, and argues for co-primacy (both empathy and justice) in moral motivation.

Conclusion

The final chapter concludes our use of Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to ponder the moral domain and explore growth beyond the superficial in morality. We recap our critique of Haidt’s theory. We culminate our argument for a coprimacy in moral motivation by relating Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s theories to motivationally and qualitatively distinct categories of knowledge (logico-mathematical, empirical). We relate logical-moral ideals to an analysis of adaptation and evolution (Piaget, Singer) that is less reductionistic than the pragmatic version offered by Haidt and others. We conclude with some final thoughts on moral development, perception, and behavior vis-à-vis a deeper reality of human connection.

Understanding Antisocial Behavior

The referent for social behavior shifts in this chapter to antisocial behavior and how to account for it. Most offenders, from petty pranksters to ideological terrorists, fail (except for self-serving purposes) to take the perspectives of their victims. Social perspective-taking limitations pervade the “three Ds” of antisocial youth: moral developmental delay, self-serving cognitive distortions, and social skills deficiencies. The latter variables are needed to supplement Kohlberg’s and Hoffman’s emphasis on developmental delay if we are adequately to account for antisocial behavior. The chapter concludes with the powerful illustrative case of Timothy McVeigh. This case makes particularly clear how cognitive distortions can insulate a self-centered worldview (itself a primary distortion, linked to feeling superior or inadequately respected); that is, self-serving distortions can preempt or neutralize social perspective-taking, moral understanding, and veridical empathy.

“The Right” and Moral Development

This chapter explicates cognitive developmental themes in moral development. The attention of young children is readily captured by or centered on that which is immediate and salient in their sociomoral and non-social worlds. Just as centrations and superficiality characterize early childhood moral judgment, “decentration” and depth can be said to characterize the moral competence constructed in the school years and beyond. We relate morality to logic (cf. Piaget); explain that the ideals of justice or moral reciprocity are constructed, not merely enculturated, socialized, or internalized; explicate the role of peer interaction and social perspective-taking opportunities in this moral constructive process across diverse cultures; argue that justice can be a moral motive in its own right; and ponder issues in the concept and assessment of “stages” in the development of moral judgment.

Beyond Haidt’s New Synthesis

This chapter reviews—and moves beyond—Haidt’s new synthesis of trends in disciplines (such as social psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology) pertinent to morality and enculturation. Reviewed are his major themes: ingroup solidarity, intuitive primacy, and social persuasion (rather than truth or objectivity) as the function of moral reasoning. His work reminds us of our pretensions and the major role of innately prepared, fast, preconscious intuitions in morality. He discusses the phylogenetic history and neurology of those intuitions and their shaping through culture. We are also reminded of the values of phylogenetic humility, scientific description, and cultural diversity. In the final analysis, however, three serious limitations of Haidt’s theory—a negative skew or inadequacy in descriptive work; an unwarranted exclusion of the prescriptive implications of the higher reaches in morality; and moral relativism—overshadow its contributions.

Beyond the Theories

This chapter goes beyond Kohlberg’s, Hoffman’s, and Haidt’s theories to consider the question of a deeper reality. As noted, Kohlberg argued that existential thinkers in their soul-searching sometimes come to see their earthly moral life from an inspiring “cosmic perspective.” Perhaps such a reality can be glimpsed not only through existential crises, but also through physically life-threatening ones. Accordingly, this chapter studies cases of persons who have had a so-called near-death experience (“When some people come close to death, they go through a profound experience that may include a sense of leaving the body and entering some other realm or dimension” [Greyson]). A review of the literature—especially, recent medical research literature—suggests that the experience entails a transcendent significance congruent with Kohlberg’s cosmic perspective. In this light, “growing beyond the superficial” and “taking the perspectives of others” take on radical new meaning.

Treating Antisocial Behavior

If multiple limitations contribute to antisocial behavior, then an adequate treatment program must be correspondingly multi-componential. Adequate social perspective-taking—perspective-taking that is profound or mature; rationalization-busting, adequately informed, and hence discerning; reciprocally ideal and balanced; and socially expansive or inclusive—should be a basic theme pervasive across the components of any effective treatment program. This chapter focuses on a multicomponent treatment program that incorporates a wide variety of social perspective-taking opportunities pertaining to the remediation of moral developmental delay, social cognitive distortions, and social skill deficiencies, namely, the EQUIP program. High-fidelity implementations of EQUIP can stimulate a positive synergy through EQUIP’s integration of mutual help (motivation, culture) and cognitive behavioral (curriculum) approaches. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of adaptations and outcome evaluations, and illustrates social perspective-taking treatments available for severe offenders.