Jacob Frank

Author(s):  
Pawel Maciejko

Ya‘akov (Jakub) ben Yehudah Leib Frank (b. 1726–d. 1791) was the founder of Frankism, a Jewish religious movement that spread in East-Central Europe in the second half of the 18th century. Ya‘akov ben Leyb, later known as Frank or Frenk, was born in Podolia, the east-southernmost Palatinate of the Polish-Lihuanian Commonwealth in a family of known Sabbatians. When he was only a few months old, his family left Poland and moved to the Ottoman Empire. In Salonika, he established contacts with the most radical branch of the Dönmeh, founded by Berukhiah Russo (d. 1720), who was considered by his followers to be the next manifestation of the soul of Shabetai Tsevi. In 1755, Frank returned to Poland where he presented himself as an emissary of the Dönmeh and a famous kabbalist. He managed to unify splintered Sabbatian groups and attracted many followers throughout Podolia. Arrested by the rabbinic authorities, Frank and his followers demanded permission to hold a public disputation against the rabbis. Two disputations were held, the first one in Kamieniec Podolski in 1757 and the other one in Lviv in 1759. It the wake of the second disputation Frank and several thousands of his followers converted to Roman Catholicism. Shortly after the conversion, Frank was arrested again, this time by the Christians. He spent thirteen years in the prison-monastery in Częstowchowa. Therein, he developed a set of highly original theological doctrines focusing on the concept of the female messiah. Freed in 1772 by the Russians, he settled in Brno in Moravia. Frank died in 1791 in Offenbach am Main. The movement founded by him continued, in various forms, at least till the mid-19th century.

1990 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
John C. Campbell ◽  
Jacques Rupnik

2016 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 803-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Sass Mikkelsen

This article examines relationships between historical administrative systems and civil service politicization across Europe. I argue that to appreciate when and how history matters, we need to consider public service bargains struck between politicians and senior bureaucrats. Doing so complicates the relationship between historical and current administrative systems: a bureaucratic, as opposed to patrimonial, 18th-century state infrastructure is necessary for the depoliticization of ministerial bureaucracies in present-day Western Europe. However, the relationship does not hold in East-Central Europe since administrative histories are tumultuous and fractured. Combining data from across the European continent, I provide evidence in support of these propositions. Points for practitioners This article addresses policymakers dealing with reforms of personnel policy regimes at the centre of government. It considers the importance of history for politically attractive reforms, as well as the limits of this importance. I argue that 18th-century state infrastructures shape the extent to which political appointments are politically attractive tools for administrative control. I show that only in countries that feature a bureaucratic, as opposed to patrimonial, 18th-century infrastructure are ministerial top management occupied by a permanent, as opposed to politically appointed, staff. However, in East-Central Europe, a ruptured administrative history ensures that the distant past does not similarly shape the extent of political appointments.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-292
Author(s):  
SHARON L. WOLCHIK

Over a decade has passed since the heady days of 1989 and 1990 when communist governments fell one after the other and almost all political parties taking part in elections shared the same goals: Democracy, the Market, and Back to Europe. In December 2002, the efforts of the new leaders of these countries to ‘return to Europe’ bore fruit in an event that many had in 1989 regarded as too farfetched to imagine, the invitation of most of the countries in the region to join the EU in 2004 or 2007. The culmination of a decade-long process of harmonization and negotiation, this invitation symbolized the success of these countries in instituting political democracies and market economies. But how complete is this process, particularly in the political realm?


1997 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald Quataert

In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II orchestrated the slaughter of 6,000–7,000 janissaries and, in order to incinerate any janissary remnants that had taken refuge there, burned the Belgrade Forest outside Istanbul. During his reign (1808–39), the sultan attacked many of the other bases of the ancien régime, such as the timar system, the lifetime tax farms, and the political autonomy of provincial notables. He also centralized the pious foundations, brought them under a special ministry, and expropriated their revenues. Such stories of Sultan Mahmud's dramatic and violent policies, as well as their 18th-century origins and their 19th-century legacies, are familiar ones in Ottoman and Middle Eastern history. It is a commonplace that Sultan Mahmud aimed to dismantle the power of the military and religious classes in favor of a new bureaucracy of administrators and scribes. And it is also known that his efforts had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of the Tanzimat reform programs during the later 19th century.


2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (4 (244)) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Anna Kalinowska

An Englishman in-between Two Worlds: Robert Bargrave’s Travel through East-Central Europe, 1652-1653 The article discusses a journey of a young Englishman Robert Bargrave (1628-1661), who in the early 1650s travelled from Constantinople to England. The travel diary recording this journey reflects Bargrave’s keen interest in the customs, everyday life and languages as well as natural conditions and economy of the places he visited and shows that he tried to place it in a wider context. As a result, closer analysis of this text gives us an excellent opportunity to examine the picture of East -Central Europe as seen by a mid-seventeenth century Englishman and the way he perceived it in relation to both the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-381
Author(s):  
Attila Ágh

AbstractThe Europeanised, progressive intelligentsia in East-Central Europe (ECE) made a fundamental mistake in the nineties that amounts in some ways to the ‘treason of intellectuals’ and the basic reassessment of these naïve illusions has only begun nowadays. Motivated by the radical change in the ‘miraculous year’ (1989) the progressive intellectuals uncritically accepted and supported the Europeanisation in that particular form as it entered into the chaotic days of the early nineties, since they naively thought that its negative features would automatically disappear. In good faith, they created an apology for the established neoliberal hybrid and they sincerely defended this perverse Europeanisation against the increasing attacks of the traditionalistnativist narrative. With this action they have been unwillingly drifting close to the other side by offering some ideological protection for the ‘really existing’ neoliberal hybrid instead of criticising this deviation from genuine democratisation in order to facilitate its historical correction. However, due to the emergence of the neoliberal hybrid, the ‘external’ integration by the EU has resulted in the ‘internal’ disintegration inside the ECE member states. There has been a deep polarisation in the domestic societies and after thirty years the majority of populations in the ECE countries feel like losers, and they have indeed become losers. This controversial situation needs an urgent reconsideration, which is underway both in the EU and in the ECE as a self-criticism of the progressive intelligentsia. Thus, this paper concentrates on the reconsideration of the main conceptual issues of Europeanisation and Democratisation in ECE.1


1994 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Joseph Rothschild

Over the past several decades the discipline of political science has, perhaps, degraded its competence and hence its eligibility for handling this issue by saddling itself with a flawed language, or, rather, flawed use of language for doing so. At any rate, that is true of political science as written and taught in English. Not that the other social-science disciplines are in better shape (perhaps History is). Still, political scientists have, for example, committed the following intellectual offenses:


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