scholarly journals O novo paradigma da decisão a partir do art. 20 da LINDB: análise do dispositivo segundo as teorias de Richard Posner e Neil MacCormick

2019 ◽  
Vol 278 (3) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Francisco Sérgio Maia Alves

<p>The new paradigm of decision based on art. 20 of the LINDB: analysis of the text according to the theories of Richard Posner and Neil MacCormick</p><p> </p><p>O presente trabalho visa analisar o art. 20 da Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito Brasileiro (LINDB), introduzido pela Lei nº 13.655/2018. Para tanto, será mostrado como os valores jurídicos foram excluídos e novamente reintroduzidos na prática jurídica e como essa reintrodução gerou preocupações quanto ao aumento da discricionariedade da aplicação do direito. O artigo apresentará as teorias pragmática e consequencialista, segundo a doutrina de dois de seus principais expoentes, Richard Posner e Neil MacCormick. No afã de cumprir o objetivo central do artigo, serão delimitados os conceitos de valores jurídicos abstratos e consequências práticas da decisão, no contexto do art. 20 da LINDB, e, por fim, definido o espaço de aplicação do dispositivo.</p><p> </p><p>This work aims to analyze art. 20 of the Law of Introduction to the Rules of Brazilian Law (LINDB), or Law No. 13.655/2018. To do so, it will be shown how legal values were excluded and reintroduced in legal practice and how this reintroduction raised concerns regarding the increase of discretion in the application of the law. The article will present pragmatic and consequentialist theories, in line with the doctrine of two of its main exponents, Richard Posner and Neil MacCormick. In order to meet the key objective of the article, the concepts of abstract legal values and practical consequences of the decision will be described in the context of art. 20 of the LINDB, concluding with a definition of the area in which the law is applied.</p>

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Bunn

People labeled as having an addiction and people with disabilities face significant discrimination in their daily lives. In countries where targeted disability discrimination law is applied, it is often assumed that including addiction in the definition of disability will protect those labeled as having an addiction from discrimination. Several scholars have considered the effects of excluding addiction from the remit of discrimination law, but there has been less work examining the consequences—both positive and negative—of including addiction. Using the method of “situated comparisons” developed by intersectionality scholars, this article interrogates how addiction and disability are co-constituted in two contrasting legal and geographical contexts, where people labeled as having an addiction have sought to assert their right to equality before the law. By comparing the application of targeted discrimination law in Australia with a human rights charter in Canada, it demonstrates how systems of power such as ableism and neoliberalism work through the law to co-constitute addiction and disability in ways that are stigmatizing, even within legal approaches that aim to eliminate discrimination. Furthermore, the law, in both contexts, fails to recognize the intersectional nature of discrimination often experienced by these groups. The article contends that conceptualizing addiction as a disability will not necessarily reduce the discrimination faced by people labeled as having an addiction and concludes with recommendations for both policy and legal practice.


1920 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 26-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald F. Roxburgh

Every satisfactory definition of law implies a sanction. Some penalty must be imposed upon a law-breaker, to be exacted, in the last resort, by external power. Force, therefore, is vital to law as it is to war, though normally it plays a less obvious part. A felon who is brought up for trial, condemned, and sent to prison, is induced by force, or by the fear of force, to submit to the court and to punishment. The policeman and the warder are the instruments of external power by which he is constrained to obey.Force also supplies the most important incentive for securing obedience to law. It is true, as Maine pointed out, that for every man who keeps the law through conscious fear of punishment, there may be hundreds who do so as it were instinctively, and without a thought on the subject. But while this law-abiding spirit, which is characteristic of large sections of a modern community, owes its origin to a number of causes, perhaps the most potent of all has been the enforcement of law through long ages in the past.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 442-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maksymilian Del Mar

AbstractThis paper offers a definition of legal fictions and an evaluation of the role of legal fictions in legal practice, especially insofar as they enable legal change. The first part of the paper defines legal fictions as any suspension of one or more of the required operative facts leading to the imposition of an associated normative consequence, whether this suspension is introduced because of (1) the absence of proof of some previously required fact; or (2) the presence of proof to the contrary. The second part argues that legal fictions have an unjustifiably bad reputation as enablers of legal change. This paper makes a plea for seeing legal fictions as forms of tentative cognition that enable courts to communicate with each other, exploring whether a certain change in the law (i.e. precisely a suspension of a required operative fact in the imposition of a certain normative consequence) ought to be introduced at a more explicit level. Under the guise of this relational reading of legal reasoning, legal fictions become an instrument of careful experimentation – a way of testing the extent to which the potential introduction of a rule will be beneficial. Seen in this light, legal fictions are by no means signs of the immaturity of the system; they are, instead, dynamic resources that allow courts, over time, to balance flexibility and responsiveness with stability and predictability.


Author(s):  
Marina De Almeida Rosa ◽  
Augusto Carlos De Menezes Beber

O presente artigo tem como objetivo estudar as possibilidades de uma teoria da decisão judicial no âmbito das cortes internacionais. Para tanto, o trabalho questiona em que medida seria possível aplicar a Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito às decisões proferidas pelos tribunais tomando como base para exame o recente julgamento da Corte Interamericana no caso Lagos del Campo vs. Perú.  A partir da teoria de Lenio Streck, observou-se que a jurisdição internacional tem se aproximado de um ativismo judicial, o que se evidenciou a partir do caso estudado, mostrando-se, assim, relevante a instituição de um paradigma que permita o constrangimento epistemológico das decisões das cortes internacionais. Com isso, concluiu-se que, a partir da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito, mesmo em termos de Direito Internacional Público, não é qualquer decisão que pode ser tomada, dado que a definição da norma jurídica não está disposta ao alvedrio do julgador.   Abstract: This article aims to study the possibilities of a theory of judicial decision in the scope of international courts. In order to do so, the work questions the extent to which it would be possible to apply the Hermeneutic Critic of the Law to the judgments given by the courts based on the recent judgment of the Inter-American Court in Lagos del Campo v. Peru. From the theory of Lenio Streck, it was observed that the international jurisdiction has approached a judicial activism, which was evidenced from the case studied, showing, therefore, relevant the institution of a paradigm that allows the epistemological constraint of international court decisions. With this, it was concluded that, based on the Hermeutic Critic of the Law, even in terms of Public International Law, it is not any decision that can be taken, since the definition of the legal norm is not available to the alder of the judge.


Author(s):  
Наталья Алексеевна Макарова

В статье анализируется правовая природа юридических коллизий, систематизируются предложенные в юридической литературе последних лет определения понятия «юридическая коллизия», выделяются достоинства и недостатки исследуемых подходов, формулируется авторское определение данного понятия. Под юридической коллизией предлагается понимать противоречие между нормами права, а равно нормами права и (или) положениями правоприменительных и интерпретационных правовых актов, потенциально или практически порождающее трудности в реализации права. Коллизии в праве (юридические коллизии) рассматриваются в их соотношении с другой разновидностью правовой неопределенности - пробелами в праве. Автор статьи приходит к выводу о том, что, хотя оба этих явления имеют негативное влияние на развитие правовой системы государства и юридическую практику, именно юридические коллизии создают наиболее серьезные трудности в ходе правоприменительного процесса. Если причины возникновения пробелов в праве носят смешанный объективно-субъективный характер, зачастую с уклоном в сторону объективных причин (нормы права объективно не всегда оперативно подлежат формальному закреплению вследствие очень высоких темпов развития общественных отношений), то причины возникновения юридических коллизий преимущественно субъективны. Любая юридическая коллизия, так или иначе, представляет собой ошибку правотворца, правоприменителя или интерпретатора. Сделан вывод о том, что для предотвращения «разрастания» коллизионности в российском праве требуется снизить темпы правотворческого процесса, четко определить границы законотворчества и подзаконного правотворчества, но прежде всего - ужесточить профессиональные требования к субъектам правоприменительной, интерпретационной и особенно правотворческой юридической практики. The article analyzes the legal nature of legal collisions, the definitions of the concept of «legal collisions» proposed in the legal literature of recent years are systematized, the advantages and disadvantages of the investigated approaches are highlighted, the author's definition of the concept is formulated. It is proposed to understand a legal collision as a contradiction between the norms of law, the norms of law and the provisions of law enforcement and interpretive legal acts, potentially or practically giving rise to difficulties in the implementation of the law. The legal collisions are considered in their relation to another kind of legal uncertainty - gaps in law. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that, although both of these phenomena have a negative impact on the development of the legal system of the state, legal collisions create the most serious difficulties in the course of the law enforcement process. The reasons for the appearance of gaps are rightfully objective, and the nature of legal collisions is predominantly subjective. Any legal collision is, in one way or another, an error. It is concluded that, in order to prevent the "growth" of collision in Russian law, it is necessary to reduce the pace of the lawmaking process, to clearly define the boundaries of lawmaking and bylaw lawmaking, toughen professional requirements for subjects of legal practice.


Author(s):  
Ю. М. Оборотов

В современной методологии юриспруденции происходит переход от изучения состо­яний ее объекта, которыми выступают право и государство, к постижению этого объек­та в его изменениях и превращениях. Две подсистемы методологии юриспруденции, подсистема обращенная к состоянию права и государства; и подсистема обращенная к изменениям права и государства, — получают свое отображение в концептуальной форме, методологических подходах, методах, специфических понятиях. Показательны перемены в содержании методологии юриспруденции, где определяю­щее значение имеют методологические подходы, определяющие стратегию исследова­тельских поисков во взаимосвязи юриспруденции с правом и государством. Среди наи­более характерных подходов антропологический, аксиологический, цивилизационный, синергетический и герменевтический — определяют плюралистичность современной методологии и свидетельствуют о становлении новой парадигмы методологии юриспру­денции.   In modern methodology of jurisprudence there is a transition from the study the states of its object to its comprehension in changes and transformations. Hence the two subsystems of methodology of jurisprudence: subsystem facing the states of the law and the state as well as their components and aspects; and subsystem facing the changes of the law and the state in general and their constituents. These subsystems of methodology of jurisprudence receive its reflection in conceptual form, methodological approaches, methods, specific concepts. Methodology of jurisprudence should not be restricted to the methodology of legal theory. In this regard, it is an important methodological question about subject of jurisprudence. It is proposed to consider the subject of jurisprudence as complex, covering both the law and the state in their specificity, interaction and integrity. Indicative changes in the content methodology of jurisprudence are the usage of decisive importance methodological approaches that govern research strategy searches in conjunction with the law and the state. Among the most characteristic of modern development approaches: anthropological, axiological, civilization, synergistic and hermeneutic. Modern methodology of jurisprudence is pluralistic in nature alleging various approaches to the law and the state. Marked approaches allow the formation of a new paradigm methodology of jurisprudence.


Author(s):  
Yishai Beer

This book seeks to revitalize the humanitarian mission of the international law governing armed conflict, which is being frustrated due to states’ actual practice. In order to achieve its two aims—creating an environment in which full abidance by the law becomes an attainable norm, thus facilitating the second and more important aim of reducing human suffering—it calls for the acknowledgment of realpolitik considerations that dictate states’ and militaries’ behavior. This requires recognition of the core interests of law-abiding states, fighting in their own self-defense—those that, from their militaries’ professional perspective, are essential in order to exercise their defense. Internalizing the importance of existential security interests, when drawing the contours of the law, should not automatically come at the expense of the core values of the humanitarian agenda—for example, the distinction rule. Rather, it allows more room for the humanitarian arena. The suggested tool to allow for such an improved dialogue is the standards and principles of military professionalism. Militaries function in a professional manner; they respect their respective doctrines, operational principles, fighting techniques, and values. Their performances are not random or incidental. The suggested paradigm surfaces and leverages the constraining elements hidden in military professionalism. It suggests a new paradigm in balancing the principles of military necessity and humanity, it deals with the legality of a preemptive strike and the leveraging of military strategy as a constraining tool, and it offers a normative framework for introducing deterrence within the current contours of the law.


Author(s):  
Donald R. Davis

This chapter examines the history and use of maxims in legal traditions from several areas of the world. A comparison of legal maxims in Roman, Hindu, Jewish, and Islamic law shows that maxims function both as a basic tools for legal interpretation and as distillations of substantive legal principles applicable to many cases. Maxims are characterized by their unquestionable character, even though it is often easy to demonstrate contradictions between them. As a result, legal maxims seem linked to the recurrent desire for law to have a moral foundation. Although maxims have lost their purchase in most contemporary jurisprudence and legal practice, categories such as “canons of construction,” “legal principles,” and “super precedents” all show similarities to the brief and limited collections of maxims in older legal traditions. The search for core ideas underlying the law thus continues under different names.


Author(s):  
James E. Baker

This article discusses covert action within the context of the U.S. law. The first section describes the main elements of the U.S. legal regime, including the definition of covert action and the “traditional activity” exceptions, the elements of a covert action finding, and the thresholds and requirements for congressional notification. The second section describes some of the significant limitations on the conduct of covert action. The third section discusses the nature of executive branch legal practice in this area of the law. And the last section draws conclusions about the role of national security law within the context of covert action.


Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
David Gindis ◽  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Abstract In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.


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