Premature Release of the Prime

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Physical Exposure ◽  
Helping Relationship ◽  
Premature Release

The third new possibility returned attention to the first egoistic hypothesis: remove–empathy. Perhaps people feeling high empathy think that even if they escape physical exposure to the need, they will continue to feel empathic concern. If so, psychological escape is still difficult, and the results previously reported (see Chapter 4) are as consistent with remove–empathy as with the empathy–altruism hypothesis. Contrary to this possibility, some research suggested physical escape did provide psychological escape in the experiments in Chapter 4. Further, Eric Stocks conducted two experiments that manipulated psychological escape directly, and results of each supported the empathy–altruism hypothesis, not remove–empathy. Based on these data, it was necessary to reject the last of the three new possibilities. Left with no plausible egoistic account of the empathy–helping relationship—this time, nobody else had one either—there was no alternative but to conclude that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. Our search was over.

Avoiding Shame and Guilt

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Empathic Concern ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Third ◽  
Helping Relationship ◽  
Shame And Guilt

After rejecting the remove–empathy hypothesis (Chapter 4), attention turned to the other two classic egoistic explanations for the motivation to help produced by empathic concern: empathy-specific punishment and empathy-specific reward. This chapter considers two kinds of empathy-specific punishment, shame and guilt. The shame hypothesis claims that we help more when we feel empathic concern because we’re motivated to avoid disapproval and censure from others. The guilt hypothesis says that we’re motivated to avoid self-condemnation for failing to do what we should. Contradicting the shame hypothesis, experiments revealed that even when no one else will know if participants fail to help, empathy still increased helping. Contradicting the guilt hypothesis, participants induced to feel empathy helped more even when provided a good excuse for not helping. Given that neither form of empathy-specific punishment could account for the empathy–helping relationship, our search shifted to the third classic egoistic explanation: pursuing pride.

Self–Other Merging

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Change ◽  
Family Member ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Good Friend ◽  
The Third ◽  
Subsequent Research ◽  
Helping Relationship

The second new possibility was that when you feel empathic concern, you no longer see yourself and the person for whom you feel empathy as distinct individuals. Rather, a perceptual/conceptual change occurs in which the two of you merge together in your mind, and you see his or her needs as yours. So, empathy-induced helping is really helping yourself: egoism. In three experiments, Bob Cialdini and colleagues found that participants said they would provide more costly, intimate help to people to whom they felt more connected (a good friend or family member vs. an acquaintance or near stranger). Cialdini and his colleagues interpreted this as support for merging. But subsequent research, in which actual (rather than imagined) helping was assessed and relationship confounds were avoided, provided a range of evidence that merging cannot account for the empathy–helping relationship. It seemed necessary to dismiss this second possibility and move on to the third.

How to Find It

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Research Strategy ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Instrumental Goal ◽  
The Way

When we help someone in need, we also benefit. If benefiting the person in need is an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate goal of getting some self-benefit, our motivation is egoistic. If benefiting the person in need is the ultimate goal and the resultant self-benefits are unintended consequences, our motivation is altruistic. To search for such altruism, a four-step research strategy is proposed: The first step is to identify a possible source of altruistic motivation. The most likely source is empathic concern. The second, to identify the plausible egoistic ultimate goal or goals from this source. The prime egoistic suspect is removing our empathic concern. The third is to vary the situation so that either the altruistic goal or the egoistic goal, but not both, can be better reached without having to help. Experiments make this possible. The fourth, to see whether this variation reduces helping.

A Scientific Search for Altruism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Fundamental Question ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Half Century ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
Past Half

This book provides an example of how the scientific method can be used to address a fundamental question about human nature. For centuries—indeed for millennia—the egoism–altruism debate has echoed through Western thought. Egoism says that the motivation for everything we do, including all of our seemingly selfless acts of care for others, is to gain one or another self-benefit. Altruism, while not denying the force of self-benefit, says that under certain circumstances we can care for others for their sakes, not our own. Over the past half-century, social psychologists have turned to laboratory experiments to provide a scientific resolution of this human nature debate. The experiments focused on the possibility that empathic concern—other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need—produces altruistic motivation to remove that need. With carefully constructed experimental designs, these psychologists have tested the nature of the motivation produced by empathic concern, determining whether it is egoistic or altruistic. This series of experiments has provided an answer to a fundamental question about what makes us tick. Framed as a detective story, the book traces this scientific search for altruism through the numerous twists and turns that led to the conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is indeed part of our nature. It then examines the implications of this conclusion—negative implications as well as positive—both for our understanding of who we are as humans and for how we might create a more humane society.

The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Strong Support ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Motivational State ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Parental Nurturance ◽  
The Past ◽  
Practical Implications

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care for others for their sakes and not simply for our own? The empathy-altruism hypothesis offers an affirmative answer to this question. It claims that empathic concern (defined as “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of another in need”) produces altruistic motivation (“a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing the other’s welfare”). Research over the past 40 years testing this hypothesis against egoistic alternatives has provided quite strong support. Empathy-induced altruistic motivation does seem to be within the human repertoire. This empathy-induced altruism may have its biological roots in generalized parental nurturance. Practical implications of the empathy-altruism hypothesis include both benefits and liabilities—for the targets of empathy, for others, and for the person feeling empathic concern. Implications of the empathy-altruism research for the content and conduct of compassion science are suggested.

Empathy and Altruism

2009 ◽  
pp. 416-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson ◽  
Nadia Ahmad ◽  
David A. Lishner
Keyword(s):  
Research Evidence ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Prosocial Motivation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Separate Form ◽  
Practical Implications

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care about others for their sakes and not simply for our own? Psychology has long assumed that everything humans do, no matter how nice and noble, is motivated by self-interest. However, research over the past three decades suggests that this assumption is wrong. This research has focused on the empathy—altruism hypothesis, which claims that empathic concern—an other-oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need—produces altruistic motivation—motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare. Results of the over 30 experiments designed to test this hypothesis against various egoistic alternatives have proved remarkably supportive, leading to the tentative conclusion that feeling empathic concern for a person in need does indeed evoke altruistic motivation to see that need relieved. Sources of altruistic motivation other than empathy also have been proposed, but as yet, there is not compelling research evidence to support these proposals. Two additional forms of prosocial motivation have also been proposed: collectivism and principlism. Collectivism—motivation with the ultimate goal of benefiting some group or collective as a whole—has been claimed to result from group identity. Principlism—motivation with the ultimate goal of upholding some moral principle—has long been advocated by religious teachers and moral philosophers. Whether either is a separate form of motivation, independent of and irreducible to egoism, is not yet clear. Research done to test for the existence of empathy-induced altruism may serve as a useful model for future research testing for the existence of collectivism and principlism. Theoretical and practical implications of the empathy-altruism hypothesis are briefly considered.

scholarly journals Does Empathy Promote Helping by Activating Altruistic Motivation or Concern About Social Evaluation? A Direct Replication of Fultz et al. (1986)

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Granville McCauley ◽  
Michael E. McCullough ◽  
William H.B. McAuliffe
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Identity ◽  
Alternative Hypothesis ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Social Evaluation ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Large N ◽  
Rule Out ◽  
Do So

Empathy motivates people to help needy others. Does it do so by activating genuine concern, or by activating more self-interested goals that helping needy others might enable them to fulfill? The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that empathic concern reflects a non-instrumental desire to improve the welfare of a person in need. To rule out the alternative hypothesis that empathy motivates prosocial behavior by first generating fear of appearing selfish, Fultz et al. (1986) manipulated empathy for a needy target using perspective-taking instructions; they also manipulated whether the subject’s opportunity to help was subject to social evaluation. However, Fultz et al.’s (1986) experiments were underpowered. Here, we conducted a large-N pre-registered replication of Experiment 2 in Fultz et al. (1986). We also administered self-report measures of moral identity and endorsement of the principle of care to test whether these traits reflect altruistic desires or desires to avoid disapprobation. We found that volunteering did not differ between the high and low social evaluation conditions, and that volunteering was not significantly higher in the high-empathy condition. These results sit uneasily with Fultz et al. (1986)’s evidence in support of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. We also failed to find evidence that the principle of care or moral identity internalization reflect altruistic motivation. Consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis, however, we did find that self-reported empathic concern predicted helping.

Empathy and Altruism

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson
Keyword(s):  
Empathic Concern ◽  
The Self ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Tentative Conclusion ◽  
The Past ◽  
Self Interest

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care about others for their sakes and not simply for our own? Psychology has long assumed that everything humans do, no matter how nice and noble, is motivated by self-interest. Research over the past four decades suggests this assumption is wrong. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. Results of the over 35 experiments designed to test this hypothesis against various egoistic alternatives have proved remarkably supportive, leading to the tentative conclusion that feeling empathic concern for a person in need does indeed evoke altruistic motivation to see that need relieved. This chapter attempts to clarify what role the self plays in empathy-induced altruism.

Altruistic personality in the context of the empathy–altruism hypothesis

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans‐Werner Bierhoff ◽  
Elke Rohmann
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Emotional Response ◽  
Empathic Concern ◽  
Prosocial Behaviour ◽  
Personal Distress ◽  
Personality Variables ◽  
Altruistic Motivation ◽  
Self Reports ◽  
Escape Condition ◽  
Responsibility Scale

In this study the influence of the altruistic personality in general and social responsibility in particular on prosocial behaviour were investigated in the context of the empathy–altruism hypothesis. In an experiment 56 female participants had an opportunity to help a person in distress. In this setting, ease of escape without helping was manipulated. In addition, on the basis of their self‐reports of situation‐specific emotions, participants were divided into an empathic‐concern and a personal‐distress group. The results of the 2 (ease of escape) × 2 (predominant emotional response) design were in agreement with the empathy–altruism hypothesis. Further results indicated that in the easy‐escape condition an altruistic motivation prevailed, whereas in the difficult‐escape condition an egoistic motivation was more dominant. Besides the full scale, two subscales of social responsibility were formed: Moral Fulfilment of the Justified Expectations of Others and Adherence to Social Prescriptions. The full social responsibility scale was significantly related to helpfulness only in the difficult‐escape condition. Further analyses including the subscales showed that the component Moral Fulfilment of the Justified Expectations of Others correlated positively with helping in the easy‐escape condition. Results were interpreted as showing that specific profiles of personality variables are associated with helpfulness in the easy‐escape and difficult‐escape conditions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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