Empathy and Altruism

Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care about others for their sakes and not simply for our own? Psychology has long assumed that everything humans do, no matter how nice and noble, is motivated by self-interest. Research over the past four decades suggests this assumption is wrong. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. Results of the over 35 experiments designed to test this hypothesis against various egoistic alternatives have proved remarkably supportive, leading to the tentative conclusion that feeling empathic concern for a person in need does indeed evoke altruistic motivation to see that need relieved. This chapter attempts to clarify what role the self plays in empathy-induced altruism.

Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson ◽  
Nadia Ahmad ◽  
David A. Lishner

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care about others for their sakes and not simply for our own? Psychology has long assumed that everything humans do, no matter how nice and noble, is motivated by self-interest. However, research over the past three decades suggests that this assumption is wrong. This research has focused on the empathy—altruism hypothesis, which claims that empathic concern—an other-oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need—produces altruistic motivation—motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare. Results of the over 30 experiments designed to test this hypothesis against various egoistic alternatives have proved remarkably supportive, leading to the tentative conclusion that feeling empathic concern for a person in need does indeed evoke altruistic motivation to see that need relieved. Sources of altruistic motivation other than empathy also have been proposed, but as yet, there is not compelling research evidence to support these proposals. Two additional forms of prosocial motivation have also been proposed: collectivism and principlism. Collectivism—motivation with the ultimate goal of benefiting some group or collective as a whole—has been claimed to result from group identity. Principlism—motivation with the ultimate goal of upholding some moral principle—has long been advocated by religious teachers and moral philosophers. Whether either is a separate form of motivation, independent of and irreducible to egoism, is not yet clear. Research done to test for the existence of empathy-induced altruism may serve as a useful model for future research testing for the existence of collectivism and principlism. Theoretical and practical implications of the empathy-altruism hypothesis are briefly considered.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

This book provides an example of how the scientific method can be used to address a fundamental question about human nature. For centuries—indeed for millennia—the egoism–altruism debate has echoed through Western thought. Egoism says that the motivation for everything we do, including all of our seemingly selfless acts of care for others, is to gain one or another self-benefit. Altruism, while not denying the force of self-benefit, says that under certain circumstances we can care for others for their sakes, not our own. Over the past half-century, social psychologists have turned to laboratory experiments to provide a scientific resolution of this human nature debate. The experiments focused on the possibility that empathic concern—other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need—produces altruistic motivation to remove that need. With carefully constructed experimental designs, these psychologists have tested the nature of the motivation produced by empathic concern, determining whether it is egoistic or altruistic. This series of experiments has provided an answer to a fundamental question about what makes us tick. Framed as a detective story, the book traces this scientific search for altruism through the numerous twists and turns that led to the conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is indeed part of our nature. It then examines the implications of this conclusion—negative implications as well as positive—both for our understanding of who we are as humans and for how we might create a more humane society.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
jamil zaki

Are humans ever truly altruistic? Or are all actions, however noble, ultimately motivated by self-interest? Scientists and philosophers have long grappled with this question, but few have considered laypeople’s beliefs about the nature of prosocial motives. Here we examine these beliefs and their social correlates. In line with prior work, we find that people tend to believe humans can be, and frequently are, altruistically motivated. Moreover, people who more strongly believe in altruistic motivation act more prosocially themselves—for instance, sacrificing relatively high levels of money and time to help others—a relationship that holds even when controlling for trait empathy. People who believe in altruism also judge other prosocial agents to be more genuinely kind, especially when agents’ motives are ambiguous. Together, this work suggests that believing in altruism predicts the extent to which people both see altruism and act altruistically, possibly reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of such lay theories.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care for others for their sakes and not simply for our own? The empathy-altruism hypothesis offers an affirmative answer to this question. It claims that empathic concern (defined as “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of another in need”) produces altruistic motivation (“a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing the other’s welfare”). Research over the past 40 years testing this hypothesis against egoistic alternatives has provided quite strong support. Empathy-induced altruistic motivation does seem to be within the human repertoire. This empathy-induced altruism may have its biological roots in generalized parental nurturance. Practical implications of the empathy-altruism hypothesis include both benefits and liabilities—for the targets of empathy, for others, and for the person feeling empathic concern. Implications of the empathy-altruism research for the content and conduct of compassion science are suggested.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 498-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUSAN DORR GOOLD

“Collective action” usually brings to mind images of picket signs held by laborers striking for better wages and benefits. Collective action, however, need not be limited to the withholding of labor. Nor need it involve only the working or middle classes, as airline pilots have recently demonstrated. Finally, collective action need not have as its only purpose the self-interest of the group. Collective action does, however, always involve a joining together of individuals united by common goals or interests in order to consolidate power for the purpose of negotiating with another group or entity. Examples of collective action obviously include striking, other withholding labor actions, and slowdowns, but can also include many other activities. “Paper strikes,” for example, have been threatened or used by house officer organizations in the past. In a paper strike, patient care continues but without documentation, and thus, the institution suffers from absent or delayed financial remuneration.


2021 ◽  
pp. 030631272110587
Author(s):  
Jérôme Baudry ◽  
Élise Tancoigne ◽  
Bruno J Strasser

Over the past two decades, a number of digital platforms have been developed with the aim of engaging citizens in scientific research projects. The success of these platforms depends in no small part on their ability to attract and retain participants, turning diffuse crowds of users into active and productive communities. This article investigates how the collectives of online citizen science are formed and governed, and identifies two ideal-types of government, either based on self-interest or on universal norms of science. Based on an ethnography of three citizen science platforms and a series of interviews with their managers, we show how different technologies – rhetorical, of the self, social, and ontological – can be diversely combined to configure these collectives. We suggest that the shift from individual projects to platforms is a defining moment for online citizen science, during which the technologies that sustain the collectives are standardized and automatized in ways that make the crowd appear to be a natural community.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-507
Author(s):  
Mel Andrew Schwing

Abstract In 2010, Jan Paulsson decried the use of party-appointed arbitrators in international arbitration as a ‘moral hazard' that threatened the legitimacy of arbitration as an impartial method of dispute resolution. He suggested a series of reforms, most notably allowing arbitral institutions to make all arbitrator appointments. Over the past decade, commentators have debated Paulsson's arguments and whether arbitrators should be chosen by parties or arbitral institutions, relying on an assumption that those two methods are the only ways by which arbitrators can be selected. This essay demonstrates that both approaches are fundamentally flawed, because they are subject to the self-interest and biases of human beings. Moreover, it explains how modern technology has produced a new way by which arbitrators can be selected--specifically, via artificial intelligence (AI)--that allows for parties to have input into the selection process but removes the issues that arise when parties select arbitrators directly. As this essay illustrates, using an AI to select arbitrators will allow arbitrators to truly be independent, ensure that arbitrators are selected for their merit and not for their connections, eliminate incentives for compromise awards and the use of dissents to communicate leanings to future appointing parties, and increase diversity in arbitrator appointments.


Author(s):  
C. Daniel Batson

The third new possibility returned attention to the first egoistic hypothesis: remove–empathy. Perhaps people feeling high empathy think that even if they escape physical exposure to the need, they will continue to feel empathic concern. If so, psychological escape is still difficult, and the results previously reported (see Chapter 4) are as consistent with remove–empathy as with the empathy–altruism hypothesis. Contrary to this possibility, some research suggested physical escape did provide psychological escape in the experiments in Chapter 4. Further, Eric Stocks conducted two experiments that manipulated psychological escape directly, and results of each supported the empathy–altruism hypothesis, not remove–empathy. Based on these data, it was necessary to reject the last of the three new possibilities. Left with no plausible egoistic account of the empathy–helping relationship—this time, nobody else had one either—there was no alternative but to conclude that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. Our search was over.


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