Nonnatural Mental Representation

Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

This chapter distinguishes between two types of representation, natural and nonnatural. It argues that nonnatural representation is necessary to explain intentionality. It also argues that traditional accounts of the semantic content of mental representations are insufficient to explain nonnatural representation and, therefore, intentionality. To remedy this, the chapter sketches an account of nonnatural representation in terms of natural representation plus offline simulation of nonactual environments plus tracking the ways in which a simulation departs from the actual environment. To represent nonnaturally, a system must be able to decouple internal simulations from sensory information by activating representational resources offline. The system must be able to represent things that are not in the actual environment and to track that it’s doing so; i.e., there must be an internal signal or state that can indicate whether what is represented departs from the actual environment. In addition, the system must be able to manipulate a representation independently of what happens in the actual environment and keep track that it’s doing so. In short, nonnatural representations are offline simulations whose departure from the actual environment the system has the function to keep track of. This is a step toward a naturalistic, mechanistic, neurocomputational account of intentionality.

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Savadori ◽  
Eraldo Nicotra ◽  
Rino Rumiati ◽  
Roberto Tamborini

The content and structure of mental representation of economic crises were studied and the flexibility of the structure in different social contexts was tested. Italian and Swiss samples (Total N = 98) were compared with respect to their judgments as to how a series of concrete examples of events representing abstract indicators were relevant symptoms of economic crisis. Mental representations were derived using a cluster procedure. Results showed that the relevance of the indicators varied as a function of national context. The growth of unemployment was judged to be by far the most important symptom of an economic crisis but the Swiss sample judged bankruptcies as more symptomatic than Italians who considered inflation, raw material prices and external accounts to be more relevant. A different clustering structure was found for the two samples: the locations of unemployment and gross domestic production indicators were the main differences in representations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Cleverson Leite Bastos ◽  
Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle

This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regan N. Schmidt

ABSTRACT: This study examines how external auditors' accessibility to “tone at the top” knowledge impacts subsequent audit judgments. To examine this relationship, a decision aid is investigated that differentially facilitates the auditors' retrieval of “tone at the top” evidence from memory. Results of an experiment indicate that, holding the client's “tone at the top” constant, the structure of a control environment decision aid influences the auditors' mental representation of the “tone at the top.” Further, favorable “tone at the top” mental representations transfer to induce relatively favorable control environment and fraud risk assessments, and greater reliance on management's explanation for variances detected in analytical procedures. Mediation analyses identify the control environment assessment as a mediator between the influenced mental representation and the subsequent fraud risk and analytical procedure judgments. The results of the paper underscore the importance of how auditors develop their “tone at the top” mental representations, the influence of these mental representations on subsequent audit judgments, and the stage in the audit process where interventions can improve audit quality. Data Availability: Contact the author.


Author(s):  
Hiroki Fukushima

In this chapter, methodologies for producing a mental representation of a cup of sake are introduced. Mental representations of taste are often vague and fuzzy in comparison to audio or visual images. On the other hand, some individuals, such as sommeliers or tasters of sake, are able to readily formulate a representation of the taste they experience. How can the average person produce words or other types of mental representations in such a situation? In this chapter, the author presents three methodologies for eliciting mental representations of taste: a new supporting tool for verbalizing an image of taste, an experimental method for testing a verbal and visual image for taste, and an experimental methodology for producing a free drawing representation of a cup of sake.


Linguistics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-81
Author(s):  
Véronique Verhagen ◽  
Maria Mos ◽  
Joost Schilperoord ◽  
Ad Backus

AbstractIn a usage-based framework, variation is part and parcel of our linguistic experiences, and therefore also of our mental representations of language. In this article, we bring attention to variation as a source of information. Instead of discarding variation as mere noise, we examine what it can reveal about the representation and use of linguistic knowledge. By means of metalinguistic judgment data, we demonstrate how to quantify and interpret four types of variation: variation across items, participants, time, and methods. The data concern familiarity ratings assigned by 91 native speakers of Dutch to 79 Dutch prepositional phrases such as in de tuin ‘in the garden’ and rond de ingang ‘around the entrance’. Participants performed the judgment task twice within a period of one to two weeks, using either a 7-point Likert scale or a Magnitude Estimation scale. We explicate the principles according to which the different types of variation can be considered information about mental representation, and we show how they can be used to test hypotheses regarding linguistic representations.


Author(s):  
Tuan Q. Tran ◽  
Peter D. Elgin ◽  
Keith S. Jones ◽  
Kimberly R. Raddatz ◽  
Elizabeth T. Cady

The increasingly popular avenue of web-based distance education places high demand on distance educators to format web pages that facilitate learning. Guidelines regarding appropriate writing styles for web-based distance education, however, do not currently exist. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of four different writing styles on the reader's mental representation of web text. Participants will study hypertext written in one of four web-writing styles (e.g., concise, scannable, objective, and combined) and then be given a cued association task intended to measure participants' mental representations of the studied information. It is hypothesized that the scannable and combined styles will bias readers to scan rather than elaborately read which may result in less dense mental representations relative to the objective and concise writing styles. Further, the use of more descriptors in the objective writing style will lead to better integration of ideas and more dense mental representations than the concise writing style.


2011 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 2168-2180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna L. Brooks ◽  
Robert H. Logie ◽  
Robert McIntosh ◽  
Sergio Della Sala

Two experiments explored lateralized biases in mental representations of matrix patterns formed from aural verbal descriptions. Healthy participants listened, either monaurally or binaurally, to verbal descriptions of 6 by 3 matrix patterns and were asked to form a mental representation of each pattern. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to judge which half of the matrix, left or right, contained more filled cells and to rate the certainty of their judgement. Participants tended to judge that the left side was fuller than the right and showed significantly greater certainty when judging patterns that were fuller on the left. This tendency was particularly strong for left-ear presentation. In Experiment 2, participants conducted the same task as that in Experiment 1 but were also asked to recall the pattern for the side judged as fuller. Participants were again more certain in judging patterns that were fuller on the left—particularly for left-ear presentation—but were no more accurate in remembering the details from the left. These results suggest that the left side of the mental representation was represented more saliently but it was not remembered more accurately. We refer to this lateralized bias as “representational pseudoneglect”. Results are discussed in terms of theories of visuospatial working memory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 40-52
Author(s):  
Zhanna Koloiz

This article deals with the universal POWER concept and its linguistic and mental representation in the Ukrainian aphoristic set. The paper focuses on revealing the features of semantic content collision within the investigated concept and the conceptual system. This investigation demonstrates the new knowledge about the conceptualization and interpretation of the relevant concept. The semantic content of the studied concept is verbalized in the aphoristic set. It is presented through the prism of nuclear, circumnuclear and peripheral elements. The author also describes a number of techniques used to achieve certain stylistic effects.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 913-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAY C. KWON ◽  
BYUNG H. LEE ◽  
JUNG MIN JI ◽  
YONG JEONG ◽  
BONG JIK KIM ◽  
...  

We investigated whether the perception or production of a given line length in normal subjects varies according to where in peripersonal space the line is perceived or produced. We also investigated the influence of the direction of movement used to make the line. In Experiment 1, blindfolded normal subjects were asked to estimate distances while the examiner moved the subject's hand in proximal (medial) or distal (lateral) space, moving centripetally or centrifugally. The subjects showed a spatial effect, perceiving the same length as shorter in proximal space than distal space. This result could be related to either a proximal spatial attentional bias or an anisometric representation of spatial distances. In Experiment 2, we attempted to dissociate these hypotheses by studying blindfolded normal subjects, who were requested to produce horizontal lines of a given length (100 or 200 mm) in proximal versus distal peripersonal space using centripetal or centrifugal movements. Centrifugal movements in proximal space were the longest; centrifugal movements in distal space were the shortest; in between were the proximal centripetal and distal centripetal movements which did not differ from each other. These results suggest that in peripersonal space the perception of length in normal subjects is most consistent with anisometric mental representation where the size of mental representations of length units decreases as a function of the distance from the subject's midsagittal plane. Length production, however, may depend on an interaction of the anisometric mental representation and the premotor/intentional factors. (JINS, 2004, 10, 913–919.)


Dialogue ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-444
Author(s):  
Pierre Steiner

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the notion of background capacities as developed by John Searle during the last twenty years in philosophy of mind. Broadly construed, this notion designates non-representational mental capacities as the means by which mental representations are given a precise semantic content and thus are able to be expressed. Though novel and relevant, I intend to show that, according to Searle's description, this notion proves inadequate to attain its descriptive and explicative goals. I go on to regard background capacities in a perspective both externalist and (minimally) representationalist.


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