Nonnatural Mental Representation
This chapter distinguishes between two types of representation, natural and nonnatural. It argues that nonnatural representation is necessary to explain intentionality. It also argues that traditional accounts of the semantic content of mental representations are insufficient to explain nonnatural representation and, therefore, intentionality. To remedy this, the chapter sketches an account of nonnatural representation in terms of natural representation plus offline simulation of nonactual environments plus tracking the ways in which a simulation departs from the actual environment. To represent nonnaturally, a system must be able to decouple internal simulations from sensory information by activating representational resources offline. The system must be able to represent things that are not in the actual environment and to track that it’s doing so; i.e., there must be an internal signal or state that can indicate whether what is represented departs from the actual environment. In addition, the system must be able to manipulate a representation independently of what happens in the actual environment and keep track that it’s doing so. In short, nonnatural representations are offline simulations whose departure from the actual environment the system has the function to keep track of. This is a step toward a naturalistic, mechanistic, neurocomputational account of intentionality.