Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 847-876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob D. Kathman
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dynamic Measures ◽  
Regional Interests

Third-party states consider the regional destabilization consequences of civil wars when deciding to intervene. However, previous work implicitly assumes that potential interveners base their intervention decisions solely on their links to the civil war country. This approach is unlikely to reflect the regional concerns of interested parties. When a civil war is increasingly likely to infect its surrounding region, potential interveners with strong interests in those states neighboring the conflict will be more likely to intervene to contain the violence. Thus, relationships outside the civil war state—intervener dyad are causally associated with intervention. To test these arguments, the author accounts for the contagious properties of civil wars and the regional interests of third parties, constructing dynamic measures to represent the contagion threat posed to third party regional interests. Analyses of these measures support the argument that third parties are increasingly likely to intervene as the risk of diffusion increasingly threatens their regional interests.

Managing Civil Wars from the Perspective of Their Development

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Tir ◽  
Johannes Karreth
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intergovernmental Organizations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Management Approaches

After surveying the literature on the causes, consequences, and management of civil wars, we argue that novel ways of examining civil war management are needed. We advocate for a developmental view of civil wars in order to better understand how to prevent the escalation of low-level armed conflict to full-scale civil war. To prevent full-scale civil war, third parties need to (a) respond swiftly, (b) have the will and ability to impose tangible costs on (and offer benefits to) governments and rebels, and (c) remain involved over the long term. Our analysis shows that typical third-party civil war management approaches (mediation, peacekeeping, and intervention) fail to adequately address at least one of these issues. This motivates our argument in favor of focusing on a different type of third party that could arguably play a particularly constructive role in civil war prevention: highly structured intergovernmental organizations.

Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 692-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Qualitative Case Study ◽  
Average Duration ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Intrastate Conflict ◽  
Global Prevalence ◽  
Protracted Conflict ◽  
Internal Conflicts

Abstract This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.

scholarly journals Interstate rivals’ intervention in third-party civil wars: The comparative case of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen (2004-2018)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Júlia Palik
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Third Party ◽  
External Support ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Rebel Governance ◽  
Conflict Duration ◽  
The Government

How does interstate rivals’ intervention in a third-party civil war impact conflict duration and outcome in that country? More specifically, (1) how do interstate rivals engage in third party civil conflicts and (2) how do conflict parties attract, utilize, and sustain the external support they receive from their supporters? I answer these questions by comparing Saudi Arabia and Iran’s intervention in two distinct conflicts in Yemen. This dissertation applies a qualitative case study method and selects two within-case methods: structured-focused comparison and process tracing. In the structured-focused comparison, I compare the support Saudi Arabia and Iran has provided to the Government of Yemen (GoY) and the Houthis respectively, differentiating between military and non-military types of support. I compare these during the Saada wars (2004-2010) and in the current internationalized civil war (2014-2018). To ensure the validity of my causal inferences I triangulate data from three sources: the development of a novel mediation and ceasefire dataset1 (1), semi-structured in-depth elite-interviews2 (2), and document reviews (3). This dissertation develops a mechanism-focused analytical framework that integrates both rivalry and civil war dynamics to explain civil war duration and outcome. I build on five distinct literatures (strategic rivalry, civil war studies, third-party intervention in civil wars, mediation, and rebel governance) and complement them with the literature on Middle East Area Studies. In the analytical framework first, I look at the inter-state dimension and propose that rivals’ initial decision to intervene and their subsequent decisions to remain engaged in third-party civil wars are two distinct processes. Rivals seek to inflict costs on their counterparts, but at the same time they seek to avoid direct confrontation. Their cognitive rigidities lock them in their own conflicts and give rise to the mechanism of conflict integration in third-party conflicts. Besides interveners, I also take into account domestic dynamics and examine civil war conflict parties’ capacity to impact rivals by keeping them engaged in their conflict through the mechanism of rivalry instrumentalization. The external and internal perspectives are reinforcing each other and create networked interdependencies. With this two-dimensional logic, I move beyond the conventional framework of proxy wars.

What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332091309
Author(s):  
Casper Sakstrup
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Spatial Analyses ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Foreign Policy Change ◽  
Leader Change

Uncertainty about capabilities or resolve is a prominent explanation for war between states. However, we know comparatively little about uncertainty as a cause of armed conflict between domestic actors. This article proposes that irregular leader change in a neighboring country generates uncertainty about third-party resolve and thus increases the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. I argue that domestic actors take potential third parties’ capabilities and resolve into account when bargaining, that neighboring countries are important potential third parties, and that irregular leader change among these potential third parties results in uncertainty because there is an increased risk of foreign policy change combined with limited access to information. With uncertain estimates of third-party resolve, the risk of bargaining failure and armed conflict increases. Global spatial analyses spanning 1946–2014 corroborate the argument. As expected, I find that irregular leader change in one or more neighboring countries increases the probability of intrastate armed conflict onset. The results are robust across three different distance thresholds for neighboring countries, using time and country fixed effects and several alternative model specifications. Overall, this article advances our knowledge about uncertainty as a cause of civil war and sheds new light on the adverse consequences of irregular leader change.

scholarly journals High Stakes and Low Bars: How International Recognition Shapes the Conduct of Civil Wars

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marika Landau-Wells
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Third Party ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
High Concentrations ◽  
Military Victory

When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.

Third-party Intervention in Civil Wars and the Prospects for Postwar Development

2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 615-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Ki Kim
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Social Development ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Infant Mortality Rate ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Postwar Reconstruction ◽  
Military Victory ◽  
Do So

How does third-party intervention in civil war influence citizens’ physical quality of life (QOL) after civil war? I find that the effects of intervention on postwar QOL depend on its type, unilateral intervention, and United Nations (UN) intervention. Unilateral interveners seeking self-interest tend to impede the improvement in postwar QOL particularly in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality rate. They are likely to do so through producing their protégé’s military victory or negotiated settlement, expanding their influence on postwar government, and resultingly forming a government less responsive to citizens’ hardship and reducing resources available for welfare. UN intervention on humanitarian grounds tends to promote postwar social development particularly in the fields of public health, although it has no significant effect on literacy rate. It is likely to do so by increasing resources available for postwar reconstruction, even though it goes where postwar social development is relatively difficult.

Liberal Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: A Critical Exploration

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (8) ◽  
pp. 1158-1172
Author(s):  
Idrissa Tamba Bindi ◽  
Ozgur Tufekci
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Third Party Intervention ◽  
Critical Exploration ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Liberal Peacebuilding

There is increasing awareness and international support for rebuilding states that have gone through conflict. Third-party interventions in bringing peace to countries that have emerged from civil wars have been channeled through a fundamental concept known as liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding, even though it faces much criticism, has been a prominent strategy for third-party intervention in post-war countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper deals with the liberal peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone, after its decade-long brutal civil war. The focus lies on Dr Roland Paris’ institutionalization before liberalization (IBL) peacebuilding strategy, its strengths and shortcomings, and its contributions to sustaining peace in Sierra Leone since the end of the war in 2002. Arguing that the IBL strategy has helped to maintain peace in Sierra Leone after ten years of civil war, the paper analyzes how peacebuilding has been implemented in post-war Sierra Leone under the six different pillars of the IBL strategy.

Third-party regime type and civil war duration

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332097581
Author(s):  
Sara Norrevik ◽  
Mehwish Sarwari
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Selection Effects ◽  
Intrastate Conflicts ◽  
Party Support ◽  
Conflict Outcomes ◽  
The Relationship

Does the regime type of a foreign intervener influence the duration of civil wars? Existing research has shown that third-party support affects the outcome of a conflict. Moreover, studies show that the type of support offered to conflict actors can determine how a war ends. While this research has offered significant implications on conflict dynamics, extant works have overlooked the importance of characteristics of foreign supporters and how their attributes can impact conflict outcomes. Focusing on foreign troop support and quantities, this article examines the relationship between the regime type of a foreign supporter and the outcome of an armed conflict. We argue that regime type of an external troop sponsor can influence war duration based on two dynamics: selection effects and signaling effects. Specifically, troop assistance provided to warring parties by democracies decreases the length of civil wars and increases the likelihood for a one-sided victory for the supported faction. The empirical findings for all intrastate conflicts during the period 1975–2012 provide evidence for our claims that the regime type of an external intervener influences the outcome of a conflict.

scholarly journals The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement

1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara F. Walter
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Internal Wars ◽  
Similar Solutions ◽  
Bargaining Table

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions. Instead, most internal wars ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact, groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.

scholarly journals International Migration and Military Intervention in Civil War

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Bove ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
International Migration ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Domestic Level

Which factors make it more likely that states militarily intervene in ongoing intrastate wars? We develop the argument that migrants, i.e., (1) people coming from the civil-war state living in a potential intervener state (immigrants) and (2) those living in the country at war who stem from the third party (emigrants), influence the decision of external states to intervene in civil wars. Our theoretical framework is thus based on a joint focus on domestic-level determinants in a civil-war country and in foreign states. Primarily based on an accountability rationale, we also claim that the third-party’s regime type has an intervening influence. Using quantitative methods, our empirical results generally support the theory, although there is only weak evidence for the intervening influence of a third party’s level of democracy.

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