Distributive Autonomy, The Constitution, and Campaign Finance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Attanasio
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Electoral Behavior ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
False Information ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Wealthy Donors

In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Supreme Court permitted government to regulate the volume of sound trucks. One opinion stated that free speech does not include freedom “to drown out the natural speech of others.” Campaign speech of by interests drowns out all other campaign speech. This problem heavily distorts both the speaker’s right to speak and the listener’s right to know. The distortions disadvantage poorly financed candidates and mislead voters. What people think are the most important issues will be distorted; so will intensity of feelings on those issues. Such distortions will systematically skew electoral behavior based on false information. These distortions impair distributive autonomy of both listeners and speakers. In 2016, both presidential candidates overwhelmingly catered to wealthy donors. In this milieu, wealthy donors comprise the political “in” group; that is, the group who dominates government. Everyone else (the vast majority of voters) is a political “out.”

Whither Campaign Finance Jurisprudence?

2021 ◽  
pp. 133-138
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
The Political ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Political Policy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
And Behavior

Chapter 7 offers a discussion of the main results and a consideration of the political, policy, and jurisprudential implications of the study. It deliberates what happens in instances like this—when the Supreme Court fosters the construction of an entire edifice of laws and regulations that limit a fundamental right (free speech) based on an erroneous set of assumptions about political opinion and behavior. The role of social science in court decisions—particularly in the context of informing behavioral assumptions—is emphasized, along with a particular call for social scientists to investigate further the Buckley Court’s model.

The Appearance of Corruption

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
The Political ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Money In Politics

Chapter 1 describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning on campaign finance regulation, free speech, and political campaigns and then offers a chapter-by-chapter plan for testing the key assumptions underlying the Court’s reasoning. The behavioral model of the Buckley v. Valeo (1976) links individuals’ perceptions of corruption to their decisions to participate politically, hypothesizing that the greater an individual’s perception of corruption the less likely that person is to participate in the political process (e.g., vote) because of an erosion of trust in government. Based on these assumptions, the Court accepts the mitigation of corruption as the (lone) compelling state interest for limits on money in politics. Chapter 1 outlines how the authors will empirically explore the behavioral model posited by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision.

scholarly journals Freedom of speech issues in Peach v Toohey and a hypothetical variant of that case

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Patrick Keyzer
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
High Court Of Australia

The purpose of this article is to consider the tensions within Australian free speech jurisprudence based on a hypothetical variant of the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Northen Territory in Peach v Toohey. In particular, this article briefly explores the competing legal interests  that operate when journalists seek access to restricted areas, in this case aborginal land, in the course of an investigation. After considering the case and the issues it raises the author develops a hypothetical that draws out some of the deeper tensions in this area of the law. The article concludes with proposals for new apporoaches to the test developed by the High Court of Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation for the balancing of freedom to discuss political and governmental affairs—including the public right to know — against other legitimate objectives such as the maintence of property rights and the privacy interests that can be associated with propety rights. 

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Public Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Independent Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Harsh Criticism

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.

The Appearance of Corruption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Political Speech ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Political Opinions ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
The U.S

The sanctity of political speech is a key element of the U.S. Constitution and a cornerstone of the American republic. When the Supreme Court linked political speech to campaign finance in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision, the modern era of campaign finance regulation was born. In practical terms, this decision meant that in order to pass constitutional muster, any laws limiting money in politics must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. The lone state interest the Court was willing to entertain was the mitigation of corruption. In order to reach this argument the Court advanced a sophisticated behavioral model, one with key assumptions about how laws will affect voters’ opinions and behavior. These assumptions have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. This book takes up the task of identifying and analyzing empirically the Court’s presumed links between campaign finance regulations and political opinions and behavior. In so doing, we rely on original survey data and experiments from 2009–2016 to openly confront the question of what happens when the Supreme Court is wrong, and when the foundation of over forty years of jurisprudence is simply not true.

Judicial Power in a Political World

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Crowe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Rhetoric ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

This concluding chapter synthesizes the book's main findings about the architectonic politics of judicial institution building and contextualizes them within contemporary debates. It also reflects upon the lessons of the more than 200-year historical lineage of the institutional judiciary for our understanding of judicial power in America. More specifically, it considers the place of the federal judiciary in America's past and future in empirical and normative terms, respectively. It argues that both political rhetoric and academic exegesis about the Supreme Court embody a fundamentally incorrect presumption about the judiciary being external to politics, and that such presumption leads to a series of misconceptions about the relationship between judicial power and democratic politics. The chapter offers a conception that not only locates the judicial branch squarely within the political arena but also places substantially greater emphasis on its cooperation rather than conflict with other actors and institutions in that arena.

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